What do we owe the global poor? Caney (2007) answers this long-standing philosophical question by arguing that there is a negative duty of justice not to foist an unjust global order on others and...Show moreWhat do we owe the global poor? Caney (2007) answers this long-standing philosophical question by arguing that there is a negative duty of justice not to foist an unjust global order on others and a positive duty of justice to eradicate all poverty that did not arise from the imposition of this unjust order. In this thesis, I argue that the first part of Caney’s conception is too narrow, and the second part is too broad. The first part of his conception is too narrow in scope because it attributes duties only to a limited number of people through membership of a relatively fixed shared structure. I argue, instead, that one gains a duty by being causally connected to the harm. This is a more inclusive broader approach that can account for almost all cases of poverty. The second part of Caney’s conception is too broad, I argue, since it is not a perfect duty of justice but an imperfect duty. My claim is that duties must be primarily attributed through causal connection and that for a perfect duty to arise a causal connection is crucial. Therefore, I argue that there is a perfect duty through causal connection and an imperfect duty without causal connection.Show less
Het doel van deze paper is om te onderzoeken of mensen ten tijde van de klimaatcrisis zoveel kinderen als ze willen op de wereld mogen zetten volgens de beste vorm van het utilisme. Ten eerste...Show moreHet doel van deze paper is om te onderzoeken of mensen ten tijde van de klimaatcrisis zoveel kinderen als ze willen op de wereld mogen zetten volgens de beste vorm van het utilisme. Ten eerste wordt er beargumenteerd dat asymmetrisch person-affecting utilisme de beste vorm van het utilisme. Deze vorm van utilisme vermijdt de problemen van andere vormen van utilisme. Asymmetrisch person-affecting utilisme beweert dat mensen niet zoveel kinderen als ze willen op de wereld mogen zetten. We moeten lijden voorkomen. Het is immoreel om levens in de wereld te brengen die het leven niet waard zijn, ook al is het moreel gezien neutraal om levens in de wereld te brengen die wel het leven waard zijn. Hieruit volgen de volgende twee beweringen: - Wanneer we voor de verwekking weten dat het individu niet de minimale acceptabele levensstandaard zal halen, zou hij niet geproduceerd mogen worden. (We willen tenslotte niet dat het individu zou lijden.) - Als we kunnen vaststellen dat de populatie zou lijden wanneer hij wordt vergroot, moeten we voorkomen dat de populatie wordt vergroot. (We willen niet een populatie waarin mensen lijden.)Show less
Luck egalitarianism is a theory that follows from Dworkin. It is an interesting theory of distributive justice which states that differences in wealth are allowed when based on differences in...Show moreLuck egalitarianism is a theory that follows from Dworkin. It is an interesting theory of distributive justice which states that differences in wealth are allowed when based on differences in ambition. Differences based on endowments are not allowed. The original formulation of luck egalitarianism by Dworkin has three problems: the harsh treatment problem, a distributive paradigm and the background inequalities problem. This dissertation tries to reformulate luck egalitarianism in a responsibility sensitive way in order to overcome the three problems. The conclusion of this dissertation is that the responsibility sensitive interpretation of luck egalitarianism comes closer to solving the problems than Dworkin's original formulation, however the responsibility sensitive interpretation does not solve all of the problems.Show less
The largest contributor to climate change is human reproduction. Although restricting population growth might prove an effective in couteracting climate change, our liberal intuition tells us it...Show moreThe largest contributor to climate change is human reproduction. Although restricting population growth might prove an effective in couteracting climate change, our liberal intuition tells us it would be wrong to interfere with people's reproductive affairs. This essay investigates whether that is necessarily the case.Show less
Moral disagreement strikes a deep philosophical nerve and is discussed intensively in metaethical literature, often in relation to the ‘argument from disagreement’. The family of arguments from...Show moreMoral disagreement strikes a deep philosophical nerve and is discussed intensively in metaethical literature, often in relation to the ‘argument from disagreement’. The family of arguments from disagreement establishes the existence of moral disagreement to subsequently draw certain skeptical conclusions about morality and moral practice. Such arguments are often used to argue against the supposed existence of objective moral truths. This thesis answers the question ‘What is the strongest version of the argument from disagreement against the objectivity of morality?’ by evaluating the argument’s inferential structure and the characteristics of the utilized disagreement and concludes that the strongest argument from disagreement would be one that argues deductively from faultless disagreement.Show less
