Within the Dutch liberal democracy, a political as well as fundamental tension can be felt between the liberal democracy and Islam. One of the legal examples that can be offered in relation to the...Show moreWithin the Dutch liberal democracy, a political as well as fundamental tension can be felt between the liberal democracy and Islam. One of the legal examples that can be offered in relation to the tension between the liberal democracy and Islam, is the “Temporary Law on Counterterrorism Administrative Measures". This temporary law was put into place in order to fight threats of (Muslim) terrorism, by making it possible to (among other administrative measures) restrict the freedom of movement of a person through an area ban and / or travel ban based on the possible threat they can become, given their religious beliefs and actions (the fear of radicalisation). The question is where to draw the line between protecting society in relation to national security and restricting one’s freedom, based on religious beliefs that go against (some of) the principles of the liberal democracy. The main question of this thesis will therefore be the following: Is it justified for a liberal democracy to enforce administrative sanctions upon its citizens, based on their religious identity? In discussing the place of religion (and religious identity) within the liberal democracy, I will focus on four different approaches: the communitarian consensus, state neutrality, the human nature approach and the overlapping consensus approach. I will argue that none of these approaches offer a justified answer to how Salafi citizens can coexist peacefully with others while living according to the principles of liberal democracy. I will argue, however, that the inability of the Salafi identity to coexist with the ideals of the liberal democracy, does not necessarily justify state interference (by enforcing sanctions upon the Salafi citizens). It is important to look at the actions that follow from ones identity, in order to judge if state interference is justified. Following the three groups identified by Wiktorowicz in his “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement”, I will argue that the state is not allowed to act against purists, the state can use administrative measures to restrict politicos and is allowed to use both administrative as well as criminal measures against jihadis.Show less
Does the deliberative model of democracy as theorized by Jürgen Habermas yield illegitimate outcomes? To answer this question, I trace the foundations of Habermas' deliberative model and explore...Show moreDoes the deliberative model of democracy as theorized by Jürgen Habermas yield illegitimate outcomes? To answer this question, I trace the foundations of Habermas' deliberative model and explore several critiques outlined by Aletta Norval. I argue that Habermas' model does not produce illegitimate outcomes in the three ways that Norval suggests. Firstly, the elitist argument fails because it either misconceives the reconstructive core of deliberative theory or it underestimates the ability of the public sphere to accommodate difference. Secondly, Norval’s argument that the need for compromise-formation weakens the deliberative model such that it should be reconsidered as a whole, fails as well, because bargaining depends on that same discourse model in order to produce fair agreements. Compromise-formation is thus indirectly yet decisively subjected to the discourse principle. Lastly, the post-structuralist critique fails. For Habermas, an orientation towards consensus does not mean that agreement is the goal of discourse, as Norval claims. Discussion, not consensus, is what is central to deliberation. Furthermore, the principle of neutrality does not preclude differences from being discussed. It is not a normative principle, but rather a result from the reconstruction of actual practices of argumentation.Show less
In this thesis I examine the arguments against open borders that David Miller gives in his book 'Strangers in Our Midst'. First, I identify and examine three stages in his case. Then, I show...Show moreIn this thesis I examine the arguments against open borders that David Miller gives in his book 'Strangers in Our Midst'. First, I identify and examine three stages in his case. Then, I show problems with the first two stages. Finally, I examine the third stage and, focusing on the usage of 'culture' make clear why Miller's case fails.Show less
In recent years, distributive justice has been increasingly concerned with the elimination of disadvantages for which individuals are not responsible. Ideally, these misfortunes should be relieved...Show moreIn recent years, distributive justice has been increasingly concerned with the elimination of disadvantages for which individuals are not responsible. Ideally, these misfortunes should be relieved by those whose fortune is not their responsibility. This is the core of responsibility-egalitarianism. This thesis asks how can it be possible that a society accomplishes a responsibility-egalitarian distribution of economic inequalities. More specifically, I discuss the real-world possibility of (re)distributing economic inequalities according to a specific version of responsibility-egalitarianism. If possible, this version would ensure that all disadvantaged individuals are able to avoid the economic disadvantages they face. I use Ronald Dworkin´s proposal for equality of resources as an example of this responsibility-egalitarian distribution and assess its application in the real-world by means of taxation. My thesis is that a responsibility-egalitarian distribution of economic inequalities is possible by means of a new form of progressive income taxation. Establishing this scheme gives individuals the real ability of choosing to avoid misfortunate economic circumstances.Show less
The rapid development of technological innovation has yielded increasing returns on capital investment relative to labour. At the same time, the accumulation of capital seems to be concentrating...Show moreThe rapid development of technological innovation has yielded increasing returns on capital investment relative to labour. At the same time, the accumulation of capital seems to be concentrating more and more into the hands of a select few, resulting in the development of far-reaching economic inequalities. With the development of technological innovation having gained considerable momentum in modern times, the need to design effective policies centred around dealing with the economic, social and political effects of its development arguably seems more important than ever. Property-owning democrats –drawing on John Rawls' conception of justice as fairness- have set out proposals for curbing what they conceive to be undesirable developments in inequality, focusing mainly on the establishment of a socio-economic framework characterized by the widespread dispersal of