I provide an analysis of modern freedom, introduced by de Dijn. I claim that modern freedom is a vague and ambiguous concept, influenced by many different conceptions throughout history, which all...Show moreI provide an analysis of modern freedom, introduced by de Dijn. I claim that modern freedom is a vague and ambiguous concept, influenced by many different conceptions throughout history, which all have had different ideas about freedom and the value of freedom within a political context, and that they are all still relevant to this day. To defend this claim, this thesis makes two arguments. The first is that the conceptions of freedom that form the basis of modern freedom, show many differences in their conceptions and valuations of freedom. If the conceptions on which modern freedom is based are diverse and different, it would seem that modern freedom is not a homogeneous conception, but instead an assembly of different ideas and values that can change depending on the context of the discussion in which it is named. The second argument is that there are many elements in De Dijn’s conception of modern freedom that can be traced back to her notion of democratic freedom, which would suggest that the ‘decisive breach’ that De Dijn describes is not as decisive as she claims it was. Instead, while new elements were introduced, our modern conception of freedom has been influenced by both ancient and modern ideas on freedom, leading to a broad and vague, context-dependent conception of freedom in modern times.Show less
I aim to explore the possible answers to the question; what makes institutional corruption wrong? In particular, I provide an account of corruption based on institutional virtue theory. I come up...Show moreI aim to explore the possible answers to the question; what makes institutional corruption wrong? In particular, I provide an account of corruption based on institutional virtue theory. I come up with three conditions for corruption; viciousness, knowing an act could have particular effects, and the benefits one receives from it. These conditions are applicable on an individual and institutional level. I suggest my account benefits from avoiding the criticism directed at its alternatives (deontic and teleological views on the wrongness of corruption). It cannot overexplain the central concept of the text because it distinguishes corrupt acts from breaches of fiduciary duty through the third condition for corruption. With that, it avoids the charge of underexplaining, as it claims one-off acts are corrupt independent of their effect on an institution.Show less
