Moral disagreement and compromise seem to go hand in hand in democratic politics. Politicians disagree about moral matters, such as abortion. These moral disagreements cannot be solved by consensus...Show moreMoral disagreement and compromise seem to go hand in hand in democratic politics. Politicians disagree about moral matters, such as abortion. These moral disagreements cannot be solved by consensus or public agreement. This leaves another domain of democratic politics: forming of compromise. Compromise is everywhere in democratic politics: coalition-building, law-making, policy-adoption etc. Compromise is a necessary part of politics. I therefore introduce compromise as a means of dealing with intractable moral disagreement in politics. Compromises of this sort are moral compromises. I define the notion of compromise (chapter one) and defend my view of politics as necessarily involving moral disagreements (chapter two). I then ask whether is it ethically justifiable to engage in moral compromises in democratic politics. I argue that it is. My argument begins by refuting multiple objections brought against moral compromise. I begin by arguing against David Enoch, who argues that moral compromises are never justified (chapter three). I then argue against Simon May, who argues that principled reasons to compromise do not exist (chapter three). Next, I argue against the idea that moral compromise weakens integrity (chapter four). Based on a distinction between honoring and promoting a principle, I also conclude that, from the point of view of the moral principle in question, it can actually be morally right or required that one compromises on that principle. I end by considering three question/objections that might arise concerning whether moral compromise involves a betrayal of the electorate, which moral compromises are acceptable and why principled reasons are needed (chapter four). If my arguments succeed, then I will have given an ethical justification of moral compromise. This means that politicians should engage in moral compromise in the political sphere.Show less
This thesis presents my approach towards patterns and their reality. First, preliminary information on the topic is given regarding the terms that are used. Second, these terms are expanded upon...Show moreThis thesis presents my approach towards patterns and their reality. First, preliminary information on the topic is given regarding the terms that are used. Second, these terms are expanded upon regarding the approaches of James McAllister and James Woodward, between who’s approaches mine lies. Third, differences between McAllister and Woodward are pointed out, including where I differ in regard to their approaches, most notably regarding the conception of ‘phenomenon.’ Fourth, I present my own approach as completely as possible both on its own and in relation to McAllister’s and Woodward’s. This includes an explanation of the 3 different kinds of patterns, relating to their reality, which comes in degrees. Finally, I present two smaller points which serve as an illustration to my approach. I will conclude that patterns can differ in what they refer to and that this affects their reality, which comes in different degrees rather than a binary, depending on the usefulness of the pattern.Show less
This thesis addresses these problems regarding collective decision-making in democracy, analyses the solution epistocracy provides, and argues that the solution proposed by epistocracy is not...Show moreThis thesis addresses these problems regarding collective decision-making in democracy, analyses the solution epistocracy provides, and argues that the solution proposed by epistocracy is not enough to create competent political individuals. Furthermore, I provide one possible solution for overcoming these problems with a political system based on multiple essential political virtues – a virtuecracy. This project consists of research on how and which political virtues can create and support a conception of a political citizen and voter that is competent enough to fill in the ‘virtue’ gap that Jason Brennan’s epistocracy creates.Show less
Morele prudentie toevoegen aan de Nederlandse toegepaste militaire ethiek als methodische invalshoek verbetert de kwaliteit van ethische beslissingen op het slagveld, doordat recht wordt gedaan aan...Show moreMorele prudentie toevoegen aan de Nederlandse toegepaste militaire ethiek als methodische invalshoek verbetert de kwaliteit van ethische beslissingen op het slagveld, doordat recht wordt gedaan aan de temporele en situationele factoren van invloed op de beslissing.Show less
This gendered character of knowing is extremely limiting and prescriptive, leading to toxic reproductions of gender-stereotypes and a narrow selection of ‘appropriate’ knowledge-practices....Show moreThis gendered character of knowing is extremely limiting and prescriptive, leading to toxic reproductions of gender-stereotypes and a narrow selection of ‘appropriate’ knowledge-practices. Additionally, it makes us all, men and women, miss out on certain paths to knowledge and leads to an imbalanced community of knowers, favoring the rational approach to research and associating kinds of intellectual work with men and marginalizing kinds of research and knowledge that are understood as ‘female’. Therefore, I believe, we are in need of a new framework of knowing that: a) does not ascribe gender to any way of knowing, b) does not propagate a male-female dichotomy and hierarchy, c) includes all genders in all operations and modes of knowledge and can be used by all genders and d) allows for non-toxic, fluid and free manifestations of gender based on epistemological practices. How can we construct such a new and non-gendered framework of knowledge? After explaining the problem and some core issues in the first chapter, the second chapter will introduce the relevant work done in the field of modern feminist epistemology. Its naturalized branch will especially help us construct a new knowledge-framework. In the third chapter, we will explain the Confucian concept of the ‘heart-mind’ and its relevance for this new framework of knowing, before fleshing out this framework in more detail in the final chapter. With a constructive comparative approach and a creative handling of the concepts we will ground our framework in naturalized feminist epistemology and employ the Confucian ‘heart-mind’ as a personal and practical locus of non-gendered knowing that addresses all the criteria (a-d) of our solution above.Show less
