In this thesis I defend the claim that globalization, capitalism and consumerism are determining factors in contemporary society and therefore a normative political theory ought to incorporate an...Show moreIn this thesis I defend the claim that globalization, capitalism and consumerism are determining factors in contemporary society and therefore a normative political theory ought to incorporate an answer to how these factors must be dealt with. Agonists must either revise their agonistic democratic theories or oppose globalization, capitalism and consumerism all together. I have chosen the views of William Connolly and James Tully.Show less
A thesis about individual responsibility for collective action problems and more specifically anthropogenic global climate change. This thesis tries to refute claims made by Walter Sinnott...Show moreA thesis about individual responsibility for collective action problems and more specifically anthropogenic global climate change. This thesis tries to refute claims made by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong on individual causal inefficacy.Show less
In this thesis, I will defend the epistemic and moral value of democratic government, and oppose claims that there are legitimate grounds to replace democratic elections or restrict universal and...Show moreIn this thesis, I will defend the epistemic and moral value of democratic government, and oppose claims that there are legitimate grounds to replace democratic elections or restrict universal and equal suffrage to ensure the epistemic value of political decision-making. If one takes the principles normative authority and legitimacy into account, then any restriction on equal voting rights on the grounds of elitism will result neither in a rule of government that is intrinsically better nor a rule of government that is superior in producing better outcomes than a democratic system.Show less
In this thesis I argue that Nietzsche and Weber have common points, or to put it precisely, that in Max Weber’s thought Nietzsche’s presence can be detected. Specifically, and in light of the...Show moreIn this thesis I argue that Nietzsche and Weber have common points, or to put it precisely, that in Max Weber’s thought Nietzsche’s presence can be detected. Specifically, and in light of the passage from Science as a Vocation, my focus will be on the critique of science they both articulated. My thesis is that Weber’s attitude towards science bears similarities to Nietzsche’s despite the grave differences separating their thought. I will argue that both rejected the idea of scientific objectivity as well as the belief in science’s capacity to generate ultimate values. The reasons for this rejection lie in fact that in their accounts science stands as the main force which carried forward the Death of God and the process of disenchantment (Entzauberung) in modernity. However, for both science still retains its instrumental importance and hence neither Nietzsche nor Weber relapse into positions that disregard science as such. In effect, I argue, Nietzsche and Weber affirm science although they do not ascribe to it anything more than its instrumental value. However, the heterogeneity of their critiques as regards to science and philosophy in general arises from Nietzsche’s commitment to a contestation of values aiming at the enhancement and affirmation of life itself, whereas Weber insists on the character of vocation (Beruf).Show less
The debate on immigration is broad and controversial, but many of the academic literature on the topic is lacking philosophical analysis. In this thesis, my aim is to provide a philosophical...Show moreThe debate on immigration is broad and controversial, but many of the academic literature on the topic is lacking philosophical analysis. In this thesis, my aim is to provide a philosophical argument against the naturalization of all immigrants. I will do so by showing that the naturalization of some immigrants is not a moral obligation but in fact supererogatory instead.Show less
The debate on state interference to promote citizen’s health is broad and controversial. In this thesis, my aim is to provide a philosophical argument in favour of nudging for health, which is an...Show moreThe debate on state interference to promote citizen’s health is broad and controversial. In this thesis, my aim is to provide a philosophical argument in favour of nudging for health, which is an effective tool to create more health. Liberals in general are afraid that nudging for health is too paternalistic and coercive and hence deprive our freedom. I will argue that some liberals and specifically “Humean liberals” can accept this far-reaching and invasive interference in the personal sphere. This argument is based on the idea that we should follow our ‘higher’ desire to be healthy.Show less
