Despite the fact that Middle Eastern states tend to align in loose and informal ways, rather than form formal alliances with each other, scholars have attempted to apply Western-centric theories on...Show moreDespite the fact that Middle Eastern states tend to align in loose and informal ways, rather than form formal alliances with each other, scholars have attempted to apply Western-centric theories on alliance formation in the Middle East. This thesis highlights the limits of Western-centric theories when applied on non-Western regions. In doing so, this thesis focuses on one crucial non-Western region, the Middle East, and asks if the leading Western-centric alliance formation theories (balance-of threat, balance-ofpower and ideological solidarity) can explain the alignments made in the Middle East during the First Gulf War, if so to what extent, and if not what an alternative could be. It researches this question through the systematic exploration of one topical moment of Middle East contemporary history, which caused major regional realignment in the region: The First Gulf War in 1990. The findings of the case study, show that seven of the eight states considered in the case study had to balance the external threat (of Iraq threatening the status quo after invading Kuwait) as well as internal threats (of public unrest, economic difficulties and diminishment of their leadership position in the region). Therefore, this thesis will argue that the balance-of-power, balance-of-threat and ideological solidarity theories cannot explain alignment formation in the Middle East in their current form, as these theories only take external threats into account. Only if the balance-of-threat theory is expanded to include internal threats as well as external threats may it explain the formation of alignments in the Middle East during the First Gulf War. The ‘regime security’ approach of Ryan is, therefore, considered to be a suitable alternative approach, as it examines ruling regimes and their insecurities, considering external as well as internal threats. Nevertheless, this approach needs to be expanded as well, in order to include the external influence coercive diplomacy and the use of multiple strategies have on state behaviour of other states. Every state was externally influenced through these strategies, leading them to join the U.N. coalition or declare neutrality with large repercussions. This has not been discussed in alliance formation literature before. Finally, the strategies balancing and bandwagoning need to be revised as well as the definitions do not hold up in a coalition, especially regarding the Middle East where states have large differences in military capabilities.Show less
In the international system, ISIS and Hezbollah are non-state actors involved in the power struggle characterizing the Middle East, and they found themselves opposed in the Syrian Civil War since...Show moreIn the international system, ISIS and Hezbollah are non-state actors involved in the power struggle characterizing the Middle East, and they found themselves opposed in the Syrian Civil War since 2011. Although they are different by virtue of their confessional identity, they share multiple similarities. Both are the product of the international intervention in Iraq/Syria and Lebanon; both share, until recently, a powerful military apparatus as well as a functional organizational system; both are recognised as terrorist or criminal organization by part of the international community. They share another characteristic too: the pursuit of the Islamic State, a utopia rooted in the teachings of the Qu’ran and Mohammad that calls for the demise of the Western-type of state in the Middle East. Nevertheless, their ideals of Islamic State are essentially different, and different are their historical and political contexts as well as their ideological motivations. One group has declared the Islamic State whereas the other has not. This work aims to unravel under what conditions non-state armed groups claim territorial sovereignty. Consequently, ISIS and Hezbollah are two cases subjected to deep analysis. Building on the concept of rebel governance, I argue that rebel’s strategies are affected respectively by the place and time-frame but mostly by the group’s relationship with the population, other armed groups, and the international community. Notwithstanding, ideology is still the building block of the rebel’s approach. I sustain that historical and political developments have structured the actors’ ideologies which in turn have affected their approaches and consequently the self-determination claim. The difference in the outputs then lies in the ideological and socio-political divide between ISIS and Hezbollah. The contrasting developments of these groups, which replied differently to national and international menaces, and their different regional priorities, as well as their distant ideas of Islamic State, allow us to understand what led to the creation of the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” and the “Party of God”. Inter alia, how the refusal of any compromise and the creation of a new Sunni identity rejecting the nation-state favoured the self-determination, whereas the entry into politics to gain resilience from a plethora of confessional realities has suggested the suspension of the Islamic State.Show less
In September 1975, large civil unrest in Lebanon broke out for the third time in little more than a hundred years. Just like the previous two times in 1860 and 1958, the Maronite community were...Show moreIn September 1975, large civil unrest in Lebanon broke out for the third time in little more than a hundred years. Just like the previous two times in 1860 and 1958, the Maronite community were involved in the fighting. In a country where confessional identity or sect plays a decisive role, a coalition between Maronite warlords called the Lebanese Front was formed in 1976. Together these patriarchs of influential clans could join forces and defend the status quo cemented in the 1943 National Pact that laid the foundation of a multiconfessional and independent Lebanese Republic. In the agreement, that divided political power according to the 1932 census, the Maronites essentially dominated the government apparatus. However, relations between participating parties in the LF turned sour within just a few years. Instead of facing the common enemy, Bashir Gemayel turned against his Maronite allies.Show less
