The experiences of contemporaries have been neglected in the research of the far-reach-ing changes in Austria in the early 1930s. With the historiography focussing on institutions and structures as...Show moreThe experiences of contemporaries have been neglected in the research of the far-reach-ing changes in Austria in the early 1930s. With the historiography focussing on institutions and structures as well as mostly the time since 1933, significant gaps exist and underlying assump-tions which do not reflect the experiences of people living in the troubled times. In contrast, this thesis uses a bottom-up approach to unravel the lives of contemporaries, their hopes and fears and the impact of the various crises in politics, economics and identity from 1930 to 1934. It thus asks how ordinary members of society experienced their times and witnessed the slow slide towards fascism and how they reacted to it. Based on the accounts of seven diarists, these troubled times are analysed through the lenses of contemporaries writing soon after the events and often still under the impression of them. Hence, they paint unblurred pictures of their times influenced by their surroundings. Their views shed light on the past as it ‘actually was’ and unravel the stories beyond the institutions. The first chapter analyses the end of parliamentary democracy in Austria in 1934 as witnessed by the diarists with a focus on the turning point of February 1934. The second chapter situates the diarists within the political and financial crises of the violent times. Lastly, the third chapter looks at the profound unsolved questions of identity, linked to religion and political decisions within the framework of the diarists’ perceptions of the past. In this fascism in Austria is understood as existing in two similar yet distinct variants: clerical Austrofascism and Nazism. The former tried to establish itself foremost by eliminating its biggest enemy, the Socialists, at the same time as creating a collective identity based on religion, German nationalism and the Habsburg past. The diarists’ experiences change the external narrative especially in view of February 1934: they showed the necessity of reinterpreting February 1934 as the turning point in the timeline of Austrian history as which it was perceived in comparison to the Anschluss in 1938. Furthermore, the accounts revealed the interconnectedness of the many crises of their times and how these as well as the remembered past and anticipated future shaped their perceptions and everyday life. However, also the split into distinct ‘Lager’ and the thesis of Austrofascism op-posing the threat of Nazism have to be revisited. The latter was insofar challenged as the step from democracy to an authoritarian regime was seemingly more impacting the diarists’ lives than the step from one variant of fascism to another.Show less
This thesis does not deal with orthodox questions about Nazism (how they came to power or how Nazis could kill millions of people). These issues have long been addressed. This thesis deals with a...Show moreThis thesis does not deal with orthodox questions about Nazism (how they came to power or how Nazis could kill millions of people). These issues have long been addressed. This thesis deals with a more nuanced question, namely what cultural ideas of Europe Nazis appealed to. This paper demonstrates that the Nazis pretended to promote European culture and save European cinema, while their pan-European appeals solely served to strengthen German influence, increase German impact and widen German dominion. It dissects their meticulously planned strategy to indoctrinate international audiences and subordinate national film industries. This thesis ultimately shows how Europe was deployed as a rhetorical weapon.Show less
This thesis examines the conceptualisation of ‘civilian morale’ as a military idea in Germany and the United Kingdom between 1919 and 1939, arguing that the First World War played a major in morale...Show moreThis thesis examines the conceptualisation of ‘civilian morale’ as a military idea in Germany and the United Kingdom between 1919 and 1939, arguing that the First World War played a major in morale’s emergence within military theory. Adopting a hybrid approach to total war theory, the thesis employs the ideal-types of total mobilisation, total control, total aims, and total methods for its basic structure, but also looks at morale in relation to war as it was understood by contemporaries in a its historical context. Using the ideas of two prominent theorists: Erich