In dit onderzoek is gekeken hoe de regering binnenlandse steun tracht te verwerven voor haar gewenste buitenlandbeleid. Vanuit de theorie van Putnam over buitenlandpolitiek, de two-level games...Show moreIn dit onderzoek is gekeken hoe de regering binnenlandse steun tracht te verwerven voor haar gewenste buitenlandbeleid. Vanuit de theorie van Putnam over buitenlandpolitiek, de two-level games genoemd, bekleedt een regering de rol van onderhandelaar in zowel de internationale als nationale arena. Steun of verzet in één arena kan door de regering worden gebruikt bij de onderhandelingen in de andere. In de nationale arena dient de regering bijvoorbeeld een akkoord te verkrijgen op haar beleidswensen, die zij vanuit de internationale arena meeneemt. Die beleidswensen voor haar buitenlandpolitiek kennen een breed gamma. In dit onderzoek is een specifieke casus ter hand genomen: de Nederlandse deelname aan de ISAF-missie in Uruzgan, een provincie in Zuid-Afghanistan. Aan de hand van een open bronnenonderzoek en interviews met toentertijd betrokken personen is inzicht verkregen, in hoe de regering werkt aan het verkrijgen van binnenlandse steun voor haar buitenlandbeleid. De resultaten tonen aan dat de regering voor haar gewenste deelname aan de ISAF-missie in Uruzgan, bepaald geen passieve houding heeft aangenomen. Het zoeken van steun voor gewenst buitenlandbeleid, i.c. de missie, begon bij de betrokken bewindslieden. In eerste instantie tastten zij binnen het kabinet af of er onoverkomelijke bezwaren bestonden tegen dat beleid. Vervolgens spraken zij met de fractievoorzitters en buitenland- en defensiewoordvoerders van de coalitiefracties. Hierna werd de kring uitgebreid naar woordvoerders van de oppositie, van wie men inschatte dat zij de missie zouden steunen. Als bleek dat zij de missie inderdaad waarschijnlijk zouden steunen, ontstond er tussen hen en de bewindslieden een intensieve interactie. Deze woordvoerders werden qua informatievoorziening behandeld, als maakten zij deel uit van de coalitie. Uit die intensieve interactie vloeiden bepaalde vragen en/of wensen voort. Door hierop in te gaan konden de bewindslieden de respectievelijke oppositiepartijen tegemoetkomen en zich van hun steun verzekeren. De ministers werden op verschillende momenten in het traject ondersteund door de woordvoerders van de coalitiefracties en ambtenaren. Zij probeerden niet direct te overtuigen, maar gaven hun visie op de missie en deelden informatie dan wel voorzagen hun gesprekspartners van antwoorden op vragen en inventariseerden hun zorgen. Een extra gelegenheid voor de coalitiewoordvoerders vormde het overleg tussen regering en parlement. Tijdens een Algemeen Overleg of plenair debat kon de woordvoerder “kritische vragen” stellen, waarvan hij wist dat de minister ze relatief gemakkelijk kon beantwoorden. Dat gold ook voor gemakkelijk tegemoet te komen garanties en moties. Nadat de missie eenmaal was aangevangen, vormden de werkbezoeken een waardevol instrument in de verwerving van steun. De meeste Kamerleden lieten hun mening er niet van afhangen, maar het verschafte hun een reëel beeld van de missie. Naast de inzet van ministers, coalitiewoordvoerders en ambtenaren is er een vierde groep ingezet, de zogenaamde steunzenders. Binnen deze groep kunnen de opinieleiders, buitenlandse ambassadeurs en internationale politici worden genoemd. De opinieleiders, die zelf voorstander van de missie waren, werden uitermate goed op de hoogte gehouden door ministers en ambtenaren, waardoor zij in hun mediaoptredens en in hun contacten met politici de juiste informatie konden geven en daarmee de (verlengde) missiewens konden steunen. Een aantal buitenlandse ambassadeurs, met name de Amerikaanse ambassadeur, heeft actief bijgedragen aan het verwerven van steun voor de missie. Zeker bij de poging tot een tweede verlenging is veelvuldig met de Amerikaanse ambassadeur gesproken over hoe PvdA-partijleider Bos en zijn fractie konden worden beïnvloed. Daarbij werd het laten toepassen van beïnvloeding door Amerikaanse en Australische ministers niet uit de weg gegaan. Opvallende internationale bijdragen tot het verwerven van steun voor de missie was het bezoek van SG VN Kofi Annan aan Den Haag op 30 januari 2006 en het verzoek van de Amerikaanse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Clinton om in Nederland een Afghanistanconferentie te organiseren op 31 maart 2009. De laatste vorm van het verwerven van steun verliep via de media. Het Defensiecommunicatieplan bood daartoe een breed scala aan mogelijkheden. Het richtte zich via de media op het brede publiek en het parlement. Naast de reguliere mediaoptredens van ministers introduceerde het plan ook verschillende noviteiten voor dit beleidsterrein. Hierbij zijn met name het embedded journalism, tv-uitzendingen en reportages vanuit Uruzgan en mediaoptredens door teruggekeerde militairen vermeldenswaardig. De communicatiestrategie was erop gericht de media het echte verhaal te laten vertellen, in de hoop dat dit tot begrip en daarmee tot steun zou leiden. De media zijn echter nagenoeg constant negatief over de missie blijven berichten en wilden vooral aantonen dat het een vechtmissie was. Mogelijk dat dit mede werd veroorzaakt door de wijze waarop Defensie en Buitenlandse Zaken (BZ) het minder gewenste nieuws uit de media trachtten te houden. In de laatste fase ging alle