The thesis assesses the writings of a key set of neoconservative intellectuals in the post-Cold War era to ascertain what arguments they use to be critical of the United Nations as a global...Show moreThe thesis assesses the writings of a key set of neoconservative intellectuals in the post-Cold War era to ascertain what arguments they use to be critical of the United Nations as a global security provider. The thesis clarifies that while the UN was still useful for US foreign policy, this was only so in cases where the US would determine what it should do, when and whereShow less
With their intellectual and traditional focus on civil rights in the past, the NAACP was often accused of being too moderate and too indifferent to the problems of the black masses. The NAACP...Show moreWith their intellectual and traditional focus on civil rights in the past, the NAACP was often accused of being too moderate and too indifferent to the problems of the black masses. The NAACP really went through a lot of historical and socio-cultural developments that caused them to change their tactics and strategies. What impact did the energy crises of the 1970s have on the civil rights agenda of the NAACP. How did they interpret this crisis? And did it represent a new turn for this civil rights organization, demonstrating more interest in economic issues?Show less
Within the limits of European cooperation, economies, and strategies, during the Cold War, lies the Berlin question and West Germany’s fate. The US from the start saw it as a vital condition that...Show moreWithin the limits of European cooperation, economies, and strategies, during the Cold War, lies the Berlin question and West Germany’s fate. The US from the start saw it as a vital condition that West Germany joins the Western allies in order to help its nation’s rebuilding and to upgrade Germany’s European role and diplomatic relations. Since the early days of Kennedy’s administration, a complex relationship between the West Germany and the US is distinguishable. It could be said that West Germany became the locomotive of implication of US policy in Europe. Kennedy used Germany’s question towards West’s favor. The FRG not only became a representative of American policy and American thinking but also played the role of the mediator amongst European nations which at the time were not as synchronized and responsive as they should towards the new situation, regarding European and national security and safety. However, it seems that the German administration, during the last two years of the Berlin Crisis brought great headaches to the US president and his team.Show less
The Dutch government used cultural diplomacy to reinforce East-West relations on numerous occasions. High-ranking Dutch civil servants and diplomats used art, classical music and academic exchanges...Show moreThe Dutch government used cultural diplomacy to reinforce East-West relations on numerous occasions. High-ranking Dutch civil servants and diplomats used art, classical music and academic exchanges to influence public opinion on the other side of the Iron Curtain. This thesis will show that the Dutch Foreign Ministry (BZ) used these exhibitions, concerts and sporting events to influence public opinion in the East European Bloc. In an attempt to regenerate the Dutch art scene after World War II the Ministry of Education, Arts and Sciences stimulated the cultural scene in the Netherlands by forging ties with international renowned artists. The policy of OK&W to focus on regaining cultural prestige was contrary to the policy that was laid down by BZ.OK&W also used cultural diplomacy to achieve its objectives, however these goals meant that the Netherlands had to engage more and more with foreign publics. This approach was contrary to the policy of the Foreign Office that was focused on securing national security. The difference in these approaches created tensions between the two offices of government, which had dire consequences for the NIICB established in 1955. This thesis will illustrate the battle fought between the Ministries on the cultural backstage of Dutch Cold War politics by answering the following question: What factors played a role in the development of the Dutch cultural relations in the 1950s with Eastern Europe?Show less
On March 24, 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force, a bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in response to ongoing hostilities in Kosovo. US President Bill Clinton...Show moreOn March 24, 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force, a bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in response to ongoing hostilities in Kosovo. US President Bill Clinton proudly called the intervention in Kosovo 'the first ever humanitarian war.'1 Others condemned the war, arguing that it was illegal and that NATO was acting on its own interests rather than on humanitarian motives. So why did NATO really intervene in Kosovo? This thesis draws on constructivist and Gramscian theory to explain why NATO intervened in Kosovo, and to shed light on the most salient issue: the relationship between and the relative importance of humanitarian values and strategic interests. Constructivists believe that state identities and interests are not given, instead, they are socially constructed. Interests are not only defined by material facts but also by social facts, like norms and ideas. Therefore, foreign policy decision making is more about defining national interests than about defending them. A constructivist analysis of the Clinton administration's decision to intervene in Kosovo reveals that this decision was shaped by social facts, like shared notions about the grounds on which it is legitimate to carry out a military intervention, and norms of behaviour, like human rights. These perceptions were shaped by social and cultural factors, like the memory of the two World Wars, the national trauma of the Vietnam war, previous wars in the Balkans and the Weinberger doctrine. An analysis of Clinton's rhetoric on Kosovo reveals that he was expanding previous understandings of what constitutes the national interest to include standing up to human rights abuses. In this sense, he was advancing humanitarian norms as a cause for action. These norms did not only influence the way in which the war was presented and defended, but also the way it was fought. The constructivist perspective therefore attaches great causal significance to norms and ideas. The neo-Gramscian school in international relations