Ludendorff and Basil Liddell Hart, this study concludes that morale was conceptualised as a new determinant factor in future warfare. It shows that the key lesson of the Great War had been that nation formed the core of any military effort, and whoever could successfully mobilise the nation possessed the greatest strength. Morale served as the variable that determined the success of this mobilising process. Controlling home front morale was thus essential for avoiding your own military collapse, but the theorised ways for achieving this differed between Liddell Hart and Ludendorff, which this thesis attributes to a dichotomy between Liddell Hart’s liberalist views as compared to Ludendorff’s totalitarian views. This divide also informed morale’s conceptualisation as a war target, with Ludendorff viewing the enemy’s morale as one of the elements that needed to be completely annihilated, with Liddell Hart conceptualising it as means for limiting war; the collapse of morale hastening the end of a war. Finally, this thesis examines two major technological innovations to come from the First World War: poison-gas and the airplane, and tracks how their role was theorised for use against morale as a war aim, underwriting civilian morale’s emergence as a concept of modern warfare.Show less
De Eerste Wereldoorlog had enorme gevolgen voor Duitsland. In de naschokken van de oorlog werd de Duitse samenleving steeds verder gepolariseerd en geradicaliseerd. In deze scriptie kijk ik naar de...Show moreDe Eerste Wereldoorlog had enorme gevolgen voor Duitsland. In de naschokken van de oorlog werd de Duitse samenleving steeds verder gepolariseerd en geradicaliseerd. In deze scriptie kijk ik naar de gevolgen daarvan in Beieren, waar links en rechts recht tegenover elkaar stonden en wat uiteindelijk resulteerde in een ware burgeroorlog met honderden doden tot gevolg. Maar ook binnen deze groepen bestonden grote onderlinge verschillen. Het extreme geweld en de onderlinge verschillen staan centraal in deze scriptie.Show less
In this thesis the author analyses the events between November 9th, 1918 and January 15th 1919 in Germany and Berlin in particular. This period is characterised by political instability. The...Show moreIn this thesis the author analyses the events between November 9th, 1918 and January 15th 1919 in Germany and Berlin in particular. This period is characterised by political instability. The socialist movement had fractured during the First World War over the support of the war effort. Radical socialists were further emboldened by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The struggle between the three main factions of German socialism; the moderate MSPD, the independents of the USPD and the radical Spartakusbund, forms the core of this thesis. This thesis answers the question to what extent was the Spartacist Uprising a revolution to defend the November revolution or a counter revolution which would only damage the gains of the November revolution? By analysing primary sources such as newspapers, autobiographies and personal recollections the attitudes and opinions of these three parties the author traces the evolution these parties and their leaders underwent during the months November, December and January. Recent work by Mark Jones on the role of autosuggestion (self-generated beliefs allowing historical actors to truly and firmly believe that particular events were happening when they in fact were not) and the role and nature of revolutionary crowds provide additional perspectives how the main leaders of the three parties behaved during times of massive pressure.Show less
The rise to power of Konrad Adenauer was an unexpected one. At the ‘young’ age of seventy-two, the long-time mayor of Cologne won the first free democratic election in Germany since 1933, becoming...Show moreThe rise to power of Konrad Adenauer was an unexpected one. At the ‘young’ age of seventy-two, the long-time mayor of Cologne won the first free democratic election in Germany since 1933, becoming the chancellor of the newly-founded Federal Republic. At that time little known outside the British sector, Adenauer was able to overcome considerable initial internal opposition and successfully built a Kanzlerdemokratie (Chancellor Democracy) that would last fourteen years. He is nowadays almost unanimously considered the founding father of ‘post-war Germany.’ His present-day popularity, however, tends to obscure his problematic first years in office. If known at all, Adenauer’s problems are regularly described as mere bumps in his farsighted path towards regaining sovereignty for the country. This thesis challenges this common view by highlighting domestic and international issues, arguing that his early position was much direr than is often anticipated. Adenauer’s national challenges centered on his dealings with the Allied High Commissioners representing the victorious Western nations. The country’s lack of sovereignty was blatantly obvious as the Western powers not only maintained a veto right over any law passed by parliament, but excluded pivotal policy areas such as foreign and defense policy from the government’s remit. Criticized by the opposition as Erfüllungspolitik (compliance politics), Adenauer tenaciously worked on gradually shifting the relationship from the humble representative of a defeated country towards an ‘inferior partnership’ based on respect and cooperation. The Petersberg Accord in November 1949 brought some improvements in the occupation status, but all-in progress was frustratingly slow and indecisive. At the same time, the chancellor was under immense pressure from a restless population to quickly improve an abysmal and further deteriorating economic situation. An increasingly vocal opposition led by Kurt Schumacher exploited Adenauer’s precarious position, sensing a chance to topple the government. The heightened tensions of the Cold War culminating in the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula ‘rescued’ Adenauer’s chancellorship. Under the forceful leadership of the U.S. State Department the Allies fundamentally changed their approach towards Germany. Within a very short timeframe the country ‘mutated’ from defeated foe to indispensable ally against any Soviet aggression in Europe, also triggering a change in attitude by the High Commissioners. Even more important for the survival of the chancellor, the worldwide economic boom caused by the Korean War greatly benefitted the German export industry, being widely considered as the starting point of the following Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). Now Adenauer’s policy of West integration bore tangible results, and with soaring approval ratings he could cement an almost unassailable position for years to come. Adenauer’s international challenges were dominated by the contentious relationship with France. His overarching policy of West integration would only succeed if at its core a French/German rapprochement could be achieved. However, France’s thinking was ‘obsessed’ with security concerns against its old arch enemy, leading her to advocate an economically weak and virtually defenseless ‘parcelized’ Germany. Paris was perpetually concerned that a sustainable recovery of the German economy would again overpower the rest of Europe, building the fundament for yet another potentially aggressive policy. One way of taming such dangers was to ‘detach’ the Saar region with its highly valuable coal and steel resources. In the same vein, defining the Rhine line as the primary defense parameter against a Soviet expansionist policy was preferable to any rearmament of the long-term foe. The public outcry in Germany was livid and across the political spectrum. Adenauer faced immense pressure not to accede to any unilateral change of the 1937 borders prior to a formal peace treaty, and to refute any policy that would not grant the country the undeniable right of defending its territory. The grass roots Ohne Mich (Without Me) movement formed a viable threat to the sustainability of the government. Again, Adenauer was ‘rescued’ by external initiatives. France was acutely aware that its vastly diminished power relative to the United States made its position untenable. It devised two plans along identical lines to ‘Europeanize’ the issues, in order to preserve some influence over developments in Germany. The Schuman Plan called for joint oversight over the vital coal, iron and steel industry, thus alleviating concerns that Germany may divert resources for war preparations. But it also allowed Adenauer to subsume the Saar conflict under the overarching aim of French/German rapprochement and European integration. Similarly, the Pleven Plan proposed the creation of a joint West European army, securing a fair share contribution of Germany in defending its own soil whilst simultaneously preventing a nationalistically driven rearmament of the country that may potentially threaten France’s security. Adenauer endorsed the plan as it would secure the Western Allies’ defense support for the entire country, with the discriminatory elements of the plan being of secondary