This study examines the relationship between domestic constraints and the implementation of international agreements by concentrating on the process of ratification. Specifically, I empirically...Show moreThis study examines the relationship between domestic constraints and the implementation of international agreements by concentrating on the process of ratification. Specifically, I empirically focus on the case of German defection and the NATO mission to Libya. Since the main theories of international cooperation lacked the focus on domestic factors, this study tests the role of five domestic factors. However, with respect to their relative influence, I argue that domestic constraints are influenced themselves by (historical) narratives and prominent political elites.Show less
In dit onderzoek is gekeken hoe de regering binnenlandse steun tracht te verwerven voor haar gewenste buitenlandbeleid. Vanuit de theorie van Putnam over buitenlandpolitiek, de two-level games...Show moreIn dit onderzoek is gekeken hoe de regering binnenlandse steun tracht te verwerven voor haar gewenste buitenlandbeleid. Vanuit de theorie van Putnam over buitenlandpolitiek, de two-level games genoemd, bekleedt een regering de rol van onderhandelaar in zowel de internationale als nationale arena. Steun of verzet in één arena kan door de regering worden gebruikt bij de onderhandelingen in de andere. In de nationale arena dient de regering bijvoorbeeld een akkoord te verkrijgen op haar beleidswensen, die zij vanuit de internationale arena meeneemt. Die beleidswensen voor haar buitenlandpolitiek kennen een breed gamma. In dit onderzoek is een specifieke casus ter hand genomen: de Nederlandse deelname aan de ISAF-missie in Uruzgan, een provincie in Zuid-Afghanistan. Aan de hand van een open bronnenonderzoek en interviews met toentertijd betrokken personen is inzicht verkregen, in hoe de regering werkt aan het verkrijgen van binnenlandse steun voor haar buitenlandbeleid. De resultaten tonen aan dat de regering voor haar gewenste deelname aan de ISAF-missie in Uruzgan, bepaald geen passieve houding heeft aangenomen. Het zoeken van steun voor gewenst buitenlandbeleid, i.c. de missie, begon bij de betrokken bewindslieden. In eerste instantie tastten zij binnen het kabinet af of er onoverkomelijke bezwaren bestonden tegen dat beleid. Vervolgens spraken zij met de fractievoorzitters en buitenland- en defensiewoordvoerders van de coalitiefracties. Hierna werd de kring uitgebreid naar woordvoerders van de oppositie, van wie men inschatte dat zij de missie zouden steunen. Als bleek dat zij de missie inderdaad waarschijnlijk zouden steunen, ontstond er tussen hen en de bewindslieden een intensieve interactie. Deze woordvoerders werden qua informatievoorziening behandeld, als maakten zij deel uit van de coalitie. Uit die intensieve interactie vloeiden bepaalde vragen en/of wensen voort. Door hierop in te gaan konden de bewindslieden de respectievelijke oppositiepartijen tegemoetkomen en zich van hun steun verzekeren. De ministers werden op verschillende momenten in het traject ondersteund door de woordvoerders van de coalitiefracties en ambtenaren. Zij probeerden niet direct te overtuigen, maar gaven hun visie op de missie en deelden informatie dan wel voorzagen hun gesprekspartners van antwoorden op vragen en inventariseerden hun zorgen. Een extra gelegenheid voor de coalitiewoordvoerders vormde het overleg tussen regering en parlement. Tijdens een Algemeen Overleg of plenair debat kon de woordvoerder “kritische vragen” stellen, waarvan hij wist dat de minister ze relatief gemakkelijk kon beantwoorden. Dat gold ook voor gemakkelijk tegemoet te komen garanties en moties. Nadat de missie eenmaal was aangevangen, vormden de werkbezoeken een waardevol instrument in de verwerving van steun. De meeste Kamerleden lieten hun mening er niet van afhangen, maar het verschafte hun een reëel beeld van de missie. Naast de inzet van ministers, coalitiewoordvoerders en ambtenaren is er een vierde groep ingezet, de zogenaamde steunzenders. Binnen deze groep kunnen de opinieleiders, buitenlandse ambassadeurs en internationale politici worden genoemd. De opinieleiders, die zelf voorstander van de missie waren, werden uitermate goed op de hoogte gehouden door ministers en ambtenaren, waardoor zij in hun mediaoptredens en in hun contacten met politici de juiste informatie konden geven en daarmee de (verlengde) missiewens konden steunen. Een aantal buitenlandse ambassadeurs, met name de Amerikaanse ambassadeur, heeft actief bijgedragen aan het verwerven van steun voor de missie. Zeker bij de poging tot een tweede verlenging is veelvuldig met de Amerikaanse ambassadeur gesproken over hoe PvdA-partijleider Bos en zijn fractie konden worden beïnvloed. Daarbij werd het laten toepassen van beïnvloeding door Amerikaanse en Australische ministers niet uit de weg gegaan. Opvallende internationale bijdragen tot het verwerven van steun voor de missie was het bezoek van SG VN Kofi Annan aan Den Haag op 30 januari 2006 en het verzoek van de Amerikaanse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Clinton om in Nederland een Afghanistanconferentie te organiseren op 31 maart 2009. De laatste vorm van het verwerven van steun verliep via de media. Het Defensiecommunicatieplan bood daartoe een breed scala aan mogelijkheden. Het richtte zich via de media op het brede publiek en het parlement. Naast