media-aandacht uit naar het conflict binnen het kabinet, wat niet bijdroeg aan steun voor de missie. De negatieve berichtgeving over de missie en de ontbrekende steun voor de missie moet los worden gezien van de steun die onder de Nederlandse bevolking bestond voor haar militairen. Misschien kan wel worden geconcludeerd dat het Defensiecommunicatieplan uitermate goed is geslaagd in haar opzet, dat wil zeggen: het in de schijnwerper zetten van de krijgsmacht en het verhogen van de waardering voor de militairen. Daarmee zou ook kunnen worden geconcludeerd dat deze communicatiestrategie te eng in opzet was; teveel gericht op de rol van Defensie. Dat is overigens niet vreemd, als wordt gerealiseerd dat het om een Defensieplan ging dat niet was afgestemd met BZ. Dit sluit aan bij een opvallende constatering: het ontbreken van een specifiek communicatieplan bij BZ. De missie naar Uruzgan was destijds een hoofdonderdeel van het buitenlandbeleid geworden, maar in het contact met de media speelde niet BZ maar Defensie de hoofdrol. Dit zou kunnen worden teruggevoerd op cultuurverschillen tussen beide departementen; Defensie liep voorop en het conservatieve BZ volgde. Hierdoor werd in Den Haag een echte 3D- of geïntegreerde benadering van de missie echter wel bemoeilijkt. Het gevolg hiervan was, dat de drie betrokken ministers en hun departementen op dit onderwerp een minder sterke drie-eenheid vormden dan mogelijk zou zijn geweest. Deze suboptimale situatie moet effect hebben gehad op de eenheid binnen de coalitie en berichtgeving daarover in de media (wat vervolgens weer als katalysator werkte op de verschillende partijen). Er zal echter ook sprake zijn geweest van de inverse beweging: de verschillende meningen binnen de coalitie over de missie waren van invloed op de Haagse samenwerking op dit dossier.Show less
Levitsky & Way (2010) have performed interesting research on competitive authoritarian regimes(CAR). They investigated the influence of democracies on these type of regimes. They also noted...Show moreLevitsky & Way (2010) have performed interesting research on competitive authoritarian regimes(CAR). They investigated the influence of democracies on these type of regimes. They also noted that there are authoritarian regimes who influenced the same CAR's. They labelled these authoritarian regimes Black Knights. This thesis investigates the influence of such a Black Knight on a CAR, in this case the influence of Russia on Kyrgyzstan. This thesis furthermore provides a possible framework for performing research on the influence of Black Knights on CAR's, by building on the existing theory of Levitsky & Way (2010).Show less
Various scholars have addressed the role of past institutions in current developments. Many of those studies have focused on cases in the same geographical regions: Europe and South America. These...Show moreVarious scholars have addressed the role of past institutions in current developments. Many of those studies have focused on cases in the same geographical regions: Europe and South America. These studies concluded that institutional legacies regularly have a distinct influence on current events, providing constraints and opportunities. This study tests this theory in a region that has been underrepresented in the literature: Asia. By conducting a case study of Taiwan, this research assesses continuities in electoral institutions from the authoritarian era into the process of democratic consolidation. Based on the findings of this examination, this study concludes that the institutional legacies in the political society of Taiwan have had an identifiable but ambiguous impact in the process of democratic consolidation.Show less
The research question of this essay is: What was the attitude of the Dutch government and the Second Chamber towards eight Israeli-Arab conflicts? These conflicts were Israel’s War of Independence...Show moreThe research question of this essay is: What was the attitude of the Dutch government and the Second Chamber towards eight Israeli-Arab conflicts? These conflicts were Israel’s War of Independence from 15 May 1948 to 24 February 1949, the Suez Crisis from 29 October to 16 March 1957, the Six-Day War of June 1967, the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, the Israeli-Lebanese conflict from 6 June 1982 to 17 May 1983, the First Intifada from 9 December 1987 to 13 September 1993, the Second Intifada from 28 September 2000 to August 2005 and the Second Lebanon War from 12 July to 14 August 2006. The attitude and reactions from the Dutch government and political parties in the Second Chamber towards these conflicts are analyzed. More specifically, both the Israeli and Arab perspectives are taken into account. Based on this, conclusions can be drawn if these parties had taken in each conflict a pro-Israel, neutral or pro-Arabic attitude. After these research results, the hypotheses can be answered. In this research the political parties in the Dutch Second Chamber are divided into three important party families, which embody the political continuity in the Dutch politics. These party families, to which almost all political parties in the research can be divided in, are the Christian Democratic, the Social Democratic and the Liberal party families. The three most important political parties in the Netherlands in this research are called the ‘Big