The capacity to evaluate others’ behavior and to attribute positive or negative values to actions is called moral evaluation (Hamlin, 2013; Bloom, 2010). The origins of this capacity, innate,...Show moreThe capacity to evaluate others’ behavior and to attribute positive or negative values to actions is called moral evaluation (Hamlin, 2013; Bloom, 2010). The origins of this capacity, innate, through socialization or both, is investigated in the current study. Infants’ general capacity to make moral evaluations about responsive and unresponsive behavior in third-party interactions is examined. Also, individual differences in moral evaluation based on infants’ attachment classification is investigated. We presented 147 12-month-old infants with eight animated third-party interactions with two outcomes. In half of the interactions, a big agent acts responsive to a small agent, while in the other half of the interactions the big agents acts unresponsive to the small agent. The two responses of the big agents are marked by different colors. Infants are then presented with two objects in the same shape and color as the two big agents and encouraged to choose the object of their preference. Infants’ preference is taken as an indicator of their moral evaluation. It was found that infants in general chose the ‘responsive’ object as often as the ‘unresponsive’ object. Securely attached infant chose the ‘responsive’ object as often as insecurely attached infants. Interaction effects indicate that gender and condition variables might be related to infants’ preference. The current study found no evidence for infants’ capacity to make moral evaluations about responsive and unresponsive behavior. The results are discussed in light of earlier and future research.Show less