de reguliere mediaoptredens van ministers introduceerde het plan ook verschillende noviteiten voor dit beleidsterrein. Hierbij zijn met name het embedded journalism, tv-uitzendingen en reportages vanuit Uruzgan en mediaoptredens door teruggekeerde militairen vermeldenswaardig. De communicatiestrategie was erop gericht de media het echte verhaal te laten vertellen, in de hoop dat dit tot begrip en daarmee tot steun zou leiden. De media zijn echter nagenoeg constant negatief over de missie blijven berichten en wilden vooral aantonen dat het een vechtmissie was. Mogelijk dat dit mede werd veroorzaakt door de wijze waarop Defensie en Buitenlandse Zaken (BZ) het minder gewenste nieuws uit de media trachtten te houden. In de laatste fase ging alle media-aandacht uit naar het conflict binnen het kabinet, wat niet bijdroeg aan steun voor de missie. De negatieve berichtgeving over de missie en de ontbrekende steun voor de missie moet los worden gezien van de steun die onder de Nederlandse bevolking bestond voor haar militairen. Misschien kan wel worden geconcludeerd dat het Defensiecommunicatieplan uitermate goed is geslaagd in haar opzet, dat wil zeggen: het in de schijnwerper zetten van de krijgsmacht en het verhogen van de waardering voor de militairen. Daarmee zou ook kunnen worden geconcludeerd dat deze communicatiestrategie te eng in opzet was; teveel gericht op de rol van Defensie. Dat is overigens niet vreemd, als wordt gerealiseerd dat het om een Defensieplan ging dat niet was afgestemd met BZ. Dit sluit aan bij een opvallende constatering: het ontbreken van een specifiek communicatieplan bij BZ. De missie naar Uruzgan was destijds een hoofdonderdeel van het buitenlandbeleid geworden, maar in het contact met de media speelde niet BZ maar Defensie de hoofdrol. Dit zou kunnen worden teruggevoerd op cultuurverschillen tussen beide departementen; Defensie liep voorop en het conservatieve BZ volgde. Hierdoor werd in Den Haag een echte 3D- of geïntegreerde benadering van de missie echter wel bemoeilijkt. Het gevolg hiervan was, dat de drie betrokken ministers en hun departementen op dit onderwerp een minder sterke drie-eenheid vormden dan mogelijk zou zijn geweest. Deze suboptimale situatie moet effect hebben gehad op de eenheid binnen de coalitie en berichtgeving daarover in de media (wat vervolgens weer als katalysator werkte op de verschillende partijen). Er zal echter ook sprake zijn geweest van de inverse beweging: de verschillende meningen binnen de coalitie over de missie waren van invloed op de Haagse samenwerking op dit dossier.Show less
Levitsky & Way (2010) have performed interesting research on competitive authoritarian regimes(CAR). They investigated the influence of democracies on these type of regimes. They also noted...Show moreLevitsky & Way (2010) have performed interesting research on competitive authoritarian regimes(CAR). They investigated the influence of democracies on these type of regimes. They also noted that there are authoritarian regimes who influenced the same CAR's. They labelled these authoritarian regimes Black Knights. This thesis investigates the influence of such a Black Knight on a CAR, in this case the influence of Russia on Kyrgyzstan. This thesis furthermore provides a possible framework for performing research on the influence of Black Knights on CAR's, by building on the existing theory of Levitsky & Way (2010).Show less
In this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic)...Show moreIn this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic) narrative. He focuses on two arguments: (1) domestic politics cause friction for both actors, (2) international pressure (from state and non-state actors) causes friction for both actors. This international pressure also includes image. Using a variety of observation techniques and limited quantitative analysis, the author finds that (1) domestic political rivalry facilitates escalation for the strong and the weak actor and has no bearing on de-escalation; escalation erodes and diminishes domestic political rivalry. (2) International pressure and image facilitates de-escalation on both sides in order to maintain a positive image. (3) The weak actor must start de-escalating in response to the strong actor’s de-escalation; else it may very well damage its own capacity to achieve its political objectives. He then discusses the policy implications that this conclusion has, most notably (1) the way that policy-makers may change their behavior in order to improve their own image, or the image of the actor they represent. (2) They may or may not be more cautious when dealing with domestic rivalry, as they may seek to avoid escalating, and would rather tackle the actual cause of domestic rivalry. Opportunities for future research in the thesis. Most notable opportunities for future research include (1) the relationship between strong actor de-escalation and weak actor de-escalation and the way the former enables the latter. (2) The effect of the situation on the ground, rather than on the purely political level, on each actor’s decision to de-escalate.Show less
Advanced master thesis | Political Science (Advanced Master)
open access
