After a brutal war, ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) lost its significant territorial areas. How to deal with the organization’s members returning back to their home countries, has been...Show moreAfter a brutal war, ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) lost its significant territorial areas. How to deal with the organization’s members returning back to their home countries, has been subject to heated debate. By focusing specifically on the role of the organization’s female members this paper explores the differences in the judicial approaches to the returning ISIS-women, through a case study analysis of Norway and Sweden. By discussing the differences in the expansion of national terror legislation, its implementation in relation to the women of ISIS, and the possible contributing factors to the different approaches, this paper answers the following research question: how do Norway and Sweden differ in their judicial approach to the Norwegian and Swedish women of ISIS returning back home between 2012-2022? Moreover, what are the main contributing factors leading to the differences in the approaches? The paper argues that Norway is more punitive towards returning women than Sweden. This is due to Norway’s legislation on terrorism participation, which allows for prosecution without classifying which actions count as participation. Furthermore, the paper argues that this differs from Sweden’s legislation on participation, which requires evidence of grave terrorist crimes committed in order to prosecute. This, the paper demonstrates, results in Sweden lacking the legal framework to prosecute its female nationals returning from ISIS. Lastly, the paper explores possible factors contributing to the different judicial approaches and highlights the Swedish legislative council, the effect of recent terrorist attacks, and loud critics as the most significant. Through the use of the case study, this paper contributes to knowledge on the implications domestic judicial differences can have in combatting transnational threats like terrorism.Show less
This thesis uses explaining-outcome process tracing to analyse why the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to build a long-standing proxy ally among the Shiite and Hazara groups of Afghanistan as it...Show moreThis thesis uses explaining-outcome process tracing to analyse why the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to build a long-standing proxy ally among the Shiite and Hazara groups of Afghanistan as it did in other countries during the 1980s and 1990s.Show less
Tangible explanations for structural changes in terrorism over time are missing. Furthermore, attempting to explain such changes as ideological is problematic in that it reinforces a tautology,...Show moreTangible explanations for structural changes in terrorism over time are missing. Furthermore, attempting to explain such changes as ideological is problematic in that it reinforces a tautology, considering that terrorism itself is often conceptualised as inherently ideological. Problematising the notion of ideology in the definition of terrorism and the typology of changes in terrorism, therefore, offers an exit from such continuous circular reasoning that focuses on ideology. A tangible change in terrorism is that from pack terrorism, i.e. group terrorism, to lone wolf terrorism. Three rival explanations potentially account for this change. An ideological explanation that focuses on the capability of ideology to spark violence, as well as a contextual explanation that argues that changes in the living environments of perpetrators lead to changes in the characteristics of terrorism, cannot stand firm when taken to the test. Meanwhile, a processual explanation according to which terrorist and counterterrorist forces continuously exploit the other side’s disadvantage does. Ultimately, changes in terrorism can be conceptualised using the analogy of a cat-and-mouse game in which learning and adaptation processes on the side of terrorists and counterterrorist forces likewise cause terrorism to change structurally.Show less
This thesis seeks to address the academic debate surrounding the intervention of state actors in foreign information spaces, as this discourse lacks a coherent framework, allowing researchers to...Show moreThis thesis seeks to address the academic debate surrounding the intervention of state actors in foreign information spaces, as this discourse lacks a coherent framework, allowing researchers to identify, compare, categorize and hence explain acts of Information Intervention (II). To initiate a solution for this problem, this thesis aimed to create a typology of common contemporary types of covert and semi-covert state IIs beyond the means subsumed by the soft power and public diplomacy concepts. This process was facilitated by Kluge’s (2000) framework for the empirically grounded construction of types and an empirical research process, which was based on the identification of sources by employing keyword configurations and the search engines Google/Google Scholar. Given the scope of this project and the public unavailability of certain II practices, it was not possible to cover all acts of II for the given typology. Rather, the goal of this thesis was to guide future research in the field of Information Interventions, by providing a notion of the dynamics in the given field, on which future research can be built on. Therefore, while the typology presented in this thesis cannot be determined as universal, it made the first step towards the establishment of such framework, allowing researchers to systematically analyze IIs.Show less
Through the case study of the NPFL in Liberia, this thesis explains why some rebel groups are able to transform to a successful political organization after conflict, and others are unable to do so.
