The Eurozone crisis is an example of how democratic regimes can be threatened under emergencies, and it revealed two contributing phenomena – the state of exception and technocracy. This thesis...Show moreThe Eurozone crisis is an example of how democratic regimes can be threatened under emergencies, and it revealed two contributing phenomena – the state of exception and technocracy. This thesis aims to understand the link between the two in the context of emergency politics, through the paradox of politics. This paradox, which can be traced back to Rousseau, brings to light an aporia in democratic politics, where we need good citizens to make good laws and good laws to make good citizens. This thesis starts by analysing each phenomenon individually and the way they threaten democracy. It then interprets them through the paradox of politics as arrangements meant to resolve that paradox, but infringing upon the ideal of democracy it subscribes to (inspired by the analysis of political theorist Bonnie Honig). Finally, it analyses the link between them and the potentials for the democratization of emergency politics. The main conclusions are 1) in emergency politics, technocracy and exception display a link of mutual reinforcement that infringes upon democratic politics (empirically and conceptually), and 2) the democratization of emergency politics requires not only a deexceptionalization of emergency (as suggested by Honig), but also a process of detechnocratization of democracy.Show less
Since Martin Heidegger developed the notion of dwelling as a fundamental ontological concept that is based on the basic character of human being, this idea of dwelling has inspired a number of...Show moreSince Martin Heidegger developed the notion of dwelling as a fundamental ontological concept that is based on the basic character of human being, this idea of dwelling has inspired a number of architectural theorists in relation to the question of how we should build. However, it has been argued that such interpretations have often been flawed, and I think that in reality Heidegger’s conception of dwelling is too intangible to really comment on the act of building. This thesis will therefore explore inhabitation from a different angle – from an angle that investigates how we experience architecture, how architecture means something us and how architecture also changes us – in order to ask how we can come to an understanding of the experience of inhabitation from which it is possible to comment on the act of building. I will therefore not investigate inhabitation from a Heideggerian perspective – asking what it means to dwell – but rather approach inhabitation from a more phenomenological and hermeneutic perspective. I will argue that the experience of inhabitation depends upon the interaction between people and architecture; it is a melodic experience in which the possibilities for meaningful action that the architecture offers correspond with people’s intention of action, while at the same time the architecture amplifies experience through functioning as a medium. From this conception, I will argue that inhabitation must become an answer to building – not in the sense that existing models of inhabitation are reproduced, but rather that an understanding of the experience of inhabitation becomes guiding in the design process.Show less
This thesis investigates the canonical, western philosophical way of thinking about human origin. It claims that this traditional understanding of origin is focussed on birth: a moment that a new...Show moreThis thesis investigates the canonical, western philosophical way of thinking about human origin. It claims that this traditional understanding of origin is focussed on birth: a moment that a new person originates from the darkness, into the light. This instigates an image of human origin as one of separation, an image that is contradicted by the phenomenological acounts of the people that have actually enjoyed or endured this process of human origination in the midst of their very own bodies: pregnant women. Their accounts paint a very different picture of the start of human life. This thesis investigates this structurally overlooked perspective on origin, and will answer the question as to what and in which way the traditional, canonical philosophical realm benefits in accuracy and richness from a serious consideration of the phenomenological experience of pregnancy. Ultimately, we move from an understanding of human origin as a clearly defined moment of separation, to a continuum of becoming, marked by an ambiguous relationality.Show less
This paper explores one of philosophy's longest and most enduring puzzles: the puzzle of akrasia. Akrasia, or weakness of will as it is often called, has challenged our understanding of human...Show moreThis paper explores one of philosophy's longest and most enduring puzzles: the puzzle of akrasia. Akrasia, or weakness of will as it is often called, has challenged our understanding of human behaviour for over two millennia. Most literature treats akrasia as an isolated instance of a weak will. However, unlike most approaches, this thesis aims to reconceptualise akrasia as a character trait based on the tripartite relationship between its recurrence, self-deception, and self-control. The proposed view sees recurrent akratic behaviour as an essential factor in that process, which is often overlooked. Agents repeatedly fail to adhere to their better judgement, which supports the hypothesis of reconceptualising akrasia as a trait since it isn’t a one-time event but part of a person’s character. In this process of rethinking akrasia as a trait, self-deception is conscripted against the agent’s better judgment. This creates a bidirectional relationship between akrasia and self-deception, allowing the agents to deceive themselves and further reinforce both. Over time, as the juncture between akrasia and self- deception becomes stronger, it undermines the agent’s self-control. As the two manifest, the agent’s ability to develop and maintain self-control is hindered, reinforcing akratic behaviour.Show less
This paper explores the authenticity of social media influencers through Charles Taylor's framework and examines their power to influence. In Chapter 1, we argue that influencers cannot be...Show moreThis paper explores the authenticity of social media influencers through Charles Taylor's framework and examines their power to influence. In Chapter 1, we argue that influencers cannot be authentic as influencers live in a dual identity paradigm, often creating a completely different online self that is shaped for the purpose of an economic gain and status enhancement. We claim that influencers' identities are commodified - molded by market demands and audience preferences. In Chapter 2, we establish that influencers possess significant power due to their ability to shape opinions, trends, and purchasing decisions. Despite counter arguments suggesting influencers are mere subjects of external influences like the pressure of sponsoring brands and audience preferences, we demonstrate that their influential power is essential for the success of influencer marketing. This power is rooted in followers' perception of influencers as trustworthy and authentic, a belief that is strategically maintained for economic gain. The paper highlights several implications, such as the inadequacy of using authenticity as a moral framework for influencers and the potential ethical issues arising from their perceived authenticity. Additionally, we discuss the broader societal impacts of influencers' power, including the risk of disinformation and the erosion of genuine private life in the contemporary digitalised world. We conclude by acknowledging the limitations of our analysis and the need for further research to address the complexities of social media influence and the emerging virtual realm.Show less