Economic diplomacy is now a standard practice. However, the strategies that countries use differ. This thesis examines if countries in the same income category, low middle, upper middle and high...Show moreEconomic diplomacy is now a standard practice. However, the strategies that countries use differ. This thesis examines if countries in the same income category, low middle, upper middle and high-income have similar strategy. It would follow from the literature that based on high-income status a more advance and integrated strategy is used. Research in this thesis concludes that especially the countries in the upper middle-income category are still traditional in their policy development and management, but when it comes to economic aid donors these countries have innovative programs in place.Show less
Research master thesis | Political Science and Public Administration (research) (MSc)
open access
Post-election violence is often associated with structural conditions including poverty and ethnicity, and/or the strategic behavior of ‘big bosses’ and/or the electoral institutions. This thesis...Show morePost-election violence is often associated with structural conditions including poverty and ethnicity, and/or the strategic behavior of ‘big bosses’ and/or the electoral institutions. This thesis explains the post-election violence in Kenya 2007-8 by structurally testing existing explanations of this kind of violence. The analysis shows that constituencies in which the opposition won the elections with a small margin of victory experienced most violence after the elections. In these cases the election battle was most severe. After the elections politicians use violence to punish voters of their rival party by organizing violent action including protests and the deployment of criminal gangs. Besides, violence is used as negotiation strategy by both the opposition and the incumbent to influence the formation of a government. Politicians seduce individual citizens to use violence since their supporters depend on clientelist rewards in exchange for their political support. The allocation of state resources follows ethnic lines for which the political competition and the subsequent violence are ethnical in nature.Show less
Advanced master thesis | Political Science (Advanced Master)
open access
What factors ensure the success of an international mediation effort in an intractable conflict? Academics and practitioners remain divided on the issue, with previous research offering many and...Show moreWhat factors ensure the success of an international mediation effort in an intractable conflict? Academics and practitioners remain divided on the issue, with previous research offering many and varied explanations. Existing studies have focused on the conflict’s intensity, the nature of the issues, the parties’ motivation to mediate, and the international context in order to understand the causes of a successful mediation. This research employs a framework incorporating contextual, behavioural, and procedural factors in order to determine the explanatory value of (a) the timing of a third-party’s entry into the conflict, (b) mediator impartiality and (c) legitimacy, and (d) the mediator’s strategy in two cases of international mediation in intractable conflicts. Through an in-depth analysis of Northern Ireland and Kosovo, this thesis argues that Northern Ireland’s successful mediation experience may be attributed to propitious timing and the presence of an impartial and legitimate mediator. Similarly, the failure of the mediation effort in Kosovo may have resulted from a combination of inauspicious timing and the presence of a mediator who was perceived by one of the negotiating parties as biased and illegitimate. While mediation is not necessarily a panacea for all conflicts, an understanding of which conditions lead to mediation success will aid practitioners in future mediation efforts.Show less
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is like soccer: there are supporters and opponents. Supporters credit BMD with providing full security against rogue states. Opponents fear a renewed arms race with...Show moreBallistic Missile Defense (BMD) is like soccer: there are supporters and opponents. Supporters credit BMD with providing full security against rogue states. Opponents fear a renewed arms race with Russia or China. There is another analogy: playing in the major league is awarding. Land-based and seabased missile defense each are attractive options, offering pros and cons to foreign policy makers, while military planners have to make tough decisions on how to allocate scarce defense resources in the face of austerity. A small or medium-sized state like the Netherlands has only a few policy options: emulate the policy of the hegemon, strive for national or European innovative solutions or (continue to) do nothing at all. Neoclassical realism holds that the state is not a black box in the anarchy of international relations, but that the foreign policy elite makes resource allocation decisions on the basis of its own perception of the external vulnerability of the state. State institutions, domestic influence groups and party politics in turn influence both threat perception and resource allocation. Resource allocation should ideally support the best foreign policy option to counter the perceived threat. Of course, external state actors, industrial and transnational organizations influence the foreign policy elite as well. Against this backdrop, the author uses the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism to research