In this thesis I critically review Corey Brettschneider's value theory of democracy as a potential solution to the tension between democratic procedures and liberal rights and, thereby, also as an...Show moreIn this thesis I critically review Corey Brettschneider's value theory of democracy as a potential solution to the tension between democratic procedures and liberal rights and, thereby, also as an instrument to criticize illiberal democracies. I first discuss procedural and substantive interpretations of democracy, followed by an analysis and critique of Brettschneider’s democratic theory. I argue that Brettschneider does not succeed in grounding liberal rights in the core values of democracy and, thus, that Brettschneider fails in his attempt to reconcile procedural and substantive dimensions of democracy. I conclude that the only plausible ground for substantive rights in democracy is based in a procedural reading of democracy, which, to a certain extent, can function as an argument against illiberal democracies.Show less
This thesis examines the differences between Camus and Levinas on the topic of interaction with the Other, and what these differences ultimately mean for their philosophies from the focal question...Show moreThis thesis examines the differences between Camus and Levinas on the topic of interaction with the Other, and what these differences ultimately mean for their philosophies from the focal question of ‘how can we interact with the Other?’. My claim is that the symmetry in Camus’ understanding of the relationship with the Other results in an interaction which allows for the creation of meaning between the subject and Other that Levinas does not leave room for. I first do a basic comparison of their philosophies, then detail the use of the term ‘transcendence’ in order to establish a ground upon which the comparison between them can be made, since their approaches and terminology are quite different. I then lean on Derrida to criticize Levinas’ concept of Otherness, and end by discussing how Camus evades these pitfalls by having a concept of the Other which allows for a symmetrical relationship.Show less
In this thesis I discussed three authors writing in a relatively new tradition of contemporary feminist thought. Chapter one taught us that the world might be more complicated than we initially...Show moreIn this thesis I discussed three authors writing in a relatively new tradition of contemporary feminist thought. Chapter one taught us that the world might be more complicated than we initially thought it was. All of our authors argue that we should understand our place in the world in terms of networks. Chapter two focused on the ethical claims made by our materialists. If everything can be (or is) related, how does that influence the way we should act towards others? In chapter three, I argue that new materialism is not so much about reflecting upon how the world is, or proposing rules which explain how the world should be. By contrast, new materialists present ‘figures of the thinkable’, or creative attempts to let people rethink their relationship with specific parts of their environment.Show less
The all subjected principle aims to overcome the democratic boundary problem from within democratic theory. At the core of the principle lies the concept of personal autonomy. The principle...Show moreThe all subjected principle aims to overcome the democratic boundary problem from within democratic theory. At the core of the principle lies the concept of personal autonomy. The principle contains an issue-specific demarcation strategy by which the demos will transcend community boundaries. In other words, a consequence of implementing the principle will be that the demos will be disconnected from the community. The objective of this thesis is to determine whether or to which extent the principle and its consequences do justice to the personal autonomy of the agents involved. This thesis will argue that, on the one hand, the principle has direct effects that seem to do justice to the personal autonomy of agents since it makes them co-author of the formal laws and policies within which their personal autonomy is embedded. Moreover, it provides them a de jure position to (co-)govern the social conditions of personal autonomy. In that sense, it promotes the self-governance of agents and, thus, their personal autonomy. On the other hand, the principle seems limited for the indirect effects of the disconnection of the demos from the community: firstly, it only makes agents co-author of the formal laws and policies and not of the informal rules of society. The informal rules of society, however, are affected by the formal laws and policies. Therefore, implementing the principle would open up the possibility of a situation in which an agent is not included into the demos because a particular law or policy does not potentially undermine her personal autonomy in the local sense, but will indirectly affect the informal rules of society within which the personal autonomy of agents in the global sense is embedded. Such a situation would not improve the extent to which an agent is capable of governing herself. And secondly, although the all subjected principle might provide agents a de jure social position by including them into the demos, this does not guarantee that these agents will also possess a de facto social position to (co-)govern the social conditions within which their personal autonomy is embedded. According to Oshana’s interpretation of the communitarian claim, such a de facto social position is a requirement of genuine self-government. As the principle is unclear to which extent it provides agents such a social position, in the sense that it only guarantees an inclusion into the demos, it remains unclear to which extent it does justice to the personal autonomy of the agents involved.Show less
