This paper investigated the effectiveness of three compensation schemes (a mixed institutionalized, a fully institutionalized and a voluntary compensation scheme) in achieving project acceptance in...Show moreThis paper investigated the effectiveness of three compensation schemes (a mixed institutionalized, a fully institutionalized and a voluntary compensation scheme) in achieving project acceptance in the case of a wind energy project development. Here, bribery perceptions and perceived involvement of local residents were looked at as potential mediators. Furthermore, it was examined whether the trust reputation of the project developer influenced the effect of compensation schemes on project acceptance, as well as on the possible mediators. An experimental scenario study (N = 361) with a 3 (Institutionalization: Fully-institutionalized vs. mixed-institutionalized, vs. voluntary) x 2 (Reputation: Good vs. bad) factorial between-subjects design was conducted with project acceptance, perceived involvement and bribery perception as dependent variables. A mixed institutionalized compensation scheme was expected to lead to higher levels of project acceptance, irrespective of the project developers’ trust reputation. Moreover, a fully institutionalized compensation scheme was expected to lead to more project acceptance than a voluntary compensation scheme in the case of a project developer with a bad reputation but not for one with a good reputation. The results provided limited evidence regarding the effectivity of the compensation schemes in achieving high project acceptance. Contrary to expectations, a voluntary scheme resulted in more project acceptance than a fully institutionalized scheme. This effect was explained by the voluntary scheme leading to more perceived involvement which in turn increased project acceptance. Additionally, the analyses showed that a good trust reputation results in higher project acceptance through reduced bribery perceptions and increased perceived involvement.Show less
Community compensation may be offered in return for the adverse local costs of wind farms. In this experimental scenario study, 361 British participants took the position of a resident facing this...Show moreCommunity compensation may be offered in return for the adverse local costs of wind farms. In this experimental scenario study, 361 British participants took the position of a resident facing this hypothetical situation. They learned that the project developer had a positive or negative reputation, and that compensation was being offered by one of three approaches: voluntarily, institutionalized through law, or by a mix of the latter with local involvement in the decision regarding compensation amount. Regardless of the project developer’s reputation, it was predicted that the mixed approach would result in higher local wind farm acceptance, compared to the other approaches. The local acceptance level was expected to be moderated by reputation for the voluntary approach: with a negative reputation leading to lower local acceptance compared to the fully institutionalized approach. Finally, the effects of project developer reputation and compensation approach on local wind farm acceptance were predicted to be mediated by perceptions of bribery and local involvement. The results demonstrated that voluntarily providing compensation led to greater local wind farm acceptance than institutionalizing compensation, whilst the mixed approach did not differ from either approach. When a negative reputation was made salient, the mixed approach resulted in greater bribery perceptions than both of the other approaches. Lastly, a partial mediation indicated the importance of project developer reputation for wind farm sitings: with a positive reputation found to elicit lower bribery perceptions, higher perceived involvement, and as a result, greater overall local wind farm acceptance, than a negative reputation.Show less
