This thesis compares the ethics and phenomenology of Nietzsche and Levinas. It begins from a Levinasian critique of Nietzsche, made up of remarks Levinas made on Nietzsche's thought throughout his...Show moreThis thesis compares the ethics and phenomenology of Nietzsche and Levinas. It begins from a Levinasian critique of Nietzsche, made up of remarks Levinas made on Nietzsche's thought throughout his career. This critique is then systematized, before being rebutted by a Nietzschean response, focusing on the question of responsibility. The thesis argues that insofar as there is a disagreement between Nietzsche and Levinas, it is fundamentally a phenomenological disagreement.Show less
In deze scriptie wordt de discussie tussen W.V.O. Quine ("On What There Is") en Rudolf Carnap ("Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology") beschreven t.a.v. woorden als referenten voor dingen in de...Show moreIn deze scriptie wordt de discussie tussen W.V.O. Quine ("On What There Is") en Rudolf Carnap ("Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology") beschreven t.a.v. woorden als referenten voor dingen in de wereld. Carnap weet een stap te zetten t.o.v. Quine, maar de 'ontologische' status van zijn antwoord ('frameworks') blijft onduidelijk. Aan de hand van Ludwig Wittgensteins opmerkingen over het herhalingskarakter van taal in de Philosophische Untersuchungen wordt een oplossing gezocht.Show less
Since its inception, many changes to the concept of ‘autism’ have been suggested, by both autistic people and researchers. Recently, the number of people diagnosed with a form of autism has...Show moreSince its inception, many changes to the concept of ‘autism’ have been suggested, by both autistic people and researchers. Recently, the number of people diagnosed with a form of autism has increased, and a contemporary topic of discussion is whether it should be defined as a disorder, a mere human variation, or something else. As society is inclined to stigmatise eccentricity, it is important that the definition used does not harm autistic people, or misrepresent the large variety of their experiences. This thesis argues that the fifth Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders’ (DSM-5) current conceptualisation of autism as ‘Autism Spectrum Disorder’ is both inaccurate and dangerous. Definitions from all DSMs are described, and the motivations behind the changes between DSMs are considered, alongside arguments from a collection of philosophers. The conclusion is that the components ‘Spectrum’ and ‘Disorder’ in ‘ASD’ risk inciting stigmatisation and suggest a more uniform expression than autism actually has. Thus, an alternative definition much be found. This alternative, which could be pursued through further research, should give autistic people a way to think about their identity, and non-autistic people a way to accurately understand and describe the diverse autistic experiences, both negative and positive.Show less
This paper takes a critical look at the conception of John Rawls' original position and illustrates how the conditions for knowledge, and the limitations thereof, set up by the original position...Show moreThis paper takes a critical look at the conception of John Rawls' original position and illustrates how the conditions for knowledge, and the limitations thereof, set up by the original position and the veil of ignorance, are not specific enough to avoid running into the problem of mathematical, semantic, and logical indeterminacyShow less
De Duitse filosoof Jurgen Habermas (1929) claimt in zijn boek ‘The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’ dat het domein van de publieke sfeer is gekoloniseerd door de vrije markt. Deze...Show moreDe Duitse filosoof Jurgen Habermas (1929) claimt in zijn boek ‘The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’ dat het domein van de publieke sfeer is gekoloniseerd door de vrije markt. Deze kolonisatie veroorzaakt een eroderen van de structuren van de publieke sfeer. Aangezien deze claim de legitimiteit van onze huidige (westerse) indeling van de samenleving bevraagt is het belangrijk om de aard van de claim te doorgronden. Hoe ziet deze kolonisatie er precies uit? En wat is de publieke sfeer volgens Habermas? Maar nog belangrijker is de vraag: Wat is er volgens Habermas problematisch aan de erosie van de publieke sfeer? Het is deze vraag waarop de scriptie een antwoord geeft.Show less