This thesis investigates the phenomenon of polarization within the context of a deliberative democracy, where public discourse is perceived as increasingly extreme. By examining belief and...Show moreThis thesis investigates the phenomenon of polarization within the context of a deliberative democracy, where public discourse is perceived as increasingly extreme. By examining belief and affective polarization, the study highlights both the harmful and beneficial outcomes of this intensification of opposing views. On one hand, polarization can destabilize democratic endeavors and undermine social cohesion; on the other hand, it serves as an effective strategy for addressing societal injustices and promoting social change. The research draws on the philosophies of John Rawls and Seyla Benhabib to explore these dynamics, identifying gaps in their approaches to address the complexity of polarization. To minimize the negative effects while preserving the positive aspects, the article proposes fostering political virtues such as mutual respect and self-reflection. Using the polarized debate on transgender rights in the Dutch House of Representatives as a case study, the research illustrates how these virtues can enhance reasoned discourse, genuine cooperation, and mutual understanding without undermining the valuable disagreement that advances social progress. The study emphasizes the need for a regulated public sphere, such as citizen assemblies, in order to promote these political virtues and facilitate reasoned discourse.Show less
The debate on free will is long and expansive. The conventional debate revolves around the truth of determinism and whether it is compatible with free will. However, most of the discussions between...Show moreThe debate on free will is long and expansive. The conventional debate revolves around the truth of determinism and whether it is compatible with free will. However, most of the discussions between compatibilists and incompatibilists seem to get bogged down on what it means to have freedom and end in a frustrating back-and-forth about semantics - a place which we so far have not been able to escape. In this paper, I approach this debate from a different perspective in order to avoid this familiar dead end. First, by drawing on our intuitions, I will argue that phenomenal consciousness is necessary for any conception of free will that is true to our intuitions. Next, I will explain the concept of epiphenomenalism: the view that phenomenal consciousness is an epiphenomenon and so has no causal power. Taken together, these ideas form an obvious problem for any free-willer: if phenomenal consciousness is essential for free will but it does not have any causal power, free will does not exist. It seems unreasonable to claim that adding phenomenal consciousness to a philosophical zombie (a being that functions exactly like a human being but has no phenomenal consciousness and so has no free will) makes him free. Anyone arguing for the existence of free will now faces a dilemma: they can either dispute the claim that consciousness is necessary for a conception of free will that is true to our intuitions, or they can dispute epiphenomenalism. The problem of disputing the claim that consciousness is a necessary condition for a conception of free will that is true to our intuitions is quite simple: I deem it impossible to give an example of an unconscious entity that has free will. Alternatively, disputing epiphenomenalism puts the burden of proof on the free-willers, since it would require denying the idea of causal closure in order to avoid the problem of explanatory exclusion. Defenders of free will would need to address the hard problem of consciousness and possibly even ‘solve’ it. The investigation in this paper therefore results in a robust conclusion about free will – that it is in fact an impossibility – and also provides a different perspective from whichShow less
In May of 1934, Husserl wrote a strange little text about the Earth, which has garnered a lot of scholarly interest.The text centres around a phenomenological investigation regarding our relation...Show moreIn May of 1934, Husserl wrote a strange little text about the Earth, which has garnered a lot of scholarly interest.The text centres around a phenomenological investigation regarding our relation to the Earth. It might be considered controversial in the sense that it claims that the earth does not move. It might also be said to be controversial because many scholars can’t seem to figure out whether it is trying to break out of Husserl’s egology or whether it subjects the earth in its constitutive function to the transcendental ego. However, I think the text should be controversial for another reason – a reason that, especially in the English translation, seems to have flown under the radar. The concepts Husserl uses to mediate our relationship to earth are, in my opinion, highly suspect, especially if we look at the time and place he wrote the text: Nazi Germany. I want to draw our attention to three concepts Husserl uses to argue for our necessary relation to the earth, and what their implication is for this text's relation to National Socialist ideology; these terms being Boden, Heimat and Volk.Show less
This thesis is an investigation into the ontological basis of pessimism. I develop a Nietzschean interpretive framework of pessimism, based on a distinction Nietzsche makes between two types of...Show moreThis thesis is an investigation into the ontological basis of pessimism. I develop a Nietzschean interpretive framework of pessimism, based on a distinction Nietzsche makes between two types of pessimism in The Gay Science 370: romantic and Dionysian pessimism. According to Nietzsche, this distinction is based on a dynamic articulated using the language of physiology. This dynamic is either expanding or degenerating. The thesis relates this distinction to Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's notions of a 'world of appearance' to test if their ontology testifies to a romantic or Dionysian pessimism. Their ontologies are interpreted as either a transfiguration of romantic or Dionysian pessimism. I then develop a reading of Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy. I argue that Schopenhauer’s notion of representation or appearance is central to his metaphysics. I then interpret his punctum pruriens of philosophy as a priori pessimism permeating the whole of Schopenhauer’s philosophy resulting in an ethics of renunciation. I then lay out Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer in the Genealogy, based on the aforementioned physiological dynamic. In the last chapter, I investigate Nietzsche’s world of appearance, characterized as semblance or ‘Schein’. I relate this to Nietzsche’s aesthetics and art as a transfiguration of Dionysian pessimism. However, the question is whether Nietzsche’s philosophy itself is the transfiguration of Dionysian pessimism. I then explain how Nietzsche does this by means of a project of life affirmation through the notions of perspectivism and the will to power.Show less
