How are external factors able to cause conflict in a country? Scholars have examined the spatial component of conflict largely through the lens of conflict diffusion, where conflict spread from one...Show moreHow are external factors able to cause conflict in a country? Scholars have examined the spatial component of conflict largely through the lens of conflict diffusion, where conflict spread from one country to another. They have failed however, to examine the influence of one-sided violence on conflict in other countries. This is a major gap as one-sided violence does not necessarily mean conflict is occurring, meaning studies on the direct spread of conflict between countries fail to cover these cases. I fill this gap by asking: does the use of one-sided violence raise the likelihood of conflict onset in neighbouring countries? I argue that one-sided violence influences conflict onset in three ways, each via incoming refugee flows. First, refugees might have grievances that they are unable to express via traditional ways, increasing the likelihood that they may turn to violence. Second, refugees may change the ethnic composition of the host country, with the new ethnic balance causing or worsening ethnic tensions. Third, refugees may worsen the economic situation in the host country by competing with the local population, increasing local political tensions. I will study this by analyzing UCDP data on armed conflict and one-sided violence in neighboring countries. The results show that one-sided violence in neighbouring countries has a positive, significant effect on conflict onset. Countries that border countries experiencing one-sided violence have a higher likelihood of conflict occurring. The effect of refugees on conflict onset is shown to be positive and significant as well.Show less
Although scholars have studied the aftermath of interstate cyberattacks, there has been little research on how states use non-violent measures to react to these digital attacks. Instead, research...Show moreAlthough scholars have studied the aftermath of interstate cyberattacks, there has been little research on how states use non-violent measures to react to these digital attacks. Instead, research has focussed on how cyberattacks are unlikely to trigger a physically violent, interstate response, missing how these new weapons can worsen interstate relations in non-violent ways. To address this gap, I pose the question, do cyberattacks lead to a decline in interstate relations, while still avoiding physical conflict? States are incentivised to deter future attacks by responding to the incursion while avoiding costly, physical confrontation. However, the intensity of this response is likely to be influenced by their relationship with their attacker. Attacks launched by rivals can appear more threatening due to their history of conflict and therefore warrant more aggressive, non-violent responses. I therefore investigate whether cyberattacks lead to an increase in an attacked state’s defence budget and a reduction in diplomatic relations. While some support is found for states using these non-violent measures as a response to cyberattacks, the presence of a rivalry did not lead to the expected outcomes, due to weaknesses with the operationalisation of my variables. Nevertheless, my thesis indicates non-violent, negative measures are used in response to a cyberattack and therefore the impact of cyberweapons in damaging interstate relations should not be underestimated.Show less
Despite worldwide reports of former child recruits engaging in post-conflict criminal activity, no one has sought to systematically analyze whether this turn of events was a consequence of their...Show moreDespite worldwide reports of former child recruits engaging in post-conflict criminal activity, no one has sought to systematically analyze whether this turn of events was a consequence of their child soldiering past. In fact, any attempt to empirically verify this would have to address the lack of theoretical foundations on which to rest. Indeed, theories about adult post-conflict crime cannot help mapping juvenile crime in the same context, as they are bound by age-specific assumptions. This thesis therefore addresses, and contributes to filling, both these empirical and theoretical gaps. I hypothesize that wartime child soldiering increases post-conflict juvenile crime through two complementary mechanisms – the long-term effects of a full socialization into violence and relative economic grievances – and further suggest that both are mediated by gender. Running a negative binomial regression using existing datasets enables me to glean supporting evidence for this hypothesis, as well as preliminary evidence speaking to the socialization mechanism. Yet, overall, the findings remain somewhat inconclusive due to limitations in the data. I thus call for more research – including qualitative work and original data collection – to ground them.Show less
Despite the attention given by researchers to post-war rebel-to-party transitions and their determinants, the relationship between the presence political wings and the transition of rebel groups...Show moreDespite the attention given by researchers to post-war rebel-to-party transitions and their determinants, the relationship between the presence political wings and the transition of rebel groups into political parties remains understudied. In order to fill this gap, this research proposal proposes a large-N statistical analysis of the rebel groups having successfully transitioned into a political party, for all civil wars having ended between 1975 and 2015. It is expected that the presence of political wings will increase the likelihood of rebel-to-party transitions because of two reasons. First, political wings allow rebel groups to expect electoral success, because they provide a legal venue in which supporters can express their support for the rebel group. Second, political wings provide rebel groups with experience and an organizational basis on which to found a political party, thus facilitating the transition of rebel groups to political parties. No evidence is found supporting this hypothesis, which means that political wings are not found to have any effect on rebel-to-party transitions. Still, future research should continue exploring the link between state-building processes and rebel-to-party transitions. While political wings might not play a role, the set up of state-like structures could.Show less
In this thesis, I examine the role of rebel fragmentation on the intensity of sexual violence during armed conflict. The linkage of both concepts has been neglected in the existing literature. In...Show moreIn this thesis, I examine the role of rebel fragmentation on the intensity of sexual violence during armed conflict. The linkage of both concepts has been neglected in the existing literature. In order to overcome this gap, I look at the influence of outbidding. The process of outbidding is the competing effect between two or more rival factions or rebel groups in the same territory and the subsequent surge in extreme violence. Using a single case study, I describe the preexisting levels of sexual violence by the SPLM and the intensity of sexual violence after the split. By doing so, I find evidence that the occurrence of rebel fragmentation is associated with higher intensities of sexual violence. More specifically, my findings conclude that the conflict dynamic of outbidding, and the subsequent reaction with violence by both groups, is a useful explanation for the increase in the levels of sexual violence in South Sudan. The result of this thesis adds to the existing literature on sexual violence and provides an incentive for further research on the matter.Show less