This paper considers the morality that comes with the actions of autonomous AI-systems (AAA). AAA are becoming more autonomous and more intelligent every day, and are already part of our daily...Show moreThis paper considers the morality that comes with the actions of autonomous AI-systems (AAA). AAA are becoming more autonomous and more intelligent every day, and are already part of our daily lives in the form of decision support tools, all sorts of apps, or even self-driving cars and that is why they need a moral compass. Currently, implementing a moral compass into AAA is problematic since the current strategies, laws, principles, guidelines and moral codes do not suffice for solving the moral challenges that surround AAA and impact human lives. Two strategies are considered: Top-Down (TD) and Bottom-Up (BU) strategies. TD strategies use explicit rules that are programmed into AAA, and AAA are designed to follow these rules. BU strategies allow AAA to teach themselves the correct behaviour using feedback from the evaluation of their actions. The problems with TD strategies are that situational dilemmas require almost infinite lists of rules which account for every possible factor, and that a shorter set of rules will result in definitions that are too vague to be eligible for implementation in practise. The problems with BU strategies are that they provide limited transparency of the actions and reasoning behind these actions, and that it becomes harder to evaluate AAA’s moral compass. Furthermore, additional problems come with the moral compass of AAA. Understanding how to emulate the relevant human factors in the moral compass of AAA is difficult, and the moral compass of AAA should adapt to the changing and subjective moral compass of humans over time. This paper concludes that, currently, both TD and BU strategies for implementing a moral compass into AAA prove to be problematic, and that proper evaluation of AAA is difficult. Additionally, the moral compass of AAA becomes more problematic because the programmed moral compass differs from human reasoning and actions.Show less
In this essay I investigate the relation between emotions and atmospheres in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. Our existence is a dialectic between a pre-personal anchorage in...Show moreIn this essay I investigate the relation between emotions and atmospheres in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. Our existence is a dialectic between a pre-personal anchorage in the world and the personal act of taking it up. Because of this pre-personal anchorage in the world, this dialectic is fundamentally affective. There are two notions of freedom at play in the relation between emotions and atmospheres. One is a conditional freedom implied in the personal act of taking up the world. The second is a questionable power that is implied in atmospheres. Atmospheres are possible harmonies of sense that pre-personally motivate us to take up the world in the particular manner that affirms them and that opposes everything that does not suit this manner of taking up the world. The relation between personal emotions and atmospheres is a dialectic between a conditional freedom and a questionable power in a fundamentally affective existence.Show less
Deze scriptie betreft een discussie over het autonomiemodel van Christman. Hij benadert autonomie historisch: een persoon is autonoom ten aanzien van een preferentie indien hij factoren die zijn...Show moreDeze scriptie betreft een discussie over het autonomiemodel van Christman. Hij benadert autonomie historisch: een persoon is autonoom ten aanzien van een preferentie indien hij factoren die zijn preferenties beïnvloeden niet heeft afgewezen, of niet zou hebben afgewezen indien hij de mogelijkheid had deze preferenties af te wijzen. Benson bekritiseert dit model aan de hand van socialisering. Socialisering doet mensen preferenties niet afwijzen, ook als zij dit wel hadden gedaan zonder socialisering. Wat Benson betreft zijn deze mensen niet autonoom ten aanzien van preferenties die het gevolg zijn van socialisering, ook al hebben zij het proces van socialisering nooit afgewezen. Deze scriptie voegt drie elementen toe aan de discussie. Ten eerste wil wordt Bensons kritiek verbreed door te stellen dat deze niet slechts geldt voor socialisering, maar dat bijna al onze reflectie is beïnvloed door externe factoren. Daarnaast wordt uitgelegd hoe dit betekent dat Christmans model (impliciet) een eigen zelf veronderstelt, los van externe factoren. Tot slot wordt de onenigheid tussen beide auteurs verklaard door te stellen dat beiden een andere intuïtie van autonomie articuleren.Show less
This thesis looks into how able current human rights theories are able to handle instances of individuals identifying as things they are physically not. In particular the Otherkin, indivuals that...Show moreThis thesis looks into how able current human rights theories are able to handle instances of individuals identifying as things they are physically not. In particular the Otherkin, indivuals that claim they ought to have been born as an animal, and how that affects their position within the current human rights framework. This leads to several problems with the two most notable being that allowing somebody to identify as non-human means they don't have human rights so they can't identify as something non-human meaning they have human rights.Show less
