In this paper, I shall argue that in Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom (Henceforth referred to as the Freedom Essay), Schelling oscillates between two incompatible...Show moreIn this paper, I shall argue that in Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom (Henceforth referred to as the Freedom Essay), Schelling oscillates between two incompatible concepts of freedom: radical and limited. Radical freedom is spontaneous and identical to the agent's own act. It is founded on undetermined intelligibility and stands outside the theological system's domain. Limited freedom is a decided intelligibility that one-sidedly determines human actions. It is located within the domain of the theological system and meets its requirements. I will make the case that these two concepts of freedom are vulnerable to the charge of arbitrariness. First, I shall argue that equating radical freedom with the agent's own act does not provide determinacy for this concept of freedom. Second, I shall contend that the agent's decision on her intelligibility in limited freedom is undetermined, which consequently renders this freedom undetermined. I will suggest the source of Schelling's oscillation in the Freedom Essay is the existence of two incompatible tendencies: a commitment to provide a concept of freedom with unlimited power, and to indwell that freedom in an ordered theological system. I maintain that the simultaneous fulfilment of these two tasks is impossible.Show less
The notion of the will plays an important role in modern German philosophy. In recent years work has been done on developing a general overview of the concept of the will in ethics, politics and...Show moreThe notion of the will plays an important role in modern German philosophy. In recent years work has been done on developing a general overview of the concept of the will in ethics, politics and metaphysics from Kant to 20th century thought. This thesis seeks to give a new impetus for exploring this topic by looking at Schelling’s account of the will in his later philosophy. Schelling is of particular interest for exploring the significance of the will in (post)Kantian thought because he uses the concept of the will to solve the fundamental problem he sees with the Kantian notion of intelligibility. In this thesis I attempt to show how Schelling uses his notion of the will to critically reevaluate the notion of fundamental intelligibility which Kant represents in his discussion of the ideal of pure reason. The main argument of this thesis is that the concept of the will allows Schelling to reconceptualize how the intelligibility of reality is grounded. First Schelling’s distinction between positive and negative philosophy is discussed in relation to what idea of intelligibility is behind modern philosophy. Then, using Markus Gabriel and Wolfram Hogrebe their explications of Schelling’s ontology, the concept of the will is introduced as the only way to think the ground of existence as self-grounded. In the last part of the thesis, I show how this notion of the will allows Schelling to rethink the transcendental ideal in a way which combines the affirmative nature of external reality with the fact that thought itself comes to constitute the potency for thought. In this way the will can help us rethink the notion of intelligibility, which is grounded in fundamental affirmation, as not merely ideal, as in Kant or negative philosophy, but as an actual element grounding all conceptual and ontological determinations. The conclusion of my research is that Schelling’s notion of the will in his late philosophy reveals an important way of reconceptualizing Kant’s insights in his discussion on the transcendental ideal of reason which makes the idea presented there, of the necessary fundamental affirmation by reality of all concepts, more ontologically plausible and true to actual knowing. This reinterpretation of the transcendental ideal shows Schelling’s relevance in the attempt to make Kantian thought of greater importance for modern philosophy in both its analytic and continental forms.Show less
In this thesis I raise the following research question: how to reconcile Heidegger’s interpretation of eternal recurrence and his question of the meaning of Being? This thesis aims at arguing that...Show moreIn this thesis I raise the following research question: how to reconcile Heidegger’s interpretation of eternal recurrence and his question of the meaning of Being? This thesis aims at arguing that the two fundamental thoughts, eternal recurrence and question of the meaning of Being, are for Heidegger compatible. Throughout the thesis, I repeatedly argue that Nietzsche’s communication of the thought of eternal return was at the fundamental level of Heidegger’s question of the meaning of Being, even though Nietzsche did not raise the question of Being explicitly. In order to demonstrate the latter point, I discuss five essential aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation: “the overman”, “the spirit of revenge”, “the possibility”, “the tragic”, and “the Moment”. The overman and the spirit of revenge point to similarity between eternal recurrence and question of Being, the possibility and the tragic prove that Heidegger viewed the two as compatible, and the Moment suggests how can this compatibility take place for Heidegger. The question of reconciling eternal recurrence and question of the meaning of Being has not been sufficiently addressed either in Heidegger’s studies or in the contemporary literature on Nietzsche. Numerous authors regard Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche as severely limited, including Deleuze, who essentially argues that Nietzsche is a metaphysician of Becoming. However, on the contrary, I argue, in line with Derrida and Müller-Lauter, that there is much to be salvaged from Heidegger’s interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche and his controversial thought of eternal return.Show less
