In this dissertation I will be evaluating whether and how moral-concept abolitionism can be a satisfactory answer to the now-what question for moral-error theory. The version of error-theory most...Show moreIn this dissertation I will be evaluating whether and how moral-concept abolitionism can be a satisfactory answer to the now-what question for moral-error theory. The version of error-theory most people will be familiar with was forwarded by Mackie (1977). Error-theorists are committed to the idea that first-order moral claims are truth-apt, they are trying to refer to some fact out there in the world, but since an ontological investigation does not provide one with moral facts, all moral claims are wrong by default. This leads into the ‘now-what’ question: what are we to do with our moral language once we accept the error-theory. I will forgo arguing that the known version of the error-theory is plausible or true, since I expect those interested in the now-what question to already have accepted the error-theory. Moral-concept abolitionism is one among the possible answers to the now-what question. It recommends we jettison moral concepts from our language for diverging reasons. I start my investigation with Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) in which I argue she forwards an error-theory and her own answers to the now-what question. Her error-theory follows from a historical analysis, rather than an ontological one like Mackie’s (1977). Second, I will evaluate how Anscombe’s abolitionism compares to the work of abolitionists that are responding to Mackie, as well as show their significant differences, their incommensurability. These differences lead me to demarcate two distinct forms of abolitionism. Anscombe’s version, soft-abolitionism, recommends we jettison moral language, but also provides criteria to meaningfully reacquire moral thoughts and talk. I argue these criteria would not be accepted by modern abolitionists for multiple reasons: moral language, as well as the positive account of virtue Anscombe envisions, is at risk of being elitist, authoritarian, and ineffective, which is detrimental to time-sensitive issues such as climate change. I call the position that recommends jettisoning moral language, full stop, hard-abolitionism. I will compare the nuances of both soft- and hard-abolitionism and conclude that while they offer different merits as an answer to the now-what question, the concerns raised by hard-abolitionists lead me to conclude that, at least when deciding between forms of abolitionism, the modern hard-abolitionist version holds the better cards. I conclude that while both forms of abolitionism could be a satisfactory answer to the now-what question, hard-abolitionism is the more viable abolitionism in the face of our current problems.Show less
This thesis aims to discuss the applicability of metaphysical models concerning personhood. I use Geach’s treatment of identity statements to show that the predicates we use to describe personhood,...Show moreThis thesis aims to discuss the applicability of metaphysical models concerning personhood. I use Geach’s treatment of identity statements to show that the predicates we use to describe personhood, or in Derek Parfit’s case R-relatedness, are applicable rather than necessarily true of the world. I will conclude that metaphysical theses about personhood have to be true for us, if we are to act as if they were explanatory, such that we can say we believe in them. If the truth-aptness of metaphysical models is to be verified in terms of how we act in the world, then given the attachment I personally have towards entities I call persons, which I show by acting in specific related ways, I cannot give up the explanatory force persons have for me, even if Parfit’s reductionism may be propositionally convincing. This is exemplified in Tang Junyi’s treatment of human nature as a context-dependent disposition.Show less
