This study examines the relationship between domestic constraints and the implementation of international agreements by concentrating on the process of ratification. Specifically, I empirically...Show moreThis study examines the relationship between domestic constraints and the implementation of international agreements by concentrating on the process of ratification. Specifically, I empirically focus on the case of German defection and the NATO mission to Libya. Since the main theories of international cooperation lacked the focus on domestic factors, this study tests the role of five domestic factors. However, with respect to their relative influence, I argue that domestic constraints are influenced themselves by (historical) narratives and prominent political elites.Show less
Levitsky & Way (2010) have performed interesting research on competitive authoritarian regimes(CAR). They investigated the influence of democracies on these type of regimes. They also noted...Show moreLevitsky & Way (2010) have performed interesting research on competitive authoritarian regimes(CAR). They investigated the influence of democracies on these type of regimes. They also noted that there are authoritarian regimes who influenced the same CAR's. They labelled these authoritarian regimes Black Knights. This thesis investigates the influence of such a Black Knight on a CAR, in this case the influence of Russia on Kyrgyzstan. This thesis furthermore provides a possible framework for performing research on the influence of Black Knights on CAR's, by building on the existing theory of Levitsky & Way (2010).Show less
In this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic)...Show moreIn this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic) narrative. He focuses on two arguments: (1) domestic politics cause friction for both actors, (2) international pressure (from state and non-state actors) causes friction for both actors. This international pressure also includes image. Using a variety of observation techniques and limited quantitative analysis, the author finds that (1) domestic political rivalry facilitates escalation for the strong and the weak actor and has no bearing on de-escalation; escalation erodes and diminishes domestic political rivalry. (2) International pressure and image facilitates de-escalation on both sides in order to maintain a positive image. (3) The weak actor must start de-escalating in response to the strong actor’s de-escalation; else it may very well damage its own capacity to achieve its political objectives. He then discusses the policy implications that this conclusion has, most notably (1) the way that policy-makers may change their behavior in order to improve their own image, or the image of the actor they represent. (2) They may or may not be more cautious when dealing with domestic rivalry, as they may seek to avoid escalating, and would rather tackle the actual cause of domestic rivalry. Opportunities for future research in the thesis. Most notable opportunities for future research include (1) the relationship between strong actor de-escalation and weak actor de-escalation and the way the former enables the latter. (2) The effect of the situation on the ground, rather than on the purely political level, on each actor’s decision to de-escalate.Show less
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is like soccer: there are supporters and opponents. Supporters credit BMD with providing full security against rogue states. Opponents fear a renewed arms race with...Show moreBallistic Missile Defense (BMD) is like soccer: there are supporters and opponents. Supporters credit BMD with providing full security against rogue states. Opponents fear a renewed arms race with Russia or China. There is another analogy: playing in the major league is awarding. Land-based and seabased missile defense each are attractive options, offering pros and cons to foreign policy makers, while military planners have to make tough decisions on how to allocate scarce defense resources in the face of austerity. A small or medium-sized state like the Netherlands has only a few policy options: emulate the policy of the hegemon, strive for national or European innovative solutions or (continue to) do nothing at all. Neoclassical realism holds that the state is not a black box in the anarchy of international relations, but that the foreign policy elite makes resource allocation decisions on the basis of its own perception of the external vulnerability of the state. State institutions, domestic influence groups and party politics in turn influence both threat perception and resource allocation. Resource allocation should ideally support the best foreign policy option to counter the perceived threat. Of course, external state actors, industrial and transnational organizations influence the foreign policy elite as well. Against this backdrop, the author uses the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism to research and describe the influence that domestic influence groups can exert on policy decisions regarding the Netherlands’ BMD capabilities. After a brief introduction into neoclassical realism, the external vulnerability is described in terms of the existing ballistic missile threat posed by Iran. The threat perception is approached form the eye of the beholder: regional actors, NATO as our primary security alliance and of course domestic actors. Then the primary BMD resources available to the Netherlands are described: operational capabilities, technological innovation and defense industrial base. External factors and domestic interest groups that affect resource allocation decisions, such as the international defense industry and national civic societal actors, are analyzed. The dominant foreign policy mantra that the Netherlands’ international reputation is at stake after incessant defense budget cuts and relinquishing our NATO commitments is also taken into account as a factor of influence. Finally, four adaptive strategies are researched as BMD policy options: blindly emulate US policy (with high investment costs), join European innovation policies (with high political and investment costs), do nothing (which eventually leads to a free rider status) or a mixed innovative emulation strategy (which attains foreign policy objectives appropriate for a small or medium power while at the same time promoting Dutch industrial interests). Research indicates that very few domestic actors actually oppose the Dutch role in BMD. The author concludes that the Netherlands cannot afford to lose its leading position in European BMD capabilities. Our reputation is firmly based on our Patriot capability, and for a long time we have punched above our weight. Our credibility is at risk – and maritime BMD is one of the very few niche capabilities that we hold as bargaining chip to promote our interests in international relations. The stakes are high – but so are the potential rewards.Show less