What is Western philosophy? The established narrative of 'our' intellectual tradition begins with classical Greek reason: championed by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, revived and perfected in...Show moreWhat is Western philosophy? The established narrative of 'our' intellectual tradition begins with classical Greek reason: championed by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, revived and perfected in Enlightenment rationalism and empiricism, to culminate in the modern European canon of Kant, Frege or Nietzsche. Conspicuously absent are any 'Middle Eastern' sources, notably Arabic and Persian philosophy. 'Islamic golden age' Aristotelians are often seen as babysitting rationality during a supposed mediaeval 'Christian dark age'. But the original impact on contemporary thought by the likes of al-Ghazali (d.1111) or Suhrawardi (d.1191) is ignored. Analysing this conspicuous absence reveals a deep binary structure in the narrative. Our canon is in fact made universally valid by excluding everything deemed mystical and arbitrary: Eastern religious thought. All religious traditions — especially Islam — represent this non-Western un-philosophy, simultaneously 'foreign' and 'archaic'. To recover our proper intellectual history, beyond this colonialist binary, we can employ a provocative redefinition: North-Atlantic (modern European) philosophy as "Far Western", and all broadly Mediterranean (Greco-Judaic and Islamo-Christian) philosophy as "Middle Western". This foregrounds the relations within the West, further suggesting its interdependence with all philosophies, including Sino-Indic ones.Show less
I provide an analysis of modern freedom, introduced by de Dijn. I claim that modern freedom is a vague and ambiguous concept, influenced by many different conceptions throughout history, which all...Show moreI provide an analysis of modern freedom, introduced by de Dijn. I claim that modern freedom is a vague and ambiguous concept, influenced by many different conceptions throughout history, which all have had different ideas about freedom and the value of freedom within a political context, and that they are all still relevant to this day. To defend this claim, this thesis makes two arguments. The first is that the conceptions of freedom that form the basis of modern freedom, show many differences in their conceptions and valuations of freedom. If the conceptions on which modern freedom is based are diverse and different, it would seem that modern freedom is not a homogeneous conception, but instead an assembly of different ideas and values that can change depending on the context of the discussion in which it is named. The second argument is that there are many elements in De Dijn’s conception of modern freedom that can be traced back to her notion of democratic freedom, which would suggest that the ‘decisive breach’ that De Dijn describes is not as decisive as she claims it was. Instead, while new elements were introduced, our modern conception of freedom has been influenced by both ancient and modern ideas on freedom, leading to a broad and vague, context-dependent conception of freedom in modern times.Show less
This dissertation starts by defending that if the conceptual engineer is serious about the new contemporary project of conceptual engineering, the conceptual engineer aims to (at least) change the...Show moreThis dissertation starts by defending that if the conceptual engineer is serious about the new contemporary project of conceptual engineering, the conceptual engineer aims to (at least) change the semantic meaning or the psychological structure of concepts used by most people in a standing language. I continue by arguing that based on this ‘serious’ definition of the conceptual engineer, the new field of conceptual engineering has three practical and normative challenges to overcome before the method can be what its primary participants want it to be. The first problem that is discussed is the widely recognised implementation problem. I discuss various proposed solutions to this problem but conclude that they do not solve the problem. The second significant challenge is what I call the evaluation dilemma. In short, this is the dilemma that the conceptual engineer faces if the engineer could implement conceptual change but has to consider based on what parameters a concept ought to be evaluated. I defend that the first horn of the dilemma that the engineer can take is considering all things about a concept. I argue that this is practically impossible. The second horn of the dilemma will only consider one or a small set of parameters to evaluate a concept. However, my argument is that this will likely lead to more unintended problems than the initial amelioration would solve. Finally, I discuss what I call two motivation problems for the conceptual engineer. The first motivation problem is the problem of accounting for the biassed motivations of the conceptual engineer. I argue that the subjective motivations of the engineer are problematic and that such motivations are likely to lead to the wrong-kind-of-reason-problem. The second motivation problem contends that if the conceptual engineer is successful in his project, one or a small group of engineers has conceptual power over large groups of people. I argue that the conceptual engineer owes us a justification for the motivation to gain such power. In short, based on the serious definition of the conceptual engineer, the new field of conceptual engineering has both practical and normative challenges to overcome before the method can be what its primary participants want it to be.Show less
