Master thesis | Crisis and Security Management (MSc)
open access
Although strategic communication is a tool that can help in countering adversarial influencing campaigns whilst simultaneously increasing resilience against them, it also has the potential to work...Show moreAlthough strategic communication is a tool that can help in countering adversarial influencing campaigns whilst simultaneously increasing resilience against them, it also has the potential to work against the sender’s own goals. This research focuses on how the design of a message contributes to this phenomenon, referred to as ‘information fratricide’. Because the term ‘information fratricide’ is derived from the military and this research focuses on non-military strategic communications in the modern contested information environment, information fratricide is theoretically and conceptually (re)developed to be better suitable for the use in this research. This is done by breaking down Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding theory (1973) and Shannon and Weaver’s concept of ‘noise’ (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). In order to identify the role of message design in information fratricide, an analysis of information fratricide incidents was made. The analysis focused on the communication of U.S. officials about the Russian military build-up at Ukraine’s borders in 2022 and the information fratricidal effects on three receivers of this communication, and found that message design contributes to information fratricide through the ideas that codes add to a message. Furthermore, it was found that the effects of past information fratricide incidents work over time to potentially affect future friendly operations.Show less
Master thesis | Crisis and Security Management (MSc)
open access
This study focuses on the changing legislation towards protecting national security and the consequences of those changes regarding the legal protection of civil rights. Through an analysis of a...Show moreThis study focuses on the changing legislation towards protecting national security and the consequences of those changes regarding the legal protection of civil rights. Through an analysis of a longitudinal case study (1987-2021), the question has been answered what the possible consequences will be for the legal protection of civil rights after the last revision of the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service Act 2017 (Wiv 2017) which took place in 2021. This revision contains extensions regarding intelligence sharing operations of the Dutch intelligence and security services. This means that fundamental civil rights stated in the European Convention of Human Rights could be more easily affected than before. This will be the case when foreign intelligence and security services share the received intelligence with third parties without consent from the Dutch intelligence and security agencies. Additionally, shared intelligence might thus be more easily used by the receiving agency for harmful purposes that do not correspond with the interest of the Dutch intelligence and security services and the Dutch state. Moreover, the receiver agency might interpret the intelligence regarding a citizen that this person is perceived as serious terrorist threat by the sending agency and therefore affect the life of the person in question. Thus, incorporating the ex-ante review of the Review Committee on the Deployment of Powers (TIB) besides the authorization of the appointed minister and ex-post review of the Intelligence and Security Services Oversight Committee (CTIVD) might improve the actual legal protection of the fundamental civil rights in the Dutch society.Show less
Master thesis | Crisis and Security Management (MSc)
open access
This thesis analyzes Italian foreign policy in Libya between 2014 and late 2019. It tries to understand the factors that contributed to success or failure in achieving the main strategic objectives...Show moreThis thesis analyzes Italian foreign policy in Libya between 2014 and late 2019. It tries to understand the factors that contributed to success or failure in achieving the main strategic objectives: 1) achieving stabilization in Libya, securing energy and commercial interests and 2) opposing/controlling immigration. With this goal, the analysis focuses on assessing the Italian governments' performance during the selected time-frame (Renzi, Gentiloni, and Conte-1). This study excludes any ethical or moral considerations, and the analysis focuses purely on the appropriateness and effectiveness in achieving the strategic objectives. The performance assessment relies on the analytical framework developed by the European Council on Foreign Relations to study European Union foreign policy. This framework consists of a "scorecard", a method that allows to link qualitative evaluations to a numerical scale; the evaluation subjects are the strategic objectives, and the criteria through which they are assessed are: resources, strategy, outcome and consequences. Therefore, the performance of each government will be evaluated on each of the strategic objectives. In turn, the strategic objectives will be assessed according to the four criteria mentioned above. Eventually, there will be an overall assessment for the government foreign policy in Libya, an overall assessment for each of its strategic objectives, and a more specific assessment on each component inside the strategic objective. From the analysis, it emerges that the Renzi government scored "good" for the first objective and "sufficient" for the second, resulting in an overall "satisfactory" final grade. The Gentiloni government got "satisfactory" for the first, and "very good" for the second, culminating in an overall "good" foreign policy in Libya. Finally, the Conte government scored "strongly insufficient" for the first objective and "very good" for the second, for a final "satisfactory" result. Stabilization - Due to the meddling of several foreign powers with different interests than stabilization, it was complicated to stabilize Libya. However, while Rome was a very influent actor in the early stages, Italy's lack of strategy and assertiveness after the Renzi government doomed any hopes of success. In particular, the inability to create a solid European front was determinant: Italy did not have the resources nor the diplomatic weight to seriously influence Libya's situation. Therefore, Russia and Turkey exploited the vacuum left by Europeans. Finally, the Italian position of "equidistance" chosen by the Conte government resulted in ambiguity, with consequential loss of credibility and influence. Energy security and commercial interests - On the one hand, the Italian navy operation Mare Sicuro proved to be an efficient measure to secure critical energy infrastructures and Italian commercial interests offshore. On the other hand, Italian commercial interests on the Libyan soil were to be achieved by stabilizing the country. The failure in doing so especially impacted medium-small business, as they had to leave the country. On the contrary, ENI had the power and capabilities to maintain its productivity throughout the Libyan conflict, suffering only temporary problems. Immigration - For reducing the number of immigrants landing in Italy, the Renzi government led colossal naval operations and argued for a redistribution system at the EU level. However, naval operations acted as a pull factor for migrants leaving from Libya, and some EU member states refused categorically to implement a redistribution system. This objective was better achieved with the unilateral and "harsher" measures taken by the Gentiloni and Conte-1 governments; the deals brokered with the local clans and with the Libyan Coast Guard led to a dramatic decrease in the number of departures. Likewise, policies "anti-NGOs" and the unilateral action to close Italian ports were highly successful: these moves determined a further reduction in the number of arrivals, deterring migrants from leaving in the first place and strong-arming some EU members to accept their share of migrants.Show less