Can the historical event of the Holocaust be thought of philosophically through and in the works of Emmanuel Levinas? Since Levinas’s ethical philosophy has often been understood as a general...Show moreCan the historical event of the Holocaust be thought of philosophically through and in the works of Emmanuel Levinas? Since Levinas’s ethical philosophy has often been understood as a general response to the historical event of the Holocaust, philosophy and history seem to meet in Levinas’s later philosophical works. This thesis questions the way in which the historicity of the Holocaust can be understood in Levinas’s philosophical work. In this research, the notion of 'respect' will appear to be crucial. Ultimately, I aim to answer the question as to whether, and if so, to what extent, Levinas's insistently nonhistoricist philosophical approach to the Holocaust can really respect the Holocaust and its victims as such, that is, in their historicity.Show less
While Hegel's work is by no means recent, many philosophers, such as Foucault, have claimed Hegelianism to remain fundamental to the way in which we approach important philosophical questions today...Show moreWhile Hegel's work is by no means recent, many philosophers, such as Foucault, have claimed Hegelianism to remain fundamental to the way in which we approach important philosophical questions today. There seems to be an aspect of Hegelianism which is immune to falsification. In this essay I will attempt to explain what this immunity consists of by closely analysing some of Hegel's most influential works.Show less
In deze thesis wordt beargumenteerd dat hoe we nu denken over verantwoordelijkheid voor klimaatverandering onder het schuldmodel valt; we wijzen verantwoordelijkheid toe in termen van verwijt en...Show moreIn deze thesis wordt beargumenteerd dat hoe we nu denken over verantwoordelijkheid voor klimaatverandering onder het schuldmodel valt; we wijzen verantwoordelijkheid toe in termen van verwijt en blaam. Echter, dit is niet de juiste manier van verantwoordelijkheid toewijzen voor klimaatverandering, omdat er niet één partij schuldig is aan het veroorzaken van klimaatverandering. In plaats van de verantwoordelijkheid bij een ander neer te leggen, moet iedereen zich verantwoordelijk voelen voor klimaatverandering. Dit is wat het participatiemodel ons kan bieden. In deze thesis wordt het participatiemodel toegepast op klimaatverandering, om zo te beargumenteren dat alle actoren die participeren in consumentisme verantwoordelijkheid dragen voor klimaatverandering. Dit is een fundamenteel andere manier van denken over verantwoordelijkheid voor klimaatverandering dan tot nu toe gebruikelijk is.Show less
This essay locates the “ontological difference” in Heidegger and Levinas in order to show how this difference presents a limitation in both philosophies. On the one hand, the “ontological...Show moreThis essay locates the “ontological difference” in Heidegger and Levinas in order to show how this difference presents a limitation in both philosophies. On the one hand, the “ontological difference” obstructs genuine thinking of be-ing in Heidegger. On the other, this difference is unable to signify the ultimate in Levinas’ ethics. In transgressing the “ontological difference”, both philosophers introduce the concept of the call that leads into two different notions of responsibility in terms of responding. Whereas Heidegger’s historical thinking of be-ing is an originary ethics in which responsibility is determined as responsiveness of Dasein to be-ing, Levinas’ ethics implies responsibility because of social relationship to the transcendent other person who is otherwise than being. In this essay, it is claimed that these two different notions of responsibility are not mutually exclusive. The very openness of be-ing in which Dasein and be-ing are enowned to each other in the counter-resonance of needing and belonging still admits for a Levinassian ethics of the transcendent other person, albeit not primordially.Show less
Thomas Pogge claims to close the gap between proponents of large-scale humanitarian aid to the third world, and those opposing such policy. Pogge turns this last group into his target audience by...Show moreThomas Pogge claims to close the gap between proponents of large-scale humanitarian aid to the third world, and those opposing such policy. Pogge turns this last group into his target audience by adopting an alleged core-principle of libertarianism, a premise that is often held among those who oppose large governmental programs, roughly the political ‘right’. According to Pogge’s argument, those holding onto the libertarian tenet must completely turn their stance on foreign aid around, as their principle actually prescribes moral duties of first world citizens to aid the third world in order to salvage inflicted damages. In this essay, I examine the actual persuasiveness of Pogge’s argument by assessing the similarity between premises used by Pogge and those held by his target audience. I do so by distinguishing two variants of Pogge’s argument, which both consist of three sub-arguments. Despite the occasional agreement, Pogge’s argument fails to concord with many key-premises generally associated with libertarians, liberals and conservatives. Due to the clash in between the two sides of the debate, Pogge’s tactic to reconcile them into one proposal fails to truly convince. I conclude that Pogge is more likely to sway his target audience by using their similarities to open a dialogue.Show less