A research on the necessity of the state, following Michael Huemer's conclusion that a stateless society would function more efficiently. The aim of the thesis was to explore whether the conclusion...Show moreA research on the necessity of the state, following Michael Huemer's conclusion that a stateless society would function more efficiently. The aim of the thesis was to explore whether the conclusion given by Michael Huemer was correct. Huemer argues that modern states lack political legitimacy and that citizens cannot be forced to oblige the state’s laws. He is convinced that societies would be better if they are stateless. The thesis followed Huemer's claims. In order to answer the research question, Thomas Hobbes was discussed as a defender of the state. Furthermore, Robert Nozick was used to test Huemer's argument. Nozick has similar claims, but he reaches a different conclusion. This thesis concludes that Huemer is not correct and that even by accepting his optimistic assumptions, the state, be it a minimal one, remains inevitable.Show less
The principle of reciprocity has been the essence of many different reciprocity arguments against the unconditional basic income (UBI). In brief, this entails that one who enjoys the benefits of...Show moreThe principle of reciprocity has been the essence of many different reciprocity arguments against the unconditional basic income (UBI). In brief, this entails that one who enjoys the benefits of social cooperation, should also contribute to the social cooperation. In this essay I introduce three perspectives on the reciprocity objection against basic income that reflect current societal tendencies. I also counter the objections against the basic income these perspectives pose. First the libertarian perspective combines the principle of reciprocity with a strong focus on self-ownership, private property and the minimal state. Second, the societal perspective entails that UBI undermines the political, economic and social structures of society through the lack of a reciprocity element in its program. Third, the market perspective shows that UBI poses a threat to the market mechanism, which pursues the common good, because there is no need for reciprocating the basic income. If these objections are true, this poses a serious problem for UBI. Yet, I demonstrate that the underlying arguments of these objections are flawed and inconsistent, so that it is fair to conclude that these reciprocity objections do not hold in relation to UBI.Show less
The democratic legitimacy of political representation is not obvious. In the literature, however, it is often treated as such, mostly because the alternative of direct democracy is deemed...Show moreThe democratic legitimacy of political representation is not obvious. In the literature, however, it is often treated as such, mostly because the alternative of direct democracy is deemed unfeasible. In this thesis, I approach this issue based on the fundamental critique of representation as made by Rousseau, according to which democracy and representation are mutually exclusive, and representative democracy thus a contradiction in terms. I compare Rousseau’s position, supported by a more modern argument by Hanna Pitkin, to an attempt by modern authors in defending representation, which started with David Plotke. I support Plotke’s ideas with those put forward by Nadia Urbinati and Mark Warren, and also look at a more extreme position as argued by Frank Ankersmit. Comparing these positions to the critique by Rousseau and Pitkin, it becomes clear that defence of representation is lacking democratic justification that can withstand Rousseau’s fundamental critique. Finally, I discuss a potentially strong argument at providing such a justification, based on arguments by Laura Montanaro and Clarissa Hayward, which emphasizes the constructive role that representation plays in the shaping of people’s interests. Until the representative turn provides a substantial argument that people do not have politically relevant interests prior to representation, I argue, Rousseau’s critique remains intact, and we need to be more careful in ascribing democratic properties to representative systems.Show less
Ian Carter identifies a philosophical dispute about whether either all political concepts necessarily express ethical evaluation, or some can be ethically detached. Establishing the truth of the...Show moreIan Carter identifies a philosophical dispute about whether either all political concepts necessarily express ethical evaluation, or some can be ethically detached. Establishing the truth of the latter is especially interesting, since ethically loaded accounts often generate confusions and misunderstandings within moral and political discourse. Carter suggests that it is possible to provide largely ethically detached accounts of certain political concepts, especially freedom, namely in being to a certain extent value-free or value-neutral. I scrutinize his proposal through examining three examples of partly ethically detached concepts of freedom, and ask whether such concepts are indeed possible and useful for both normative and conceptual theorizing. I conclude that overall, beside some remarks, Carter’s theory makes sense and provides an original and useful insight in the nature of ethical theories and their concepts, especially concepts of freedom.Show less