In this thesis I will examine the plausibility of the independence thesis concerning the relation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, by studying the concomitant principle of the moral equality...Show moreIn this thesis I will examine the plausibility of the independence thesis concerning the relation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, by studying the concomitant principle of the moral equality of combatants. With Walzer defending the principle and McMahan denying it, I will argue that McMahan’s denial of the moral equality of combatants and consequently the independence thesis, ultimately relies on his account of moral responsibility for individuals in domestic society, which cannot be properly applied to combatants during war. As such, McMahan’s denial of the moral equality of combatants becomes invalid and with it, his denial of the independence thesis. In doing so, my thesis will add to the ongoing debate between the two philosophers and test the validity of their positions, which have been very influential within the field of the ethics of war, to hopefully come closer to resolving the still relevant debate.Show less
In 'The Problem of Political Authority', Michael Huemer rejects the idea of political authority and introduces his account of the anarcho-capitalist society. In this society without government...Show moreIn 'The Problem of Political Authority', Michael Huemer rejects the idea of political authority and introduces his account of the anarcho-capitalist society. In this society without government everything is arranged by market mechanisms. In my thesis, I investigate whether Huemer's theory is philosophically convincing and I conclude that this is not the case due to major flaws in Huemer's use of methodology and in his arguments.Show less
The debate on immigration is broad and controversial, but many of the academic literature on the topic is lacking philosophical analysis. In this thesis, my aim is to provide a philosophical...Show moreThe debate on immigration is broad and controversial, but many of the academic literature on the topic is lacking philosophical analysis. In this thesis, my aim is to provide a philosophical argument against the naturalization of all immigrants. I will do so by showing that the naturalization of some immigrants is not a moral obligation but in fact supererogatory instead.Show less
The debate on state interference to promote citizen’s health is broad and controversial. In this thesis, my aim is to provide a philosophical argument in favour of nudging for health, which is an...Show moreThe debate on state interference to promote citizen’s health is broad and controversial. In this thesis, my aim is to provide a philosophical argument in favour of nudging for health, which is an effective tool to create more health. Liberals in general are afraid that nudging for health is too paternalistic and coercive and hence deprive our freedom. I will argue that some liberals and specifically “Humean liberals” can accept this far-reaching and invasive interference in the personal sphere. This argument is based on the idea that we should follow our ‘higher’ desire to be healthy.Show less
This paper takes a critical look at the conception of John Rawls' original position and illustrates how the conditions for knowledge, and the limitations thereof, set up by the original position...Show moreThis paper takes a critical look at the conception of John Rawls' original position and illustrates how the conditions for knowledge, and the limitations thereof, set up by the original position and the veil of ignorance, are not specific enough to avoid running into the problem of mathematical, semantic, and logical indeterminacyShow less
Ian Carter identifies a philosophical dispute about whether either all political concepts necessarily express ethical evaluation, or some can be ethically detached. Establishing the truth of the...Show moreIan Carter identifies a philosophical dispute about whether either all political concepts necessarily express ethical evaluation, or some can be ethically detached. Establishing the truth of the latter is especially interesting, since ethically loaded accounts often generate confusions and misunderstandings within moral and political discourse. Carter suggests that it is possible to provide largely ethically detached accounts of certain political concepts, especially freedom, namely in being to a certain extent value-free or value-neutral. I scrutinize his proposal through examining three examples of partly ethically detached concepts of freedom, and ask whether such concepts are indeed possible and useful for both normative and conceptual theorizing. I conclude that overall, beside some remarks, Carter’s theory makes sense and provides an original and useful insight in the nature of ethical theories and their concepts, especially concepts of freedom.Show less
