This thesis examines whether the belief that nature has intrinsic value is compatible with an instrumental view of nature’s value in the context of the ecosystem services approach. I will argue...Show moreThis thesis examines whether the belief that nature has intrinsic value is compatible with an instrumental view of nature’s value in the context of the ecosystem services approach. I will argue that the ecosystem services approach and the belief that nature is intrinsically valuable are for the most part at odds.Show less
This thesis explores the realm of procreative ethics. In this thesis I provide an example of a prospective procreative couple, Ario and Linda, who wish to procreate in dire circumstances of extreme...Show moreThis thesis explores the realm of procreative ethics. In this thesis I provide an example of a prospective procreative couple, Ario and Linda, who wish to procreate in dire circumstances of extreme poverty. I claim that the future child they wish to create (Zaine) will be wronged by their deliberate decision to bring about his life. They wrong this child in the sense that; 1.) they do not have the capability to provide the future child with a minimally adequate standard of upbringing; and 2.) they violate this future child’s birthright to a minimally decent life. Procreating into the dire conditions of extreme poverty prevents this child from enjoying this birthright. Therefore, Linda and Ario, in their procreative circumstances, create this child in such a way as to violate his birthright. They wrong the child in their procreative decision to bring about his life. Chapter one of this essay explores the Non-Identity Problem which poses significant justificatory hurdles if one is to claim that a future child can be wronged by being brought into existence. Chapter two builds on a non-consequentialist approach (introduced in chapter one) to wrongdoing wherein I adopt a deontic principle constraining the procreative right of potential procreators. This deontic principle claims that potential procreators have a duty to provide any offspring they create with an adequate standard of upbringing (section 2.0). Moreover, I will adopt and defend the position that a future child has a birthright to a minimally decent life (section 2.1). Furthermore, I provide, and defend, a threshold standard of existence that illustrates when a life should be considered less than minimally decent (section 2.2). Chapter three is utilized to respond to a number of objections in light of the claim I have proposed.Show less
This thesis critically analyses the success of John Rawls’s political liberalism, which recast his theory of justice from a comprehensive doctrine to a political conception. This analysis into...Show moreThis thesis critically analyses the success of John Rawls’s political liberalism, which recast his theory of justice from a comprehensive doctrine to a political conception. This analysis into Rawlsian political liberalism involves an examination of the way in which political liberals have responded to the objections raised by critics of the theory. Through analysing the problem of asymmetry in political liberalism, this thesis argues that political liberalism is only able to remain viable on the basis of the notion of reasonableness, which characterises the group of highly idealised, reasonable citizens. These citizens are immensely important to political liberalism, since they have the role of deliberating on and justifying the political conception of justice. In order for political liberalism to remain a tenable account of how agreement can be reached on the principles of justice, the idea of reasonableness requires justification. Political liberals attempt to accomplish this by appealing to the public political culture, and the shared political ideas found within it, which all democratically-aligned citizens will endorse. This thesis also argues that such a claim cannot be made, since the political ideas are subject to interpretation and thus not shared. It is also illustrated that political liberals cannot ground their theory in the support of committed democrats, since disagreement over the ideas of democracy and reasonableness are likely. After concluding that political liberalism cannot be defended, the last chapter of this thesis focuses upon a perfectionist liberalism, which Rawls argues must be rejected. This thesis argues that, on the contrary, perfectionist liberalism may be able to overcome the problems that political liberals associate with it.Show less
Given that self-respect plays an incredibly important role in our lives, the aim of this thesis is to determine what place it should have in a theory of justice. In order to do so, it first...Show moreGiven that self-respect plays an incredibly important role in our lives, the aim of this thesis is to determine what place it should have in a theory of justice. In order to do so, it first examines the existing philosophical literature on this concept. It argues that this literature does not offer us a proper understanding of self-respect, treating it as an exclusively normative notion, while failing to consider its non-normative, empirical facet. By drawing on recent scientific research, it shows that there is an essentially natural component to self-respect, thereby pointing out a gap in the existing philosophical literature. Moreover, it argues that this natural component has to be taken into account, not just in order to properly understand this concept, but also to determine its place in a theory of justice. So, what is the place of self-respect in a theory of justice? Zooming in on John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, this thesis shows that Rawls only focussed on securing the social bases of self-respect, but failed to properly acknowledge its essentially natural component. Consequentially, Rawls failed to fully comprehend the fundamental difference between selfrespect and other social primary goods, failed to recognise the limits to treating self-respect as a distribuendum, and most seriously, failed to properly compensate citizens suffering from a natural deficiency of self-respect. This leads to the view that self-respect should be understood as a metric of justice instead of as a distribuendum. Lastly, this thesis asks how a theory of justice should treat those who are pessimistically predisposed, and as a result lack self-respect. It shows that these citizens can to at least some extent develop their self-respect. However, it also shows that in order to properly support citizens’ self-respect, one should not think and speak in terms of compensating them for some ‘disadvantage’, but in terms of affirming their equal worth and allowing them to live a worthy life. It concludes that while Dworkin’s luck egalitarian theory fails on the ideal and non-ideal level, and Anderson’s relational egalitarian theory fails on the non-ideal level, incorporating the constructive critique offered by Sen’s capabilities approach would make Rawls’ theory of justice optimally conducive to securing citizens’ self-respect.Show less
