Despite the fact that Middle Eastern states tend to align in loose and informal ways, rather than form formal alliances with each other, scholars have attempted to apply Western-centric theories on...Show moreDespite the fact that Middle Eastern states tend to align in loose and informal ways, rather than form formal alliances with each other, scholars have attempted to apply Western-centric theories on alliance formation in the Middle East. This thesis highlights the limits of Western-centric theories when applied on non-Western regions. In doing so, this thesis focuses on one crucial non-Western region, the Middle East, and asks if the leading Western-centric alliance formation theories (balance-of threat, balance-ofpower and ideological solidarity) can explain the alignments made in the Middle East during the First Gulf War, if so to what extent, and if not what an alternative could be. It researches this question through the systematic exploration of one topical moment of Middle East contemporary history, which caused major regional realignment in the region: The First Gulf War in 1990. The findings of the case study, show that seven of the eight states considered in the case study had to balance the external threat (of Iraq threatening the status quo after invading Kuwait) as well as internal threats (of public unrest, economic difficulties and diminishment of their leadership position in the region). Therefore, this thesis will argue that the balance-of-power, balance-of-threat and ideological solidarity theories cannot explain alignment formation in the Middle East in their current form, as these theories only take external threats into account. Only if the balance-of-threat theory is expanded to include internal threats as well as external threats may it explain the formation of alignments in the Middle East during the First Gulf War. The ‘regime security’ approach of Ryan is, therefore, considered to be a suitable alternative approach, as it examines ruling regimes and their insecurities, considering external as well as internal threats. Nevertheless, this approach needs to be expanded as well, in order to include the external influence coercive diplomacy and the use of multiple strategies have on state behaviour of other states. Every state was externally influenced through these strategies, leading them to join the U.N. coalition or declare neutrality with large repercussions. This has not been discussed in alliance formation literature before. Finally, the strategies balancing and bandwagoning need to be revised as well as the definitions do not hold up in a coalition, especially regarding the Middle East where states have large differences in military capabilities.Show less
