In this thesis, I examine the interaction between the business strategy of the Amsterdam banking house Hope & Co. from 1756-1780 and the credit crisis of 1772-1773. Hope & Co. played a...Show moreIn this thesis, I examine the interaction between the business strategy of the Amsterdam banking house Hope & Co. from 1756-1780 and the credit crisis of 1772-1773. Hope & Co. played a central role in the unfolding of this historical event, whereas on the other hand, the crisis had a decisive impact on the Hopes’ business strategy. Before the credit crisis, the Hopes operated prudently and consistently, and the firm acted as a market-regulating institution. However, in the runup to the crisis, Hope & Co. became increasingly involved in large-scale financial speculation in London and Amsterdam. Subsequently, in the aftermath of the crisis, the Hopes returned to a strategy of caution. They diversified their business portfolio by investing in the loan sector and gradually shifted from mercantile activities to financial services. Moreover, as the last major family firm in Amsterdam, Hope & Co. affirmed its market-regulating role, henceforth becoming the banker’s banker. This thesis emphasises the importance of credit governance structures for the resilience of markets and merchant communities. The fact that Hope & Co. established itself as a market-regulating institution poses a challenge to new institutional economics. It raises questions on the role of family firms in (the governance of) early modern credit structures.Show less
Research master thesis | History: Societies and Institutions (research) (MA)
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A system of subprime plantation mortgages was created by the Dutch in the second half of the 18th century. A credit structure was set up that would link Dutch investors with their West Indian...Show moreA system of subprime plantation mortgages was created by the Dutch in the second half of the 18th century. A credit structure was set up that would link Dutch investors with their West Indian colonies, by providing plantation mortgages (called negotiaties) for those dreaming of becoming planters. Interest rates were high: attractive for investors, but all too cumbersome for the new plantation owners. Many planters, mostly producing coffee, could not repay their loans, leading to the demise of the system as many bankrupt planters returned home and investors lost their capital. That is the case in Suriname at least, because in the near-by colonies of Essequibo and Demerara the plantation economy had only just took-off and continued to expand. This thesis tries to explain that divergence, next to identifying the winners and losers in the system and testing several explanatory concepts in order to gain a better conceptual understanding of the negotiatie structure. Results are that winners and losers were different than previously thought: investors could still be winners, while the fund managers could easily be losers. Additionally, the negotiatie system should be termed a classic mania, that could persist only for a limited time because of the Ponzi aspects, visible in the need for continuous refinancing. Lastly, the plantation mortgage structure could be seen as a failed transition to modernity, one that tried to bridge the commercial and financial interest of the Dutch economy, but was too much rooted in mercantilist thought. This was less the case for Essequibo and Demerara, where an open, but partly illegal, connection with the rest of the Atlantic was more important than the obligatory relationship with the metropolis. Next to legal supplies, illegal trade occurred on a large scale and proved crucial for the development of the two colonies.Show less