This thesis explores cultural paradigms. Part I accepts and expands upon Arditi's base definition of cultural paradigms as being inextricably linked with our understanding of cultural roles. Part...Show moreThis thesis explores cultural paradigms. Part I accepts and expands upon Arditi's base definition of cultural paradigms as being inextricably linked with our understanding of cultural roles. Part II applies Foucauldian theories on 'discursive forms of knowledge' to understand the relationship between 'knowledge' and 'being' that is exemplified by cultural paradigms. Part III focuses on other discursive aspects of cultural paradigms regarding the enunciations of knowledge and being, namely 'bias' and 'style'. While cultural paradigms might be colloquially generalized, that generalization is made up of a web of subject-based breaks and modifications of shared cultural paradigms by way of enunciations of knowledge and being. In conclusion, this thesis establishes that cultural paradigms are themselves indeterminate and that subjectivity ultimately can arise to edit cultural paradigms and alter the contours of their evolution.Show less
The focus of this essay lies on analysing the relationship of hypnosis and consciousness. It is my claim that modernly held theories of hypnosis do not manage to fully account for all facets of...Show moreThe focus of this essay lies on analysing the relationship of hypnosis and consciousness. It is my claim that modernly held theories of hypnosis do not manage to fully account for all facets of this seeming psychological anomaly because they may be based on a faulty notion of consciousness. I will attempt to show what this notion of consciousness is and how the phenomenon of hypnosis challenges this notion. I will then propose the use of a radically different notion of consciousness by Julian Jaynes and show what a more successful theory of hypnosis based on this notion of consciousness might look like. I will briefly lay out the origins of hypnosis and why this phenomenon seems to carry with it a less than favourable image. I will isolate recurring classes of hypnotic phenomena and discuss what makes these phenomena so seemingly inexplicable (chapter 2). I will then move on to a discussion of our commonly held notion of consciousness and how it relates to hypnosis (chapter 3). The next step will be a discussion of different attempts at explaining hypnosis (chapter 4). Here I will point out the advantages as well as challenges of each of the theories presented, concluding that they all face difficulties based on their underlying notion of consciousness. Following this will be a discussion of Jaynes’s concept of consciousness, shedding light on the differences between his notion and the formerly discussed commonly held understanding of consciousness, as well as presenting potential criticisms of Jaynes’ idea (chapter 5). I will then present Jaynes’ theory of hypnosis, hoping to further flesh out, clarify and develop the different parts of his theory. This theory will then be shown to integrate the advantages of modern models of hypnosis while doing away with their formerly discussed challenges (chapter 6). Lastly, a brief conclusion with suggestions for further research is presented (chapter 7), followed by this essay’s bibliography (chapter 8).Show less
Martin Heideggers overdenkingen omtrent de moderne techniek zijn zeer invloedrijk en constitutief gebleken voor de techniekfilosofie, die zich sinds zijn tijd als serieuze filosofische discipline...Show moreMartin Heideggers overdenkingen omtrent de moderne techniek zijn zeer invloedrijk en constitutief gebleken voor de techniekfilosofie, die zich sinds zijn tijd als serieuze filosofische discipline is gaan vestigen. In deze studie verken ik op welke wijze Heideggers overdenkingen ontvangen zijn door hedendaagse techniekfilosofen. Er blijkt dat deze ontvangst overwegend kritisch is. In het bijzonder laat ik zien dat, waar Heidegger de techniek interpreteerde als een massaal, alles overkoepelend wezen, er van hedendaagse techniekfilosofen gezegd kan worden dat zij een empirische wending hebben gemaakt naar concrete technische artefacten in hun omgangspraktijk. Hierna laat ik zien, door mij voornamelijk te richten op de postfenomenologie van Don Ihde en Peter-Paul Verbeek, dat deze empirische wending problematischer is dan zij door empirische techniekfilosofen wordt begrepen, omdat het ‘maatgevende’ aspect van Heideggers techniekfilosofie niet consequent genoeg doorgedacht wordt. Vervolgens geef ik een herwaardering van Heideggers techniekfilosofie en actualiseer ik hem door twee hedendaagse ontwikkelingen te benoemen die als symptomen gezien kunnen worden van de moderne techniek volgens Heideggers interpretatie: de universele normatieve maatstaf die uit het zicht raakt en de ecologische crisis aan de hand van respectievelijk Werner Marx en Paul Kingsnorth. Ten slotte richt ik mijn aandacht op een door hedendaagse techniekfilosofen vaak buiten beschouwing gelaten aspect van Heideggers techniekfilosofie: het ‘reddende’ in de moderne techniek. Ik geef een interpretatie van dit reddende aspect aan de hand van de poëzie van Hölderlin, Heideggers favoriete dichter. Ik laat zien dat volgens Heidegger de redding ligt in het opnieuw ‘dichterlijk’ leren meten in het huidige tijdperk, dat gekenmerkt wordt door maat- en afstandsloosheid.Show less