capital assets. Some scholars such as Vallier (2015), however, have cast doubts on the desirability and effectiveness of adopting a property-owning democracy as the socio-economic arrangement fit to meet these challenges. This thesis attempts to settle the debate. I argue that the satisfaction of the Rawlsian fair value of political liberties favours the justification of a property-owning democracy over that of welfare-capitalism. Furthermore, I assert that the satisfaction of Rawls’ difference principle depends on the exact definition of ‘benefiting’ the least well off, so that this principle may favour the justification of either socio-economic arrangement. I further argue that meeting Rawls’ principle of equality of opportunity would be better served in the context of welfare-state capitalism, taking into account the critiques set out by O’Neill (2009) and Vallier. In addition, I identify further theoretical issues regarding property-owning democrats’ definition of private property that have, in my view, not been sufficiently addressed. Lastly, I identify a number of practical issues regarding the implications of a property-owning democracy in an economic context. Given that only the fair value of political liberties points directly towards the justification of a property-owning democracy -with its justification on the basis of the difference principle and equality of opportunity being questionable and thus unjust- I conclude that a property-owning democracy is not justifiable on Rawlsian grounds.Show less
It is often assumed that act-utilitarianism cannot account for human rights. In this thesis, I argue that an act-utilitarian derivation of human rights is possible. First, I show that most major...Show moreIt is often assumed that act-utilitarianism cannot account for human rights. In this thesis, I argue that an act-utilitarian derivation of human rights is possible. First, I show that most major objections to a utilitarian theory of rights can be tackled by using a plausible definition of rights that contains no unnecessary anti-utilitarian elements. However, one serious problem remains: in any adequate definition, rights must have moral force. Because act-utilitarianism only considers the consequences of acts, it appears to be unable to assign the force to human rights that they require. I argue that primitive rule-utilitarianism does not suffer from this problem: it makes human rights have major weight in utility calculations, which gives them significant moral force. However, David Lyons’ thesis of extensional equivalence between generalised and simple utility entails that act-utilitarianism can assign just as much force to human rights as primitive rule-utilitarianism can. I conclude that, in contrast to what is commonly assumed, human rights do have force in act-utilitarianism.Show less
Voor Fukuyama is het doel van de geschiedenis dat de idee van vrijheid wordt gerealiseerd. De overwinning van de liberaal democratische ideologie op het fascisme en communisme realiseert deze...Show moreVoor Fukuyama is het doel van de geschiedenis dat de idee van vrijheid wordt gerealiseerd. De overwinning van de liberaal democratische ideologie op het fascisme en communisme realiseert deze vrijheid. De liberale democratie heeft een universele aantrekkingskracht en zal naar zijn verwachting alle andere bestuursvormen vervangen. Een Hegeliaanse strijd om erkenning is de motor van de geschiedenis. Uit deze strijd komt de liberaal democratische mens als winnaar tevoorschijn, transformeert de wereld in een one harmonious world en zal de motor van de geschiedenis stilvallen omdat de bestemming van de geschiedenis is bereikt. De essentie van de geschiedenis is voor Huntington de strijd tussen beschavingen. Hij heeft kritiek op Fukuyama’s teleologische geschiedfilosofie. De liberale democratie heeft helemaal geen universele aantrekkingskracht en is een typisch westerse manier om een samenleving in te richten die door iedere andere beschaving verworpen zal worden zodra een beschaving bewuster wordt van haar eigen culturele- en religieuze identiteit. Strijd tussen beschavingen is voor Huntington de motor van de geschiedenis. In deze scriptie wordt duidelijk dat de geschiedenis niet in de richting van een bepaald ideologisch einddoel wordt voortgestuwd en dat de geschiedenis niet primair gedefinieerd kan worden door de opkomst en val van beschavingen. Er valt geen allesomvattend doel of patroon in de geschiedenis te ontdekken omdat de wereld te complex en te veranderlijk is.Show less
Byung-Chul Han diagnosticeert de huidige maatschappij als een Transparenzgesellschaft. Han laat zien hoe de moderne maatschappij eigenlijk een onvrije maatschappij is, al verkeren we zelf in de...Show moreByung-Chul Han diagnosticeert de huidige maatschappij als een Transparenzgesellschaft. Han laat zien hoe de moderne maatschappij eigenlijk een onvrije maatschappij is, al verkeren we zelf in de illusie dat dit niet zo is. In dit bacheloreindwerkstuk zal worden aangetoond, dat de negatieve aspecten van de Transparenzgesellschafft voortkomen uit een rationeel systeem. Het is dit rationele systeem dat omslaat in negatieve gevolgen. Dit probleem werd eerder door Max Horkheimer en Theodor Adorno aan de kaak gesteld in Dialektik der Aufklärung. Met betrekking tot de diagnose van Han zal hun analyse van de rationaliteit dan ook relevant blijken. Door Hans diagnose op deze manier te belichten wordt zijn denken in een breed wijsgerig kader geplaatst. Via het verbinden van deze twee maatschappijanalyses is men instaat aan te sluiten bij de methode van de filosofie die door Michel Foucault gekarakteriseerd wordt als ontologie du présent. Tevens wordt hiermee de vitaliteit van het gedachtegoed van Horkheimer en Adorno duidelijk. De door Jürgen Habermas gegeven kritiek op dit gedachtegoed zal echter ook worden behandeld en er zal worden aangetoond dat door de overeenkomsten met de maatschappijanalyse van Horkheimer en Adorno deze kritiek ook toepasbaar is op de maatschappijanalyse van Han. Samenvattend is de stelling van dit bacheloreindwerkstuk: ‘Bij de negatieve diagnose die Han vaststelt van de huidige maatschappij speelt onderliggend altijd nog de problematiek van Horkheimer en Adorno met betrekking tot de instrumentele rede.’Show less
This paper critically examines some of the assumptions underlying the non-identity problem. In particular the Time-Dependency claim and Person-Affecting Principle are at stake. I argue that the...Show moreThis paper critically examines some of the assumptions underlying the non-identity problem. In particular the Time-Dependency claim and Person-Affecting Principle are at stake. I argue that the Time-dependency claim can not be taken as a fact. Furthermore I argue that the Person-Affecting Principle concerning moral judgments can be retained. This would be possible by morally evaluating the predictable result of actions without regard of the identities of the persons affected.Show less