“The future of the world’s population is urban.”1 People move to the city for opportunities, money and a better life. When we look at this transition from a freedom perspective, instead of the...Show more“The future of the world’s population is urban.”1 People move to the city for opportunities, money and a better life. When we look at this transition from a freedom perspective, instead of the common resource or utility views, you could question whether the city will always provide this better life. Do urban environments provide the freedoms we value, better than rural environments? In this thesis I claim that certain freedoms, present in rural environments, actually get reduced when people move to the city, and that the urban spatial environment is a crucial factor in this. I will introduce Amartya Sen’s capability approach to elaborate on the importance of capabilities, compared to other normative indicators of human flourishing. Sen’s capability approach does not focus on resources or outcomes, but on the process whereby people flourish; the freedom people have to do and to be as they have reason to value. These substantive freedoms are divided by Sen in a freedom concerned with people’s wellbeing (reflecting capabilities) and a freedom concerned with people’s agency. This distinction is particularly relevant when we consider spatial environments. Where wellbeing freedom deals with the different opportunities open to people, agency freedom concerns the freedom people have to effectively shape and choose their own. By looking at concrete cases, I show that certain freedoms, while present in rural environments, are reduced by the spatial design of our cities, after which I present a number of inspirational design cases which are able to address these losses. I conclude by arguing that, in designing our cities, there is reason to pay more attention to the rural valuing of freedom, both in providing alternative options for people to achieve wellbeing, and in providing space for people to exercise agency in order to conceive a wider range of valuable goals.Show less
I aim to explore the possible answers to the question; what makes institutional corruption wrong? In particular, I provide an account of corruption based on institutional virtue theory. I come up...Show moreI aim to explore the possible answers to the question; what makes institutional corruption wrong? In particular, I provide an account of corruption based on institutional virtue theory. I come up with three conditions for corruption; viciousness, knowing an act could have particular effects, and the benefits one receives from it. These conditions are applicable on an individual and institutional level. I suggest my account benefits from avoiding the criticism directed at its alternatives (deontic and teleological views on the wrongness of corruption). It cannot overexplain the central concept of the text because it distinguishes corrupt acts from breaches of fiduciary duty through the third condition for corruption. With that, it avoids the charge of underexplaining, as it claims one-off acts are corrupt independent of their effect on an institution.Show less
In this thesis I start with the assumption that politics equals normative ethics and argue to what extent politicians that do not use moral concepts (and thus endorse the abolitionist answer to the...Show moreIn this thesis I start with the assumption that politics equals normative ethics and argue to what extent politicians that do not use moral concepts (and thus endorse the abolitionist answer to the “Now what?” question within the Moral Error Theory) are able to communicate with people that do use moral concepts. As such, it focuses on whether abolitionists can engage in normative ethics without using moral concepts. Schwarz’s theory is posed which provides a framework for doing so and I argue that this theory comes with flaws as seen in problematic scenarios. I also argue that some of these problematic scenarios are solvable by adding to her theory and that her theory comes with two problematic scenarios that are theoretically unsolvable. The proposed solutions are meant to show how these can enhance the relevance of the theory. It is also argued that a possible solution to the theoretically unsolvable problematic scenarios is that abolitionist politicians, when adhering to Schwarz’s theory, can temporarily divert from her theory by conceding to using moral concepts just to be able to communicate with people that do use moral concepts. This thesis uses the case of the COVID-19 pandemic to demonstrate how these problematic scenarios can occur in practice. This thesis concludes that, while Schwarz’s theory provides a framework that allows abolitionist politicians that do not use moral concepts to effectively communicate with people that do use moral concepts, Schwarz’s theory comes with problematic scenarios for which I show how her theory can be improved. Furthermore, it is also concluded that her theory sometimes fails to provide these abolitionist politicians the full ability to effectively communicate within the practice of normative ethics without using moral concepts. Additionally, I propose further research is needed to improve the shortcomings of Schwarz’s theory that arise whenever her criteria C1 comes into play, which is often inevitable.Show less