The enhancement of the revolutionary ideology promoted by Hezbollah during the Arab Uprisings was challenged when in 2011 the protests began in the city of Deraa in Syria. Hezbollah’s support of...Show moreThe enhancement of the revolutionary ideology promoted by Hezbollah during the Arab Uprisings was challenged when in 2011 the protests began in the city of Deraa in Syria. Hezbollah’s support of the revolutionary nature and ideology of the opposition movements became an issue when the anti-government demonstrations began in Syria and the organization suddenly contradicted its previous posture by backing the regime.The Janus-faced behavior of the organization had an immediate negative impact on the image that Hezbollah had been building through a pragmatic and selective legitimation process. In this scenario, how does Hezbollah react to the challenges to the legitimacy of its organization?. In light of the aforementioned, this thesis will aim to analyze and identify the way in which Hezbollah justify the intervention in Syria to their support groups at the local, national and international level. This research focuses on Hezbollah’s creation of 4 meaning in the ideological discourse in order to justify their actions and preserve their legitimacy at three different levels of target audiences (communal, national, international) by developing diverse context models (van Dijk, 2006, 21) according to each audience’s particular interests.Show less
The exposure of Libya’s political fragmentation and societal disintegration after 2011 was picked up by academics, journalists, and policy researchers who have written on that aspect of the Libyan...Show moreThe exposure of Libya’s political fragmentation and societal disintegration after 2011 was picked up by academics, journalists, and policy researchers who have written on that aspect of the Libyan reality more than any other. Libya is perceived as a fragile state with hundreds of armed groups, multiple claims of governance and tens of warring tribes. Both local and international actors have contributed to this image, but this thesis attempts to argue that there is more than the fragile and disorganized state discourse to describe Libya. The fact that Libyan unity, sovereignty, and independence have survived this extreme level of fragmentation is a question that deserves to be investigated. Thus, through the use of wide range of theories, academic and policy papers, news articles, survey data, and political agreements reports, this thesis aims to answer why and how Libya managed to preserve its status as a state in such an environment. It treats the question as a question of sovereignty by arguing that the traditional definition of sovereignty limits our ability to comprehend the state issue in Libya fully. By focusing on different aspects of sovereignty and by selecting broader definitions of the concept, this thesis argues that Libya’s unity and sovereignty have been preserved so far because international and local actors benefit from this arrangement even though they may be (in)directly contributing to fragmentation in the country. The international community is not willing to let states fall-apart, and the Libyan people do not seem to favor division and separation movements. Local state and non-state actors realize this arrangement, and they have not challenged thus far.Show less
Under the circumstances of a protracted war situation, failures to establish a political solution and no meaningful dialogue on the current security situation in Syria, refugee repatriation and...Show moreUnder the circumstances of a protracted war situation, failures to establish a political solution and no meaningful dialogue on the current security situation in Syria, refugee repatriation and reconstruction dilemmas have become the new subject of matter for Syrian refugee host countries, both European and neighboring, and Syrian government-supporting actors, including Russia and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Since 2017, several actors in Lebanon actively facilitate and promote the repatriation of Syrians refugees. UNHCR stated that the requirements under international law for the United Nations to organise or encourage voluntary repatriation are not yet in place in Syria. However, UNHCR officers do meet with the returning refugees and are present at all current departure points of the returns facilitated by the Lebanese General Security based on the believe that people’s voluntary choice to return must be respected. This study examines the role of UNHCR in the Syrian repatriation process in Lebanon in order to understand how non-state actors operate vis-à-vis sovereign states and to give insight into the role of international organizations in world politics. The thesis is partly based on field research in Lebanon.Show less
Five years have passed since the attack on Sinjar, and no one could have predicted the outcome we have witnessed. With the dismantling of ISIS, a myriad of consequences built over the years has...Show moreFive years have passed since the attack on Sinjar, and no one could have predicted the outcome we have witnessed. With the dismantling of ISIS, a myriad of consequences built over the years has come crashing down to the contemporary political climate. The quell of ISIS as a land-owning non-state actor may be seen as a victory, yet, the slow process of piecing together what truly happened behind the closed veil of the so-called Caliphate is the true feat. Among all of the unknown also lies the troublesome subject of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV). It is no secret that gender based violence played a prominent part in the so-called Islamic State’s reign to power, but the question remains; Why did ISIS use sexual and gender based violence against Yezidi girls and Women? There are three hypotheses that this thesis will test to understand ISIS’ use of rape against Yezidi girls and women: a) tool of war, b) patriarchy and c) religion. By analysing the rationale behind these three hypotheses this thesis will contribute to a more systematic understanding of ISIS’ modus operandi.Show less