This study examines the variations in the security outlooks of the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – toward the European Union’s quest for strategic autonomy. For decades, the...Show moreThis study examines the variations in the security outlooks of the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – toward the European Union’s quest for strategic autonomy. For decades, the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ has remained ambiguous and ill-defined despite waves of discussions amongst leaders and academics alike. In an increasingly multipolar world and a considerably evolving security landscape in Northeastern Europe in light of the war in Ukraine, a renewed interest in the topic has emerged. Nevertheless, as in previous waves of discussion, the focus is primarily directed at the major powers. This study aims to shed light on the divergence of interpretation to be found among three small states; countries often finding themselves treated as one homogenous region with the same security concerns and objectives. By conducting eight interviews with current government officials, as well as analyzing government documents, the study answers two questions: How do the Baltic states view the concept of strategic autonomy? and What differences can be identified in their understanding of the concept? The research finds that strategic autonomy is viewed as a process rather than a fixed goal. Despite increasing support for the implementation of EU security initiatives, worries about NATO decoupling, duplication, and potential discrimination of strategic partners, especially the United States, remain significant. Most notably yet, the Baltic State’s interpretation and importance of the concept do, in fact, vary. This study highlights the challenges in achieving a unified interpretation of strategic autonomy both within the contexts of the EU and between global strategic partners. In the face of shifting geopolitical realities, discerning the misunderstandings among the Baltic nations is a crucial step in bridging differences and addressing the practical implications across national borders.Show less
Disruptions to the routine operations of ICTs in conflict situations have made cybersecurity come to ascend a prominent position in the legal and political decision-makeing of the EU....Show moreDisruptions to the routine operations of ICTs in conflict situations have made cybersecurity come to ascend a prominent position in the legal and political decision-makeing of the EU. Europeanization has been used to describe the processes by which EU decision-makeing manifests itself in the logic of, for example, national policy outcomes of those processes (see Radaelli, 2012, p. 1 as cited by Fererro & Ackrill, 2016, p.880). The literature has pointed to the significant amount of soft law which the EU has issued to regulate cybersecurity. However, per definition EU member states are not legally obliged to implement soft law. Accordingly, by utilizing Europeanization as a conceptual frame, this thesis has sought to answer the question: To what extent has non-legally binding EU soft law on cybersecurity influenced the making of the national cybersecurity policies of its MS over time? To address the research, question the thesis has taken a small-scale empirical mixed-method approach by analyzing the extent to which specifically, Germany's and Slovakia's national cybersecurity strategies have harmonized over time toward the 2020 EU cybersecurity strategy (EUCSS) as a consequence of using the soft law document in their stagey-making. The analysis suggest that the EU cybersecurity strategy did influence the national strategy-making, but that the degree of harmonization depended on the extent to which the EUCSS aligned with national ambitions and priorities. To this end, the member states actively strived to 'Europeanize' their national cybersecurity strategies.Show less
The United Kingdom (UK)'s 2020 decision to prohibit the Chinese company Huawei from participating in the development of Britain's 5G networks, also known as the Huawei ban, raised many questions....Show moreThe United Kingdom (UK)'s 2020 decision to prohibit the Chinese company Huawei from participating in the development of Britain's 5G networks, also known as the Huawei ban, raised many questions. The ban represented a stark policy shift, as the UK had earlier granted Huawei the right to participate in 5G development to a limited extent. Amid political pressure that came from the United States (US) and the United Kingdom itself, the UK government reversed course. The rhetoric used by the political actors pressuring the UK government as well as by the government itself in its announcement of the ban contained characterisations of Huawei and China as threatening. This suggests the securitisation of China played a role in the UK's decision. Therefore, this study posed the following research question: "What role did the securitisation of China in the West play in the UK's decision to prohibit Huawei from participating in the development of British 5G networks?" This is a relevant question as it is concerned with how British foreign policy towards China takes shape and how securitisation takes place and influences consequential policy decisions. Critical discourse analysis with special attention to the context of discourse production and making use of Amin's (2019) three- step conceptualisation of securitisation theory found that the securitisation of China and Huawei played a key role in the UK government's decision to ban the company. The securitisation of China by US political actors influenced US and British pressure on the UK government to reverse its earlier decision. Ultimately the UK government backtracked and implemented the Huawei ban securitising China and Huawei in the process in an effort to regain lost credibility and win support for its newly adopted policy.Show less
