The current paper examines the use of political violence during the Ruhr Uprising of 1920. Its main focus is the reaction of the SPD and the KPD to the uprising and its bloody suppression by the...Show moreThe current paper examines the use of political violence during the Ruhr Uprising of 1920. Its main focus is the reaction of the SPD and the KPD to the uprising and its bloody suppression by the Reichswehr and Freikorps. It also contextualises the Uprising and violence that followed by connecting local events in the Ruhr with national developments, such as the Kapp Putsch and international trends of post-war instability and brutality. The paper through its examination of Vorwärts and Die Rote Fahne argues that both the SPD and KPD changed their understanding of the role of violence in preserving or overthrowing the Weimar Republic, respectively. On the one hand, the KPD, weakened by the failures of 1919 did not push for the spread of revolutionary violence. On the other hand, the SPD shifted ideologically from its 1919 of understanding state-sponsored violence as necessary for preserving the integrity of the State. It now understood violence as a tool for protecting the well-being of Germany’s citizenry. A tool to be used sparingly and with restraint, because it needed popular support to be legitimate. This new understanding of state-sponsored violence was not shared by the men tasked with suppressing the Uprising. The result was another bloody chapter in the life of the young RepublicShow less
This thesis shows that the conceptions of Habsburg multinationalism continued to have a decisive influence on interwar Austrian social democratic and Catholic conservative political thinking on...Show moreThis thesis shows that the conceptions of Habsburg multinationalism continued to have a decisive influence on interwar Austrian social democratic and Catholic conservative political thinking on internationalism in the period 1916-1927. The legitimations of the Habsburg Empire’s place in Central Europe, which included a distinguishing between political state and cultural nation, an othering of the ‘Eastern menace’ and the peculiar civilisational paradox of German superiority and national diversity, showed a ‘stability of meaning’ that continued to dominate Austrian political rhetoric after the Treaty of St. Germain. An actively fought ‘battle for intellectual hegemony’, which sprung from the Empire’s civilisational mission and found expression both in Austromarxist dogmatism and Catholic traditionalism, brought about a particular focus on education as a means for ‘socialisation’, renewal of Catholic values and internationalisation. Austrian Catholic and socialist internationalismsshowed similarities, stressing the importance of cultural internationalisation through education and free trade in Central Europe. The Christian Social chancellor Ignaz Seipel loomed large as an inspirational figure for (young) Catholics in the whole of Europe while Austromarxists Friedrich Adler and Otto Bauer tried in vain to bridge the gap between Labourist social democracy and Bolshevist communism The focus on Kulturpolitik and the universalist legitimations of Empire produced an internationalism that left room for utopian international schemes of European unity. Moreover, internationalism became a rhetorical tool in the increasingly polarised domestic debate in Austria, legitimising local political action with high-flying international idealism. This created a reality gap between local politics and utopian internationalism which resulted in an opportunistic Austrian foreign policy that was open to international initiatives like the League of Nations, the Little Entente and Paneuropa but that would never whole-hearted commit itself. Austrian international utopianism wanted to keep every option on the table which created a situation in which politicians had to settle for the internationalist option closest at hand. In the end, that turned out to be Anschluß to Germany.Show less