and describe the influence that domestic influence groups can exert on policy decisions regarding the Netherlands’ BMD capabilities. After a brief introduction into neoclassical realism, the external vulnerability is described in terms of the existing ballistic missile threat posed by Iran. The threat perception is approached form the eye of the beholder: regional actors, NATO as our primary security alliance and of course domestic actors. Then the primary BMD resources available to the Netherlands are described: operational capabilities, technological innovation and defense industrial base. External factors and domestic interest groups that affect resource allocation decisions, such as the international defense industry and national civic societal actors, are analyzed. The dominant foreign policy mantra that the Netherlands’ international reputation is at stake after incessant defense budget cuts and relinquishing our NATO commitments is also taken into account as a factor of influence. Finally, four adaptive strategies are researched as BMD policy options: blindly emulate US policy (with high investment costs), join European innovation policies (with high political and investment costs), do nothing (which eventually leads to a free rider status) or a mixed innovative emulation strategy (which attains foreign policy objectives appropriate for a small or medium power while at the same time promoting Dutch industrial interests). Research indicates that very few domestic actors actually oppose the Dutch role in BMD. The author concludes that the Netherlands cannot afford to lose its leading position in European BMD capabilities. Our reputation is firmly based on our Patriot capability, and for a long time we have punched above our weight. Our credibility is at risk – and maritime BMD is one of the very few niche capabilities that we hold as bargaining chip to promote our interests in international relations. The stakes are high – but so are the potential rewards.Show less
Research master thesis | Political Science and Public Administration (research) (MSc)
open access
2017-01-01T00:00:00Z
Why do democracies not go to war with other democracies? The idea that the internalized liberal-democratic norms of peaceful conflict resolution within a democratic society are responsible for the...Show moreWhy do democracies not go to war with other democracies? The idea that the internalized liberal-democratic norms of peaceful conflict resolution within a democratic society are responsible for the democratic peace, also referred to as the normative explanation, remains subject to a particular lack of empirical academic attention. The few studies into the normative explanation have not tested what should be tested: whether liberal democratic norms indeed affect the behavior of democratic citizens in comparison to the behavior of nondemocratic citizens. This research performs an improved empirical test and studies (1) whether liberal norms exist in a democracy in comparison to a non-democracy and (2) whether these norms have an effect on the individuals of these societies concerning the wish to use force in International Relations. An experimental design showed that there was no significant difference between a group of Dutch students and a group of Chinese students when it comes to the use of force in IR. A marginal effect of the regime type for the democratic citizens was found. Remarkably, in a comparison with the autocratic experimental group, these democratic citizens turned out not to be specifically more peaceful towards other democracies, but rather more war-prone towards autocracies. The overall conclusion of this study is that for both experimental groups the perception of threat was the main indicator for a decision to attack. This research argues that, in contrast with earlier research, there is no support to the claim that the normative explanation can explain the empirically found peace between democracies.Show less
Advanced master thesis | Political Science (Advanced Master)
open access
The main focus of this thesis lies in re-examining the impact of territoriality on the conduct of international relations in the context of separatism of exclaves. The enclaves were selected...Show moreThe main focus of this thesis lies in re-examining the impact of territoriality on the conduct of international relations in the context of separatism of exclaves. The enclaves were selected because of their specific territorial character, being separated from their mother state by a territory of another state entity. Our initial hypothesis stating that the demands of independence are formed by coexistence of both territorial and historical factor has been demonstrated on the cases of Cabinda and Oecussi. Using the qualitative comparative analysis, we have justified the selection of variables and conducted a cross-case study that confirmed our hypothesis. According to our findings, the historical background has a more important role in the creation of separatist tendencies than territory, while this has only a modifying effect on the initial preconditions. In the discussion we contrasted this result with the opportunity and willingness model and concluded that causal logic that applies to the interstate conflict does not adequately describe the situation of exclave’s separatism and therefore a further research into this area is needed.Show less