The advent of Shinzō Abe and Xi Jinping in 2012 as respective leaders of Japan and China amidst a deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands launched a supposed new...Show moreThe advent of Shinzō Abe and Xi Jinping in 2012 as respective leaders of Japan and China amidst a deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands launched a supposed new era in foreign policy that is typically characterised by ‘rivalry’ in much of the literature, thereby reinforcing the China Threat paradigm. Some examine Sino-Japanese relations through a material lens and focus on military strength or economic preponderance, whereas relational Constructivists centre on a Japanese ‘Self’ 'identity' in relation to 'Others'. However, these studies take subjects, discursive practices and meanings that are constitutive of foreign policy as a given and uncritically accepts these as true. This is problematic, because rather than questioning the status-quo, their ontological arguments reinforce it. A poststructural analysis on foreign policy discourse within ethical, temporal and spatial dimensions with due consideration for the margins of the political debate brings in an epistemological perspective. This reveals inherent inconsistencies and contradictions that argue against the assumed ‘rivalry’, and continuous production and reproduction of the China Threat paradigm in relational Constructivist literature. This allows for an understanding of foreign policy as a transformative praxis capable of changing the way Sino-Japanese relations are registered, both in theory and in practice.Show less
The thesis examines the effects on the EU’s normative power on the ratification of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China. The analysis applies a social constructivist framework to...Show moreThe thesis examines the effects on the EU’s normative power on the ratification of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China. The analysis applies a social constructivist framework to test whether there are causal links between the EU’s commitment to its core norms and values and the stagnating ratification of the CAI in light of human rights violations in China. The research aims to answer to the question: What explains the lack of consensus over the ratification of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China? Using process tracing, the thesis examines the Human Rights Dialogue, China’s Compliance with International Human Rights Law, sanctions and the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime as causal mechanisms. The thesis concludes that the EU’s normative power has been one of the key reasons behind that the fact the CAI has not yet been ratified.Show less
This thesis argues that during the Abe and Suga administrations, Japan has been successful at pushing some of its key security objectives into the agendas of strategically important Southeast Asian...Show moreThis thesis argues that during the Abe and Suga administrations, Japan has been successful at pushing some of its key security objectives into the agendas of strategically important Southeast Asian states through the process of tactical hedging. Tactical hedging has allowed the Abe and Suga administrations to be flexible with its policy approach to the rise of China, allowing Japan to be firm on security issues in Southeast Asia when needed, while allowing room for friendly economic competition. This flexibility made security cooperation with Japan more viable for Southeast Asian states, as none of the countries wish to pursue a hard-line China containment policy. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, which has seen notable alterations by the Abe and Suga administration to address the needs of their Southeast Asian partners, and Japan refraining from openly criticizing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are examples of Japan taking the concerns of its Southeast Asian partners into account. While still at an early stage, the results of Japan’s tactical hedging can be seen within Japan’s improved security relations with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. These three countries, which belong to the largest economies of ASEAN, and are faced with China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, will therefore be used to support the importance of tactical hedging for security cooperation in East Asia.Show less
This thesis argues that during the Abe and Suga administrations, Japan has been successful at pushing some of its key security objectives into the agendas of strategically important Southeast Asian...Show moreThis thesis argues that during the Abe and Suga administrations, Japan has been successful at pushing some of its key security objectives into the agendas of strategically important Southeast Asian states through the process of tactical hedging. Tactical hedging has allowed the Abe and Suga administrations to be flexible with its policy approach to the rise of China, allowing Japan to be firm on security issues in Southeast Asia when needed, while allowing room for friendly economic competition. This flexibility made security cooperation with Japan more viable for Southeast Asian states, as none of the countries wish to pursue a hard-line China containment policy. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, which has seen notable alterations by the Abe and Suga administration to address the needs of their Southeast Asian partners, and Japan refraining from openly criticizing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are examples of Japan taking the concerns of its Southeast Asian partners into account. While still at an early stage, the results of Japan’s tactical hedging can be seen within Japan’s improved security relations with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. These three countries, which belong to the largest economies of ASEAN, and are faced with China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, will therefore be used to support the importance of tactical hedging for security cooperation in East Asia.Show less