importance. Despite being undoubtedly one of the ablest politicians Germany ever had, Adenauer’s chancellorship may not have survived its initial phase without the ‘help’ it received through the changing international environment. External events and initiatives provided the escape route for some of the most inextricable domestic issues. The Korean War was arguably the most important event as it fundamentally altered the United States’ approach towards Germany. Acknowledging the relative power structure after the Second World War, this then ‘induced’ France to launch its ‘Europeanization’ initiatives to ameliorate the French/German relationship. These developments were instrumental in securing Adenauer’s position, paving the way to make his name nowadays synonymous with Germany’s ascendency after 1945.Show less
Er was, conform de strikte definiëring van Nipperdey, een zeer beperkte continuïteit tussen enerzijds de vrijkorpsen en hun gedachtengoed en anderzijds de nazi’s met hun ideologie en het Derde Rijk...Show moreEr was, conform de strikte definiëring van Nipperdey, een zeer beperkte continuïteit tussen enerzijds de vrijkorpsen en hun gedachtengoed en anderzijds de nazi’s met hun ideologie en het Derde Rijk. De identiteit van de vrijkorpsen week op essentiële onderdelen af om van een gehele of gedeeltelijke voortzetting van identiteit te spreken die langs schakels in de tijd is voortgezet. De vrijkorpsen kunnen hierdoor niet aangemerkt worden als de voorhoede, voorlopers of herauten van het nazisme. Ondanks dit alles zijn de vrijkorpsen wel wegbereiders geweest voor de nazi’s en uiteindelijk het Derde Rijk. De vrijkorpsen hadden niet alleen een nieuwe dimensie toegevoegd aan het politieke geweld in Duitsland na 1918, waarmee de basis gelegd werd voor de latere brutalisering van de politieke cultuur in de Weimarrepubliek. Tevens hebben vrijkorpsen en vooral Baltikumer de politieke orde van de Weimarrepubliek stelselmatig ondergraven. De vrijkorpsen werden oorspronkelijk opgericht om in de woorden van Schleicher “voor de republiek te vechten”. Maar tijdens hun relatief korte bestaan hadden vrijkorpsen in de ‘Baltikum’ gemuit tegen de eigen regering en haar in een lastig parket gebracht met wat Noske correct betitelde als “luchtkastelen”. Vrijkorpsen, waaronder Baltikumer, waren ook betrokken geweest bij de reactionaire Kapp-Lüttwitz-putsch. Deze putsch was juist gericht tegen de republiek die de vrijkorpsen geacht werden te beschermen. De organisaties die uit de vrijwilligerseenheden voortkwamen bleven na de formele opheffing van de vrijkorpsen in juni 1920 de Weimarrepubliek met putschplannen en vooral politieke moorden bestrijden. Tot en met 1922 vonden er maar liefst rond de 350 moorden plaats die voor een groot deel werden gepleegd door de OC onder leiding van Hermann Ehrhardt. Ehrhardt was daarnaast betrokken geweest bij de oprichting van een voorloper van de SA en Roßbach stichtte Ortsgruppen van de NSDAP. Na de Hitler-putsch verdwenen de vrijkorpsen uit beeld, mede als gevolg van ‘de legale weg’ van Hitler. De romans en bijbehorende mythen over de vrijkorpsen holden de republiek later nog verder uit met uiteindelijk fatale consequenties door de komst van het Derde Rijk.Show less
Deze thesis onderzoekt in hoeverre Mitteleuropa een rol speelde in het buitenlands beleid van Duitsland tussen 1890 en 1918. Aan de hand van de werken van de invloedrijke Duitse liberaal Friedrich...Show moreDeze thesis onderzoekt in hoeverre Mitteleuropa een rol speelde in het buitenlands beleid van Duitsland tussen 1890 en 1918. Aan de hand van de werken van de invloedrijke Duitse liberaal Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919) wordt geanalyseerd hoe Mitteleuropa zich ontwikkelde in bovengenoemde periode. Daarbij wordt in het bijzonder aandacht besteed aan hoe Mitteleuropa verband hield tot Duits imperialisme vóór en tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Met name de vraag in hoeverre Mitteleuropa een alternatief vormde voor overzeese bezittingen en Lebensraum staat hierbij centraal.Show less
Deze scriptie gaat over de manier waarop Walther Rathenau en Jakob Wassermann hun leven lang in een vergelijkbare gecompliceerde spagaat verkeerden tussen hun jood-zijn en hun innige liefde voor...Show moreDeze scriptie gaat over de manier waarop Walther Rathenau en Jakob Wassermann hun leven lang in een vergelijkbare gecompliceerde spagaat verkeerden tussen hun jood-zijn en hun innige liefde voor Duitsland en analyseert hoe deze identiteitsspagaat er voor ieder van beiden uitzag en veranderde gedurende hun leven.Show less