Three’, and are each the largest parties of their party families. These parties are the Christian Democratic Party (CDA), which is a fusion of the KVP, ARP and CHU, the Labour Party (PvdA) and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). The political parties that belong to the Christian Democratic party family besides the CDA and his predecessors KVP, ARP and CHU, were and are the SGP, GPV, ChristenUnie, KNP and the RKPN. The political parties that belong to the Social Democratic party family, besides the PvdA, were and are the CPN, DS’70, SP, PSP, PPR, EVP and GroenLinks. The party that belongs to the Liberal party family besides the conservative-liberal VVD is the social-liberal D66. The other parties in this research that didn’t belong to the three party families were the BP and LPF; they are classified as the Populist parties in this research. According to the research results the Dutch governments had taken more often a pro-Israeli, namely in four conflicts, than a pro-Arab, in two conflicts, or neutral, in two conflicts, attitude. There can be concluded that the Dutch government was in most conflicts in favor of Israel, but not in all conflicts. Therefore the first hypothesis, that the Dutch governments always had taken a pro-Israel attitude regarding all the eight conflicts, is not supported by these research results. The Christian Democratic Party CDA and its predecessors had taken five times a pro-Israeli, two times a neutral and one time a pro-Arab attitude. Therefore the second hypothesis, that the CDA and its three predecessors ARP, CHU and KVP, always had taken a pro-Israel attitude towards all the eight conflicts, is not supported by the research results. Despite the fact that the conservative-liberal VVD had taken most times, in comparison with the two other big parties CDA and PvdA, a pro-Israel attitude, she had not always taken a pro-Israel attitude towards the conflicts. Of the eight conflicts she had taken one time a neutral and one time a pro-Arab attitude. Therefore the third hypothesis, that the VVD always had taken a pro-Israeli attitude towards all the conflicts, is not supported by the research results. The social-liberal D66 only took once, during the Yom Kippur War, a pro-Israel attitude. This party had taken three times a pro-Arab and one time a neutral attitude towards the conflicts. Therefore there 55 can be concluded that the attitude of the conservative-liberal VVD and the social-liberal D66 regarding the conflicts differ a lot. Only during the Lebanon War of 1982 the VVD and D66 together took a pro-Arab attitude. Therefore the fourth hypothesis, that the VVD had taken more times a pro-Israel attitude than D66 towards the eight conflicts, is supported by the research results. The little Christian Democratic parties had never taken a pro-Arab attitude. Only during the Israeli War of Independence, and the GPV during the First Intifada, these parties had taken a neutral attitude. Despite the fact that these parties had taken more times a pro-Israel attitude towards the conflicts than the other parties, the fifth hypotheses; that these parties always had taken a pro-Israel attitude, is not supported by the research results. Within the Social Democrat parties it is most obvious that the PvdA has changed its attitudes towards Israel during the conflicts. While the PvdA took a pro-Israel attitude in three successive conflicts; the Suez, Sixth-Day and the Yom Kippur War, she took a pro-Arab attitude from the First Lebanon War to the Second Lebanon War. Therefor the sixth hypothesis, that the PvdA had changed on a current moment its attitude from pro-Israel to pro-Arabic, is supported by the results of the research. All the Social Democratic parties on the left side of the PvdA had taken the most pro-Arabic attitudes towards the eight conflicts, in comparison to the other political parties in the Second Chamber. Of all the parties on the left side of the PvdA only the PSP had once, during the Six-Day War, taken a pro-Israel attitude. From the First Lebanon War to the Second Lebanon War, these parties had all taken a pro-Arabic attitude towards these conflicts. The CPN had taken a neutral attitude three times and the PPR only took a neutral attitude during the Yom Kippur War. The seventh hypotheses, that the parties on the left side of the PvdA within the Social Democratic party family had always taken a pro-Arab attitude towards the eight conflicts, is not supported by these research results. The Populist BP had taken a neutral attitude one time and a pro-Israel attitude another time. The LPF however, merely took a pro-Israel attitude once.Show less
Parliamentary committees are a crucial feature of legislative organization in European democracies. Increasing electoral volatility and new roles of emerging parties effect the nature of the...Show moreParliamentary committees are a crucial feature of legislative organization in European democracies. Increasing electoral volatility and new roles of emerging parties effect the nature of the legislative proceedings that take place in committee meetings. This thesis assesses the consequences of the drastic changes in the Dutch party system (large traditional centrist parties losing ground to the upcoming middle-sized parties) for the legislative process. By looking at the proceedings of committee meetings in two different periods of fragmentation (2005 and 2011), this study explores the contribution and participation of the different parties in the committee phase in parliament. A general correlation between smaller party sizes and a decline in the seats that are represented in committee meetings is detected. Furthermore, it is found that MPs of parties with centrifugal tendencies (towards the extremes of the political spectrum) are less likely to participate in committee meetings than MPs that are closer to the political center.Show less
