Somalia and (South) Sudan belong to the most troubled countries in the world. All three of them are classified within the bottom 20% of the UNDP’s Human Development Index. Similarly, they have...Show moreSomalia and (South) Sudan belong to the most troubled countries in the world. All three of them are classified within the bottom 20% of the UNDP’s Human Development Index. Similarly, they have consistently been ranked in the top-5 of the Fragile States Index. Unsurprisingly, the contemporary history of Somalia and Sudan is characterized by chronic insecurity because of recurring civil wars between ethnic, tribal or clan-based groups and their governments. Therefore, the vast majority of international involvement in the Horn of Africa during the last twenty years has been directed at these countries. However, despite this ample attention, the deployed international military forces have thus far been unable to re-establish secure environments and rebuild state structures. Focusing on five distinct military interventions from 1990 to roughly 2010, this inquiry aims to measure the qualitative and quantitative contributions of Security Sector/System Reform (SSR) to the restoration of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. To this end, it addresses e.g. the progress made within Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs. This inquiry then attempts to assess the legitimacy of the post-conflict state reconstruction effort by looking at e.g. the empowerment of civil society representatives and the progress made within community confidence-building measures. In doing so, this inquiry adopts Paul D. Miller’s concept of ‘armed state building’ as a theoretical framework. It therewith argues that – despite a growing number of criticisms – liberal institution-building has since the end of the Cold War remained the prevailing paradigm of state reconstruction efforts. Based on a reading of relevant literature, this inquiry contends that group identities in Somalia and Sudan have become interwoven with relative deprivation between them. The result have been enduring crises of citizenship and legitimacy in the state which continue to feed narratives that help to mobilize groups for violence. This inquiry finds that SSR has managed to increase the capacities of security and justice institutions, albeit in a vacuum. Analyses indicate how the (re)-established state institutions overall have been rather a-contextual, a-historic and frequently paralleled more capable, indigenous mechanisms. Simultaneously, the problems within the state’s legitimacy domain illustrate the complex environments, wherein international military forces e.g. were hampered by their cooperation with problematic local partners. This points to limitations within the military spheres of influence that affect soldiers’ ability to address the ‘root causes’ of conflict. This, in turn, leads to questions of how SSR should otherwise be treated within their activities, and how these armed state building efforts could best be complemented.Show less