draws on the work of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, particularly the concept of hegemony. According to Gramsci, the hegemony of the bourgeoisie was not just based on coercive power, but also on their ability to construct a broad cultural and ideological consensus. A state can become hegemonic by constructing a world order which most other states accept or perceive to be in their interest. In the end, however, this order primarily exists to serve the interests of the elites. From this perspective, the notion of universal human rights is one element of a global civil society which is marked by a growing consensus on morals, values and rights. The end of the Cold War brought about an international order based on liberal values like democracy, free trade and human rights. Though not a complete hegemony, this world order certainly had hegemonic elements. Milosevic's actions in Kosovo were a transgression against these values. From this perspective, the war over Kosovo was essentially an international police mission, designed to punish Milosevic's deviation from international norms. The military component was supported by international institutions, like the UN Security Council, which, though it stopped short of endorsing the intervention, also failed to oppose it, and the IMF and the EU, which has already begun making plans for the reconstruction of Kosovo and the economic future of the region before the bombs had stopped falling. International civil society, represented by NGOs and the media, also played their part by promoting humanitarian values and calling attention to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. The extent of this hegemony is demonstrated by the failure of opposing states like Russia and China to mount an effective counter-hegemony. For constructivists, then, the decision to intervene in Kosovo reflected changing perceptions of the national interest and foreign policy priorities. Clinton claimed to act in the national interest, and undoubtedly believed this himself, but his perception of the national interest was not necessarily based on objective facts. It was shaped by historical experiences, considerations of legitimacy and shared understandings about human rights. Clinton acted as a norm entrepreneur by advancing the notion that it is legitimate to use armed force against a sovereign state to stand up to human rights abuses. Gramscians would agree with the constructivists that Kosovo represented a normative shift and that the war was fought to defend a set of values. However, the Gramscians do not take these norms and values at face value. Instead, they trace them back to the material interests of the elites. They draw attention to the striking coherence between Western military power, its ideology and international institutions. The constructivist and Gramscian perspectives have proven to be useful here because of their ability to go beyond a simple understanding of values and interests as binary opposites. It is all too easy to fall into the trap of depicting these two categories as mutually exclusive. The two theories disagree on the exact relationship between the two: constructivists believe that norms, values and ideas define interests, Gramscians believe that they ultimately serve interests. Another point of divergence is that constructivism emphasizes change while Gramscianism is more interested in continuity. From a constructivist perspective, state behavior is based on social facts which are, by nature, fluid and continually changing. For the Gramscians, the basic characteristics of the international order do not change, they continue to favour the strong over the weak. This brings out a weakness in Gramscian theory: it tends to place everything in a grand narrative about the dominance of the economic elites. When applying theory to a historical event, there is always the risk of adopting the facts to fit the preconceived notions that are present in the theoretical framework. Theory is valuable when applied critically, because it allows us to consider the facts from different viewpoints. If this analysis has succeeded in revealing different ways of looking at and thinking about the facts, then it has been a fruitful exercise.Show less
This thesis researches the way in which the pharmaceutical industry protects its interests in animal testing at the European Commission and looks especially at the influence of the public opinion.
Door de strategische ligging en de aanwezigheid van olie is de afgelopen decennia de rol van het Midden-Oosten in de wereldpolitiek belangrijker geworden. De Verenigde Staten ontwikkelden hiervoor...Show moreDoor de strategische ligging en de aanwezigheid van olie is de afgelopen decennia de rol van het Midden-Oosten in de wereldpolitiek belangrijker geworden. De Verenigde Staten ontwikkelden hiervoor de Twin Pillar Strategy, een strategie die de landen Saoedi-Arabie en Iran als belangrijkste steunpilaren voorzag. Door de Iraanse revolutie werden de presidenten Carter en Reagan gedwongen om deze te veranderen.Show less
This dissertation focuses on the ideas and beliefs of Hendrik Brugmans, an interesting and influential man during the start of the European integration process right after the Second World War.
In this study, I focused on how historians looked at British and American handling of the ‘Polish Question’ in World War II. This was from the moment the discovery of the mass graves at Katyn led...Show moreIn this study, I focused on how historians looked at British and American handling of the ‘Polish Question’ in World War II. This was from the moment the discovery of the mass graves at Katyn led to a break between the Soviet Union and the Polish government-in-exile in April 1943 to the end of the Warsaw Uprising in September 1944. I was particularly interested in what ways the United States and Great Britain wanted to solve this problem in accordance with the wishes of the Polish government-in-exile. It seems as if historians are biased on this subject. They mainly see a pleasing Allied side, desperately trying to keep Stalin in the War. Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to please Stalin so much, according to these historians, that they were willing to sell out their Polish allies and to forget about the Soviet crimes committed in the Easter-European country. Instead of this biased historical look on affairs, summarized in the schools of innocence and blame, I argue for the school of reconstruction or a more objective look at this subject.Show less