Het centrale onderwerp van deze scriptie is de invloed van de oppositiepartijen in de Tweede Kamer op wetgeving. Het startpunt van het onderzoek wordt gevormd door een uitspraak van Gerard Visscher...Show moreHet centrale onderwerp van deze scriptie is de invloed van de oppositiepartijen in de Tweede Kamer op wetgeving. Het startpunt van het onderzoek wordt gevormd door een uitspraak van Gerard Visscher, die in zijn proefschrift (1994) concludeerde dat de invloed van het parlement op het regeringsbeleid sinds de jaren zeventig van de vorige eeuw is toegenomen en dat deze invloed voor een aanzienlijk deel van de kant van de oppositie komt. Door de invloed van oppositiepartijen in de Tweede Kamer op wetgeving tijdens de kabinetten-Balkenende II en –Balkenende IV - kabinetten met een meerderheid in beide Kamers - te onderzoeken, is bekeken of deze conclusie nog steeds opgaat voor meerderheidskabinetten.Show less
In this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic)...Show moreIn this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic) narrative. He focuses on two arguments: (1) domestic politics cause friction for both actors, (2) international pressure (from state and non-state actors) causes friction for both actors. This international pressure also includes image. Using a variety of observation techniques and limited quantitative analysis, the author finds that (1) domestic political rivalry facilitates escalation for the strong and the weak actor and has no bearing on de-escalation; escalation erodes and diminishes domestic political rivalry. (2) International pressure and image facilitates de-escalation on both sides in order to maintain a positive image. (3) The weak actor must start de-escalating in response to the strong actor’s de-escalation; else it may very well damage its own capacity to achieve its political objectives. He then discusses the policy implications that this conclusion has, most notably (1) the way that policy-makers may change their behavior in order to improve their own image, or the image of the actor they represent. (2) They may or may not be more cautious when dealing with domestic rivalry, as they may seek to avoid escalating, and would rather tackle the actual cause of domestic rivalry. Opportunities for future research in the thesis. Most notable opportunities for future research include (1) the relationship between strong actor de-escalation and weak actor de-escalation and the way the former enables the latter. (2) The effect of the situation on the ground, rather than on the purely political level, on each actor’s decision to de-escalate.Show less
Recent studies in political demography have concluded that young adults, when overrepresented in a country's population, form an obstacle to democracy. After performing linear regressions on a new...Show moreRecent studies in political demography have concluded that young adults, when overrepresented in a country's population, form an obstacle to democracy. After performing linear regressions on a new global database using data from Polity IV, UNPD, and IIASA/VID, it is demonstrated that the role of young adults cannot unanimously be dismissed as obstructive in the democratization process. Instead, a new variable indicating the percentage of a country’s population that is both young and highly educated is introduced. This variable is proved to offer stable predictions on that country's level of democracy across time and space.Show less
The main goal of this thesis is is to look for an answer to the question ”what motivates citizens to engage in politics using Facebook”. The thesis will discuss which benefits citizens are getting...Show moreThe main goal of this thesis is is to look for an answer to the question ”what motivates citizens to engage in politics using Facebook”. The thesis will discuss which benefits citizens are getting when they opt to political participation over social network sites, specifically Facebook. In order to answer this question so a survey was conducted, which examined the relationship between political participation on Facebook and three topics factors. The first was resources for political participation that citizens use or need to sacrifice if they want to engage with politics. The second was the sense of internal and external political efficacy, with which citizen estimate their ability to understand and discuss politics, along with the openesss of the political system for new idea. The third and last one was, self presentation of political impressions, how individuals presesnt their political identity to their peers. The survey found that Facebook does not overwhelmingly reduce costs of participation, and that citizens who engage in politics on Facebook would not necessarily assume that their activities would bring change in policy. However, citizens who do carry on political participation on Facebook may expect a high sense of internal political efficacy and would use Facebook not so much for changing government policy, but as a mobilizing tool, and as a stage for one’s display of an idealized political impression.Show less