This thesis in an inquiry into Confucianism and the Asian values debate. This thesis looks at what would be the role of Confucianism in a democratic transition and the differences between a...Show moreThis thesis in an inquiry into Confucianism and the Asian values debate. This thesis looks at what would be the role of Confucianism in a democratic transition and the differences between a Confucian democracy and a liberal democracy.Show less
Introduction Money used to be simple. Everybody liked the shiny yellow metal we now call gold. However, at a certain point, some so-called ‘states’ made the whole practice of exchanging gold rather...Show moreIntroduction Money used to be simple. Everybody liked the shiny yellow metal we now call gold. However, at a certain point, some so-called ‘states’ made the whole practice of exchanging gold rather more complicated, as they issued vouchers that were said to ‘represent’ an amount of gold. Even more farfetched was their later decision to cut any links between our metal of desire and the vouchers we got accustomed to. In the present day, our vouchers often lack any physical qualities, and seem to be nothing more than digits projected on a computer screen. It is perhaps remarkable that the proverbial man or woman in the street does not at all seem to be concerned with how abstract our money really is. Its omnipresence and utility have made almost every inhabitant on earth comfortable using it. We hardly reflect on its nature anymore. And so, now that an entirely novel type of money – cryptomoney – is coming to the forefront, we are quick to accept it as just another incarnation of a phenomenon that we have been familiar with ever since we started appreciating a certain shiny yellow metal. But I believe this to be a mistake. Cryptomoney has the potential to transform our financial system just as radically as the move from gold and silver to fiat money, or the abandonment of the gold standard once did. This is because there are certain qualities to cryptomoney that are fundamentally different from the money as we know it. It seems, however, that although some people are interested in comparing different types of money from an economic standpoint, not many care about the philosophical implications of choosing one system over another. I believe this to be a second mistake. The economist Leonidas Zelmanovitz is right when he says that ‘the value of any monetary policy is contingent on its adherence to a coherent set of philosophical assumptions’. But this works both ways, and we should also not neglect how our philosophical assumptions are challenged by the sort of money we use. If cryptomoney would make it harder for us to adhere to our ideas about justice, equality, fairness etc. that underlie our financial system, we should try to prevent it from gaining too much prominence. The question that lies at the origin of this investigation is the following: should we want to replace ‘traditional’ money with cryptomoney? The answer to this question will be negative: in this paper I will argue that it is impossible to replace traditional currencies with any form of cryptomoney and not as a direct result undermine national sovereignty and increase inequality within countries, and between them. The former is under threat because of the decentralized market-based nature of cryptomoney that leaves powerless governmental tools to execute monetary policy. The latter is the result of the disproportionate advantage more affluent people and countries will gain over their poorer equivalents as a consequence of the way cryptomoney works. If we see the consequences of these two effects through, we arrive at the conclusion that any form of replacement of traditional money by cryptomoney means a redistribution of power from (democratic) states to the market, from people to algorithms, from economically less developed countries to economically more developed countries, and from the poor to the rich. Such a redistribution, I will argue, is unjust and undermines the legitimacy of states. To support this conclusion, I have divided this thesis in four chapters. In chapter one, I will answer the questions what money is and how cryptomoney is a separate subset of the money family. A definition of cryptomoney will also be provided, as there are many virtual phenomena called cryptomoney that are really something else. Through this definition we will come to see that cryptomoney functions quite differently from the money we use today. And because cryptomoney’s ability to change our society stems in part from its technicalities, I will then give a concise explanation of how cryptomoney works. One of the really novel aspects of cryptomoney is the way it is safeguarded against fraud. The technology that does this, the ‘blockchain’, is the reason why cryptomoney could be the first serious competitor to national currencies since gold. Important as this all is, we will not discuss the mathematical or programmers’ side of cryptomoney in detail; it has been done elsewhere. Rather, we move on to the second chapter and discuss the consequences that a financial regime based on cryptomoney would have for states and individual users. We refrain from giving too strong a normative judgment here, and merely list and explain some of the most important practical advantages and disadvantages that the introduction of cryptomoney