A central tenet of the standard account of moral enhancement qua algorithmic technology is that it has the potential to solve the mega-problems of our time, such as global poverty or the climate...Show moreA central tenet of the standard account of moral enhancement qua algorithmic technology is that it has the potential to solve the mega-problems of our time, such as global poverty or the climate crisis. Thereby, it is simply assumed that the enhanced moral competence of individual agents will directly translate into solutions to our major moral problems. This paper sheds light on this key assumption and argues for a more sophisticated outlook on the potential effects of algorithmic moral enhancement. In particular, it is shown that our major moral problems are essentially political problems which are characterised by various kinds of dilemmas. The author shows that due to this peculiar nature of these problems, three distinct challenges arise when it comes to translating moral competence into political solutions. These challenges will have to be met by future proposals of algorithmic moral enhancement.Show less
In this essay it is researched whether Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex is still relevant in today's age, in which intersectionality is the reigning theory of oppression. This essay suggests...Show moreIn this essay it is researched whether Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex is still relevant in today's age, in which intersectionality is the reigning theory of oppression. This essay suggests that The Second Sex is in fact still relevant, since De Beauvoir’s The Second Sex is compatible with the concept of intersectionality. This essay demonstrates that The Second Sex is a work of queer phenomenology and, therefore, serves the same disorienting function as intersectionality regarded as a provisional concept.Show less
This thesis argues that fiction and eventually play, accumulating into the interactive fiction of video games, can offer a toolset to help cultivate familiarity and understanding between cultures....Show moreThis thesis argues that fiction and eventually play, accumulating into the interactive fiction of video games, can offer a toolset to help cultivate familiarity and understanding between cultures. In a world where cultures are living closer together than before, tensions between cultures are sure to rise. These tensions stem from a lack of shared context causing misinterpretations of the other. I will refer to the works of Wilhelm Dilthey and Robin Collingwood, who have both developed theories of hermeneutics that emphasise the importance of context as meaning-giving. Similar contexts provide similar meaning between people and vice versa. A lack in familiarity thus constitutes a lack in understanding, which poses a problem for the cross-cultural encounter. They suggest a hermeneutic method based on empathy in order to increase our understanding of others. In the second chapter, I will illustrate how fiction functions as both a tool to impart knowledge and as an exercise in empathy, which aids the hermeneutic process, drawing on Suzanne Keen’s theory of narrative empathy. When engaging with fiction, audiences temporarily abandon their own context in order to step into the alternate world of fiction. This encourages open-mindedness and empathic understanding of others, which both are of vital importance to the hermeneutic process. In the third chapter, I’ll move on play, showing how it, like fiction, demands a certain openness of mind from the player so they can step into the play-world, which makes play very well-suited to learning by doing. This section on play will be largely informed by Johan Huizinga and Miguel Sicart’s work on play and playfulness respectively. In requiring participation from its audience, they are absorbed into the other, the strange, and the new, and provided with tools to make sense of it. As an immersive and interactive medium, video games thus allow players to gain an intuitive understanding of other cultures on their own terms.Show less
In this thesis I argue that the book On Touching-Jean-Luc Nancy by Jacques Derrida, whilst having touching as its main theme, is informed by Derrida's ethics. In On Touching Derrida argues that the...Show moreIn this thesis I argue that the book On Touching-Jean-Luc Nancy by Jacques Derrida, whilst having touching as its main theme, is informed by Derrida's ethics. In On Touching Derrida argues that the history of philosophy is haptocentric, meaning that touch is privileged over the other senses. This privilege consists in a lack of liminality and alterity in the philosophy of touching. I argue that this is problematic for Derrida because alterity is an important factor in his thinking of ethics, where the alterity of the other informs the double bind between the responsibility for the general and the singular alterior other. The double bind is important because of its implications in the impossible yet necessary jump from ethics to politics and justice for Derrida. A reading of On Touching and a contextualizing of the book within Derrida's broader oeuvre have led to these conclusions.Show less