Articles that investigate minority influence on foreign policy-making have mainly concentrated on minorities living in the United States. Research on national minorities outside the United States...Show moreArticles that investigate minority influence on foreign policy-making have mainly concentrated on minorities living in the United States. Research on national minorities outside the United States has been limited. This paper tries to compare two cases that are dissimilar to the United States, namely Turkey and Israel and this essay asks the question: to what extent do the Kurdish and Arabic minorities influence Turkish and Israeli foreign policy? There is a particular emphasis on foreign policy influence of Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Arabic political parties. The party websites of the Pro-Arabic, Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) and Meretz are looked into. With regard to Turkey, the party website of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is examined. The BDP has been established in 2008, which is considerably later compared to the pro-Arabic political parties in Israel. Unfortunately, it is impossible to investigate pro-Kurdish parties from before 2008, as these parties were banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court. It is argued in this paper that no proof can be found of pro-Arabic and pro-Kurdish political parties influencing foreign policy. Since Israel and Turkey are truly dissimilar to the United States, other cases need to be examined in order to find out whether minorities in other countries influence foreign policy. Moreover, international organizations, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union, can play a role in accommodating minorities. More research is necessary to find out whether international organizations, as the Council of Europe and the EU, play a role in protecting minority rights.Show less
In late January 1996, Greece and Turkey were literally hours from conflict after the landing of a helicopter with Turkish journalists on one of the two rocky islets in Northeastern Aegean Sea which...Show moreIn late January 1996, Greece and Turkey were literally hours from conflict after the landing of a helicopter with Turkish journalists on one of the two rocky islets in Northeastern Aegean Sea which are known in Greek as Imia and in Turkish as Kardak. Turkey’s intentions to dispute the Greek sovereignty of those islets led to the biggest crisis between the two countries after the Turkish invasion to Cyprus. The mediation of the US finally brought the deterrence of the war which was really close as Greek and Turkish troops had gathered on the islets and close to them. The fact that there was political instability in both countries at the time of the crisis creates a big question that is still to be answered: where the reasons of this crisis political? Domestic problems sometimes lead to external conflicts and the probability of the existence of a relationship between the domestic unrest mainly in Turkey and incidentally in Greece and the Imia/Kardak crisis still remains vague. This research will try to clarify the reasons of the Imia/Kardak crisis and to examine whether the diversionary theory of war has an application in it or not. Through the analysis of this theory and the description of the political situation in both countries we will try to come to a conclusion about the political dimension of this crisis.Show less
This master thesis looks at the impact of participation in Social Networking Sites (SNSs) by voters on their voting decisions during the Dutch parliamentary elections in 2012. Both the use and...Show moreThis master thesis looks at the impact of participation in Social Networking Sites (SNSs) by voters on their voting decisions during the Dutch parliamentary elections in 2012. Both the use and activity on SNSs are compared with the decision to participate in the elections and the moment a voter had decided for a party and person. The quantative analysis of a survey among train travelers and SNS users showed interesting results, but could not support the hypotheses that increased use relates to increased electoral participation. On the other hand, SNS use showed a strong significant positive correlation with the delayed choice for a party and person. SNS activity showed a strong significant positive correlation with a delayed choice for a person only. But, in the presence of stronger influences with multiple control variables the significance of the correlation disappeared, while the coefficient still remained positive. Other political communication variables like traditional media and face-to-face discussions did not show significant relationships with delayed decisions. Some of these results are interesting because they suggest that the use of SNSs has a certain impact on the decision making process of citizens during elections. A more extensive research may reveil the impact on a wider scale and must focus on specific causes of the impact, like content and specific political communication.Show less