could have, in order to better understand why cryptomoney is so attractive to some of its proponents. In chapters three and four we shift our attention to the main question of the thesis: is cryptomoney a good idea? Now there might be many arguments that could be given either for or against using cryptomoney, and some of these will be discussed in chapter two. Many of these arguments, however, are mostly pragmatic in nature, and therefore not very interesting for a philosophical inquiry. Others do merit more thorough examination, but are contingent on the type of cryptocurrency used. However, there are two arguments against cryptomoney that are rather more substantial. In chapter three, we will explain why cryptomoney necessarily undermines national sovereignty, and why that would be bad. Chapter four does the same for equality. These arguments hold for any form of cryptomoney as defined in chapter one, as they are the direct result of the way cryptomoney functions. Furthermore, they transcend all pragmatic arguments, because of the strong commitment many of us have to sovereignty and equality. Naturally, not everyone believes in these values. And although I will give some arguments in favour of sovereignty and equality, this thesis does not have the explicit aim to convince those that a priori disagree with me that these two principles are desirable. There are many libertarians and anarchists who are outright opposed to the basic idea of statehood, and do not think that national sovereignty is worthwhile at all. Likewise, there are some who claim that (some sort of) inequality has utility, usually because it yields a desired effect. For some niche thinkers it could even be good in itself. This paper might not be for them. Of course, many of cryptomoney’s (dis)advantages will only become apparent in a future where cryptomoney sheds its volatile state and blossoms into a type of money on par with the money we have now. That it could come that far is an underlying assumption for this research. It is made plausible throughout, and in chapter one especially. Interest in cryptomoney surges and it has already proven to be a very popular type of artificially created money. At the same time, it would be folly to claim that we are on the brink of a true cryptomoney revolution. The trade volume of all cryptocurrencies combined is still quite small, and no single currency, not even the (in)famous bitcoin, is anywhere near a position where it could start replacing even the weakest of national currencies. So uncertain is the future in fact, that it is even possible that we are already past the peak of cryptomoney. And that would then actually be a good thing, as an ascension of cryptomoney will lead to an increase of the problems noted in chapter three and four. In a way, you could say that this inquiry aims to make itself obsolete, because in the end it argues that cryptomoney would be bad for us. Still, if we manage to keep the use of cryptomoney at bay, and all the different cryptocurrencies lose their value, that would not mean that the phenomenon could not still be valuable as a hypothetical alternative to traditional money, capable of shedding light on our current monetary institutions and the normative foundations on which these are based.Show less
One of the central debates in international justice is about the scope of principles of distributive justice. Liberal statists endorse a relationist approach and claim that principles of justice1...Show moreOne of the central debates in international justice is about the scope of principles of distributive justice. Liberal statists endorse a relationist approach and claim that principles of justice1 are only applicable in domestic set-tings while cosmopolitans argue for a broader nonrelationist applicability of these principles in the international sphere. I will acknowledge that the state has normative peculiarity but also claim that there are other grounds of justice, both relational and nonrelational, that plea for more demanding general obligations of justice towards other peoples or states. These duties are based on principles of justice since they are more stringent and en-forceable than current statist views on foreign policies. I will oppose the narrow statist view and argue instead for a broader application of principles of justice. Relying on grounds or domains of justice allows us to leave the unilateral discussion between relationists (statists) and nonrelationists (cosmopolitans) for both do not succeed in capturing an accurate, complete account of international justice. Distinguishing different grounds of justice will show how the exact nature of a relationship determines what principles of justice are applicable for which agents. I will also show how this alternative approach is helpful in the challenging debate of noncompliance and questions on who is to pick up the slack that is left by noncomplying agents. The main argument I will thus make is that liberal statists have reasons to endorse more demanding international duties of justice. My aim is twofold: first to show inconsistencies in statist theory and second to explain how statist approaches are compatible with endorsing other, more demanding duties of global justice.Show less