A concept of life as an emergent property, originating from the interaction of two speci c interpretations of biological individuality and entropy will be discussed in this thesis. Biological...Show moreA concept of life as an emergent property, originating from the interaction of two speci c interpretations of biological individuality and entropy will be discussed in this thesis. Biological individuality will be shown to be a speci c member of the category of individuality and a notion best interpreted as a relative concept which is hierarchically structured by interrelated nested entities. A speci c interpretation of entropy will be described as a statistical notion in which entropy is able to locally increase order as a stable dynamic kinetic state in a closed system. The rise of complex organization will be something that can be explained scienti cally but is interpreted as a predominant emergentist property. In this thesis, I argue that life emerges as a property rising from within the organization of a compartmentalized entity that is able to locally decrease its entropy due to a self-replicating autocatalytic web that jumped into existence. Biological individuality and entropy both relate to a base level of complexity and start to meet at the lowest level of organization. I argue that living biological individuals are not substrate neutral implying life in silico will always be fundamentally di erent from biological life.Show less
This thesis critically examines Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument against moral particularism. He argues that moral particularism is untenable, claiming that even the weakest, most defensible version of...Show moreThis thesis critically examines Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument against moral particularism. He argues that moral particularism is untenable, claiming that even the weakest, most defensible version of moral particularism cannot be maintained. His main point is that particularism entails intuitionism, and that intuitionism is so objectionable, one ought to reject moral particularism as well. I show why Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument packs a strong punch against the particularist project, as Sinnott-Armstrong is correct in claiming that particularists necessarily need to accept intuitionism. However, I conclude that Sinnott-Amrstrong's argument against particularism does not succeed, as intuitionism really is not as objectionable as he makes it out it be.Show less
This paper seeks to clarify the concept of revenge pornography. Existing laws concerning revenge pornography are analysed and sorted into four separate categories, after which a definition of ...Show moreThis paper seeks to clarify the concept of revenge pornography. Existing laws concerning revenge pornography are analysed and sorted into four separate categories, after which a definition of (consensual) pornography is set out against definitions of four types of nonconsensual pornography, among which a definition of revenge pornography. This is followed by an analysis of the reasons for the lack of appropriate laws against revenge pornography and considers degrees of privacy. The discussion of the harms for victims will be followed by the identification of three kinds of wrongs and the identification of three kinds of perpetrators.Show less
In this thesis I will make a critical assessment of the Kantian formal conception of the will in light of Schelling and Cohen. My research question is twofold: how to assess the Kantian concept of...Show moreIn this thesis I will make a critical assessment of the Kantian formal conception of the will in light of Schelling and Cohen. My research question is twofold: how to assess the Kantian concept of will, given its notorious 'formality'? And under which conditions could Schelling's and Cohen's conception of the will meet the (assumed) flaws of the Kantian notion of the will? How could we evaluate Kant’s concept of the will in terms of its ‘formality’? What is the strength of Kant’s concept of the will and what is its weakness? Kant has provided us with a theory of how every rational human being can be ethical. We universally derive our ethical obligation, Kant claims, from the pure form of reason. This form of reason, motivating our will to act well, keeps our will formal. How can we assess this formality? On the one hand, the form of reason ensures that the individual can autonomously will and correspond to the ethical laws of a rational subject. This is the strength of Kant’s formal ethics. On the other hand, the form of reason makes our will lifeless, because Kant eliminates everything material. According to Kant, the will ought not be motivated by emotional inclinations nor serve a material purpose. Kant is not concerned with the matter of the action or what is to result from it, but solely with the form and the principle from which it does itself follow (Kant, 1984, 61). Kant’s morality is based on the presupposition that there ought to be a purely formal disposition to do good. Is there also a practical and vital disposition to do good? In other words, what would make the will dynamic? Could Schelling and Cohen perhaps solve the issue raised here? The problem of the lifelessness of the will lies in the transcendental nature of Kant’s will. The faculty of thinking and willing are united in Kant’s practical philosophy. In both Schelling and Cohen a new road is opened for a will that is not limited by reason. They both propose that there is a spirit that motivates the will, instead of reason. They also allow a dynamic power that has a disposition towards this spirit of the will. Both philosophers have a vital concept that replaces Kant’s formal concept of disposition, namely the concepts of Yearning and tendency. These concepts are not a motive of thinking but purely a motive of willing. Under the condition of making the will independent of the faculty of thinking, Schelling and Cohen are able to meet the flaws of Kant’s notion of the will.Show less
