Natural disasters pose a unique threat to authoritarian regimes because they can bring existing failures within the structure of governance into sharp relief, thus legitimising the grievances of...Show moreNatural disasters pose a unique threat to authoritarian regimes because they can bring existing failures within the structure of governance into sharp relief, thus legitimising the grievances of rebel groups and increasing the risk of civil conflict. Most regimes therefore attempt to ensure humanitarian aid is secured and distributed, to mitigate such damages. Why then, do some regimes obstruct or deny humanitarian aid if doing so may incur costs to the regime? This thesis solves this puzzle by investigating the cases of the Bhola Cyclone in East Pakistan in 1970 and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008 and assessing whether each of four key factors were observable in either case. The four factors are: ethnic and ideological differences; a fear of foreign intervention; elite rivalry; and the exit strategy of the military dictator. This analysis leads to several interesting conclusions. First, ethnic or ideological differences are not enough motivation for a regime to incur the costs of obstructing aid. Second, regimes will deny or obstruct foreign aid if they believe doing so will lead to a decreased risk of civil conflict. Third, elite rivalry may manipulate the regime’s leadership into acting against its own best interests. Finally, authoritarian leaders will prioritise their own exit strategy over the need to prevent untold numbers of civilian deaths.Show less
