Value in nature has often been studied from two perspectives, either externally or internally. Schools of intrinsic value like deep ecology have been found extreme in the past, their implications...Show moreValue in nature has often been studied from two perspectives, either externally or internally. Schools of intrinsic value like deep ecology have been found extreme in the past, their implications undesirable to humans. External perspectives like anthropocentric value judgements, for example ecosystem-service arguments, or considerations of intergenerational justice have become increasingly common and well researched. However, this thesis starts from the observation that anthropocentric value based morality does little to protect ecosystems for their own sake. Instead, it merely focuses on those parts that either appeal, service, or otherwise are useful to humans. It is especially this perception of ecosystems that lies at the root of current and past exploitation of the ecosystem. The result is nearly irreversible damage to the ecosystem. This thesis argues for pro tanto moral rights for the ecosystem, on the basis of interest-based moral considerability. I will show that previous arguments for or against the moral considerability of nature lack sufficient knowledge of ecological processes. If ecological processes are properly understood, the ecosystem can be said to have an interest. This interest, or wellbeing, is the striving towards homeostasis. This means that the ecosystem has moral considerability and is a moral patient. It is therefore eligible for moral rights. These rights-relations occur between moral agents and moral patient when there is contact. This will be explained through developing the Contact-Theory.Show less
Thomas Pogge claims to close the gap between proponents of large-scale humanitarian aid to the third world, and those opposing such policy. Pogge turns this last group into his target audience by...Show moreThomas Pogge claims to close the gap between proponents of large-scale humanitarian aid to the third world, and those opposing such policy. Pogge turns this last group into his target audience by adopting an alleged core-principle of libertarianism, a premise that is often held among those who oppose large governmental programs, roughly the political ‘right’. According to Pogge’s argument, those holding onto the libertarian tenet must completely turn their stance on foreign aid around, as their principle actually prescribes moral duties of first world citizens to aid the third world in order to salvage inflicted damages. In this essay, I examine the actual persuasiveness of Pogge’s argument by assessing the similarity between premises used by Pogge and those held by his target audience. I do so by distinguishing two variants of Pogge’s argument, which both consist of three sub-arguments. Despite the occasional agreement, Pogge’s argument fails to concord with many key-premises generally associated with libertarians, liberals and conservatives. Due to the clash in between the two sides of the debate, Pogge’s tactic to reconcile them into one proposal fails to truly convince. I conclude that Pogge is more likely to sway his target audience by using their similarities to open a dialogue.Show less