In this paper we construe a renovative dialogue by placing the conception of morality that follows from Imam Abu Hamid al- Ghazali’s metaphysics in conversation with equivalent ideas from Friedrich...Show moreIn this paper we construe a renovative dialogue by placing the conception of morality that follows from Imam Abu Hamid al- Ghazali’s metaphysics in conversation with equivalent ideas from Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, who are both defining thinkers of the Postmodern current. The dialogue primarily serves to clarify how exactly ideas from the traditional religio- philosophical system of the reviver of the Islamic faith may contribute to the expansion of the Postmodern horizon, whilst keeping an eye on its invaluable insights which promise to advance and enrich traditional thought. The central proposition of this paper is that Imam al- Ghazali’s epistemology is expansive to Postmodern thought in providing the philosophical ground for positive and fruitful deliberations on moral truth by synthesizing the faculty of reason with immediate experience (dhawq) with reference to the spiritual heart (qalb) of humans, which is an epistemic faculty of immediate insight into the nature of reality. We argue that traditional Islamic thought is relevant in the context of Secularism, because it answers to the Western surrender of Metaphysics, offering an experientiably verifiable method by means of which to engage in valid metaphysical and moral inquiry. To achieve this end we give a detailed exposition of Imam al- Ghazali’s multi- faceted, life- oriented ethics, critically examine some of the central propositions of Postmodern thought in relation to morality and place them into a dynamic dialogue with the Imam’s religio- philosophical system. Furthermore we present personal considerations supported by and harmonious with the Imam’s writings which question the validity of the nihilistic claims of its interlocutor. It is the purpose of the present endeavor to capture and deliberate about sensitive ideas which shape contemporary secular ideology in a rigorous manner, whilst opening pathways to the consideration that there might be more to reality than matter and ideology.Show less
In this thesis is questioned when human smuggling is permissible. By analysing the risk objection, the exploitation objection, the motivation objection, the freedom of association objection and the...Show moreIn this thesis is questioned when human smuggling is permissible. By analysing the risk objection, the exploitation objection, the motivation objection, the freedom of association objection and the law-breaking objection is concluded that human smuggling is not always wrong, at least not pro tanto. Nevertheless, certain conditions have to be satisfied. For one the smuggler should illuminate as many risks as possible, if doing so does not involve more than moderate risks. Therefore a smuggler should actively investigate the possible risks and take steps to mitigate the risks. Secondly, the smuggler needs to fully inform the client about the risks. Thereon, the client must give his real consent. Thirdly, a smuggler should not exploit his clients. Therefore a smuggler may not harm or abuse his client. A smuggler may not deceive his client by not giving an equivalent in return. Furthermore a smuggler may not take advantage of someone in a vulnerable position for example by charging an amount that includes a high profit. Fourthly, a smuggler may break the law if there is a moral reason to override this. The smugglers’ illegal conduct is justified if it prevents a greater evil than the conduct caused, there is no legal alternative that would have averted the harm and that the person was not responsible for creating the threat she helped avert. Finally, human smugglers should only accept a client when he claims that his rights are threatened. Migrants are only allowed to engage in human smuggling if their human rights are threatened and should apply for officials if the state will indeed give a fair hearing. It is the state's responsibility to give a fair hearing.Show less
This essay explores the possibility of a relational egalitarian account on linguistic justice. For relational egalitarianism, a society based on equal social relations forms the essence of the...Show moreThis essay explores the possibility of a relational egalitarian account on linguistic justice. For relational egalitarianism, a society based on equal social relations forms the essence of the egalitarian ideal. This paper argues that linguistic inequality, which places certain linguistic varieties in a politically, economically, and socially dominant position, automatically placing others in inferior positions, should be of concern for relational egalitarians in particular. Moreover, it portrays how existing accounts on linguistic justice are not sufficient in mitigating the relational egalitarian injustices generated by linguistic diversity. By combining and expanding these accounts, relational egalitarianism provides the theoretical prospect of true linguistic equality. However, it will appear that in practice, the feasibility of such an approach is severely constrained. This does then, in turn, raise important questions for relational egalitarian theory as a whole, which aims to be based in the practical reality that many real-life egalitarian social movements face.Show less