Relations between Italy and Iran seem to escape common conceptual definitions commonly used by international relations (IR) scholars. The two countries are not allied. They belong to different...Show moreRelations between Italy and Iran seem to escape common conceptual definitions commonly used by international relations (IR) scholars. The two countries are not allied. They belong to different international blocs and diverge on a number foreign policy issues. They have different preferences and goals. Yet, their relations have been connoted by consistent mutual empathy. The fact that Italy is a “Western” country – being one of the founders of United Europe and a member of NATO – has never jeopardised its relations with Tehran, even when an anti-Western attitude was strategically preferred by Iran for both domestic and international purposes. Not even Khomeini’s revolution and the international sanctions did completely stop their relations, and Italy has long been Iran’s main trading partner.We can say that two thousand years of history and cultural traditions make the two countries closer than it may superficially appear and are the basis for a deep political discourse. In my analysis I will examine how the two countries have managed to safeguard their respective interests within a reciprocal relationship that has remained constant despite the arising of internal ideologically antithetical situations, e.g. in Italy the opposition between DC and PCI1 during the cold war, and in Iran the transition from the Pahlavi regime to Khomeini’s theocracy. The interests, the will to keep commercial and business channels in general open have been the winning cards that can make us say today that the ‘special liaison’ exists, is factual and can be fully analysed in the IR field.Show less
"With great power comes great responsibility." In a modern neoliberal democratic society responsibility is distributed to different domains of society. My thesis is based on the theoretical notion...Show more"With great power comes great responsibility." In a modern neoliberal democratic society responsibility is distributed to different domains of society. My thesis is based on the theoretical notion of negotiation between state and citizen in the public sphere. I have theorized that within a democratic society, civil society associations represent various segments of society. Additionally, civil society associations are necessary in order to let elections function democratically. Another important element is the political rationale of neoliberalism in a modern democracy. This rationale determines how the relationship of civil society and state is defined and how responsibility is distributed. The distribution of responsibility equals distribution of power, and to justify the use of power actors instrumentalize morality.Show less
The number of residents of Nordic countries, who have joined the contemporary conflicts of Iraq and Syria as foreign fighters, is high in relation to their populations. While most of these...Show moreThe number of residents of Nordic countries, who have joined the contemporary conflicts of Iraq and Syria as foreign fighters, is high in relation to their populations. While most of these individuals have indeed travelled to the conflict zones to become foreign fighters in the ranks of ISIS or other Islamist groups, there are also Nordic residents who have joined factions fighting against the Islamists. This thesis studies the background factors and motivational reasons in becoming a foreign fighter of 26 individuals from Nordic countries in Kurdish factions in the conflicts of Iraq and Syria, combining both primary and secondary sources in the research and linking the findings of the research into existing literature in the emerging field of foreign fighter studies.Show less
This thesis asks how Kurdish nationalist political parties in Iraqi-Kurdistan have attempted to construct and develop national identifications since 1991. It aims to show that the KDP and PUK have...Show moreThis thesis asks how Kurdish nationalist political parties in Iraqi-Kurdistan have attempted to construct and develop national identifications since 1991. It aims to show that the KDP and PUK have relegated the importance of primordial attachments in their attempts at building a “nation” and, instead, endeavoured to construct “Kurdistani” national identifications primarily founded on a sense of common history and civic rights. This thesis argues that such a construction is primarily grounded in political pragmatism. The ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq requires non-primordial identity markers to be formulated and promoted by the KDP and PUK to define their national identification and distinguish the Kurds of the KRG from “others”, thereby supporting claims for political autonomy. It is political calculations – both at the domestic and international levels – that have influenced top-down constructions of a “Kurdish nation” as distinct from two specific political “others”: i) Iraq under Baghdad’s government; and ii) Kurdish groups in Turkey, Iran and Syria. This was particularly crucial in the period following the 2003 US-led invasion, when Iraq began its transition from dictatorship to federal democracy, reinforcing KDP and PUK hegemony over the Kurdistan Region. Throughout this thesis, I highlight how KDP and PUK narratives of victimhood have underpinned the construction of Baghdad as the “unjust” and “threatening” other, whereas emphasis on civic values as allegedly embedded in the “Kurdistani identity” have distinguished them from other Kurds, in order to enhance relations with neighbouring states such as Turkey and Iran, and influential state actors such as the USA and EU members.Show less