In this thesis, I examine how women’s political socialization before a conflict is connected to the prevalence of sexual violence during conflict. The thesis contributes to the existing literature...Show moreIn this thesis, I examine how women’s political socialization before a conflict is connected to the prevalence of sexual violence during conflict. The thesis contributes to the existing literature with its approach to a better understanding of sexual violence during conflict but also looking at how political socialization could favor certain behavior in conflict. Moreover, it opens a new field that distinguishes between peace and conflict times but acknowledges the importance of socialization before a conflict. The main argument is that the longer women had the chance to participate politically, the more influence they should have had on socialization, and the less sexual violence should happen during conflict. This is based on three mechanisms: women’s value in a society, gender stereotypes and women’s ability to change policies. The hypothesis will be tested in a large-N analysis by using Ordinal Logistic Regression. Two independent variables are being used in order to look at women’s political socialization: the duration of female suffrage and women’s legislative power before the conflict start. The results show that especially the duration of female suffrage can be associated with a lower prevalence of sexual violence during conflict. Against the expectations, it does not make a difference how much legislative power women had in the pre-conflict society. Female suffrage, however, can be seen as an important point in the socialization processes for women and men that has a negative effect on conflict-related sexual violence the longer it has been established.Show less
Environmental scarcity scholars believe that the scarcity of renewable resources an important contributor to violence and conflict in states belonging to the global south. Water scarcity is...Show moreEnvironmental scarcity scholars believe that the scarcity of renewable resources an important contributor to violence and conflict in states belonging to the global south. Water scarcity is becoming increasingly problematic, especially in less developed states. Existing literature has mostly focused on the macro-level and has overlooked the individual's experience of water scarcity. Existing literature mostly focuses on armed conflict and fails to address the impact water scarcity on different types of political behavior. Investigating the individual level can be more concise in explaining the likelihood of political participation. Using the theoretical concept of relative deprivation and quantitative analysis, the relation between water scarcity and individual violent political behavior is investigated in the African continent using disaggregated data from the Afrobarometer. The impact of relative water scarcity is measured to determine whether water scarcity contributes to the propensity of an individual to use violence instead of other means of political participation. No evidence is found that relative water scarcity impacts voting behavior. Both the propensity of demonstration behavior and the propensity of using violence are negatively impacted by relative water scarcity. Therefore, no evidence is found that water scarcity increases the propensity of individuals using violence instead of other political means.Show less
The impact of external interventions on the outcome of violent self-determination conflicts represents a relatively under-explored field within the scholarship on secessionism. This thesis seeks to...Show moreThe impact of external interventions on the outcome of violent self-determination conflicts represents a relatively under-explored field within the scholarship on secessionism. This thesis seeks to conceptualise and explore the ways in which peacekeeping operations (PKOs) alter the secessionists’ threat environment and, consequently, their chances of success. In doing so, it will investigate the claim that the deployment of UN PKOs inadvertently facilitates secession by isolating the rebels and preventing their reintegration. A statistical test is run to corroborate this hypothesis. The findings of this thesis indicate that a significant, positive correlation exists between the presence of UN PKOs and the secessionist movements’ expectations of survival. Consequently, the study points to the necessity of distinguishing between and disaggregating different kinds of external interventions in secessionist conflicts.Show less
Previous research has demonstrated the different factors that can play a role in the use of onesided violence by rebel groups. Humanitarian aid is one of these factors. Studies using quantitative...Show morePrevious research has demonstrated the different factors that can play a role in the use of onesided violence by rebel groups. Humanitarian aid is one of these factors. Studies using quantitative research methods have argued that humanitarian aid increases the use of one-sided violence by rebels. However, these studies lack a detailed elaboration on the relationships within the causal mechanism causing the increase in one-sided violence. I fill this gap in the literature by answering the research question ‘How does humanitarian aid affect the use of onesided violence perpetrated by rebel groups?’. I compare two cases to examine how the following causal mechanisms lead to increased one-sided violence by rebel groups: a perceived threat, looting and an increased number of refugees in one area. The analysis show that humanitarian aid increases the use of one-sided violence.Show less
More than twenty years ago, Fearon (1994; 1997) has argued that democracies are more likely to successfully compel a target state than nondemocracies. However, empirical evidence suggests that this...Show moreMore than twenty years ago, Fearon (1994; 1997) has argued that democracies are more likely to successfully compel a target state than nondemocracies. However, empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case (Snyder & Borghard, 2011; Trachtenberg, 2012; Downes & Sechser, 2012; Sechser, 2018, 335). Consequently, a new understanding of the relationship between regime type and compellence outcomes is needed (Gartzke & Lupu, 2012). I argue that democratic leaders have more incentives to keep the costs of conflict low. Consequently, they will want to prevent disputes from escalating. Hence, they are more likely to not mobilise their troops or to mobilise air troops during a conflict. These options have a lower risk of escalating the conflict than the mobilisation of land or naval troops (Pfundstein Chamberlain, 2016; Post, 2019a). By choosing the careful option, democratic leaders will not be perceived as resolved by the target state (Fearon, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Pfundstein Chamberlain, 2016; Post, 2019a). As a result, compellent threats issued by democracies will have a lower chance to be successful in comparison to threats issued by nondemocracies. I have tested this hypothesis by the Militarised Compellent Threat (MCT) database (Sechser, 2011b).Show less
