Making a decision on participation in crisis-management operations is part of foreign policy of a country. It is a government decision and in the Netherlands there has been an art.100procedure...Show moreMaking a decision on participation in crisis-management operations is part of foreign policy of a country. It is a government decision and in the Netherlands there has been an art.100procedure developed. With the final evaluation of the operation the art.100procedure is completed. Central to the study is if the political result, which is the outcome of the interaction between the government and parliament during the parliamentary debate on the art.100letter, is part of the final evaluation of the crisis-management operation. On the basis of case studies, document analysis and interviews, the study was conducted within a specific framework of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) as developed by Carlsnaes, namely the intentional and the structural dimension. The cases are three crisis-management operations, namely EUFOR Chad, SFIR/Iraq, ISAF/Uruzgan. To determine the political result the relevant parliamentary publications were analysed for each case, with an analysis scheme and within the framework of the FPA. This scheme has criteria that are derived from three main categories, namely international relations theories, the assessment framework of 2001, and subjects from the self-reflection of the Lower House. The empirical analysis (the case studies) surprisingly shows that the political result is almost not visible in the final evaluation.Show less
This paper looks at several voting power indices based upon the Banzhaf power index that take into account the ideology of voters. It then applies these indices to a voting body that is divided...Show moreThis paper looks at several voting power indices based upon the Banzhaf power index that take into account the ideology of voters. It then applies these indices to a voting body that is divided ideologically, the European Parliament. The modified power indices tend to reduce the voting power of party groups in extreme ideological positions, to the benefit of the median party group.Show less
The research question of this essay is: What was the attitude of the Dutch government and the Second Chamber towards eight Israeli-Arab conflicts? These conflicts were Israel’s War of Independence...Show moreThe research question of this essay is: What was the attitude of the Dutch government and the Second Chamber towards eight Israeli-Arab conflicts? These conflicts were Israel’s War of Independence from 15 May 1948 to 24 February 1949, the Suez Crisis from 29 October to 16 March 1957, the Six-Day War of June 1967, the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, the Israeli-Lebanese conflict from 6 June 1982 to 17 May 1983, the First Intifada from 9 December 1987 to 13 September 1993, the Second Intifada from 28 September 2000 to August 2005 and the Second Lebanon War from 12 July to 14 August 2006. The attitude and reactions from the Dutch government and political parties in the Second Chamber towards these conflicts are analyzed. More specifically, both the Israeli and Arab perspectives are taken into account. Based on this, conclusions can be drawn if these parties had taken in each conflict a pro-Israel, neutral or pro-Arabic attitude. After these research results, the hypotheses can be answered. In this research the political parties in the Dutch Second Chamber are divided into three important party families, which embody the political continuity in the Dutch politics. These party families, to which almost all political parties in the research can be divided in, are the Christian Democratic, the Social Democratic and the Liberal party families. The three most important political parties in the Netherlands in this research are called the ‘Big Three’, and are each the largest parties of their party families. These parties are the Christian Democratic Party (CDA), which is a fusion of the KVP, ARP and CHU, the Labour Party (PvdA) and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). The political parties that belong to the Christian Democratic party family besides the CDA and his predecessors KVP, ARP and CHU, were and are the SGP, GPV, ChristenUnie, KNP and the RKPN. The political parties that belong to the Social Democratic party family, besides the PvdA, were and are the CPN, DS’70, SP, PSP, PPR, EVP and GroenLinks. The party that belongs to the Liberal party family besides the conservative-liberal VVD is the social-liberal D66. The other parties in this research that didn’t belong to the three party families were the BP and LPF; they are classified as the Populist parties in this research. According to the research results the Dutch governments had taken more often a pro-Israeli, namely in four conflicts, than a pro-Arab, in two conflicts, or neutral, in two conflicts, attitude. There can be concluded that the Dutch government was in most conflicts in favor of Israel, but not in all conflicts. Therefore the first hypothesis, that the Dutch governments always had taken a pro-Israel attitude regarding all the eight conflicts, is not supported by these research results. The Christian Democratic Party CDA and its predecessors had taken five times a pro-Israeli, two times a neutral and one time a pro-Arab attitude. Therefore the second hypothesis, that the CDA and its three predecessors ARP, CHU and KVP, always had taken a pro-Israel attitude towards all the eight conflicts, is not supported by the research results. Despite the fact that the conservative-liberal VVD had taken most times, in comparison with the two other big parties CDA and PvdA, a pro-Israel attitude, she had not always taken a pro-Israel attitude towards the conflicts. Of the eight conflicts she had taken one time a neutral and one time a pro-Arab attitude. Therefore the third hypothesis, that the VVD always had taken a pro-Israeli attitude towards all the conflicts, is not supported by the research results. The social-liberal D66 only took once, during the Yom Kippur War, a pro-Israel attitude. This party had taken three times a pro-Arab and one time a neutral attitude towards the conflicts. Therefore there 55 can be concluded that the attitude of the conservative-liberal VVD and the social-liberal D66 regarding the conflicts differ a lot. Only during the Lebanon War of 1982 the VVD and D66 together took a pro-Arab attitude. Therefore the fourth hypothesis, that the VVD had taken more times a pro-Israel attitude than D66 towards the eight conflicts, is supported by the research results. The little Christian Democratic parties had never taken a pro-Arab attitude. Only during the Israeli War of Independence, and the GPV during the First Intifada, these parties had taken a neutral attitude. Despite the fact that these parties had taken more times a pro-Israel attitude towards the conflicts than the other parties, the fifth hypotheses; that these parties always had taken a pro-Israel attitude, is not supported by the research results. Within the Social Democrat parties it is most obvious that the PvdA has changed its attitudes towards Israel during the conflicts. While the PvdA took a pro-Israel attitude in three successive conflicts; the Suez, Sixth-Day and the Yom Kippur War, she took a pro-Arab attitude from the First Lebanon War to the Second Lebanon War. Therefor the sixth hypothesis, that the PvdA had changed on a current moment its attitude from pro-Israel to pro-Arabic, is supported by the results of the research. All the Social Democratic parties on the left side of the PvdA had taken the most pro-Arabic attitudes towards the eight conflicts, in comparison to the other political parties in the Second Chamber. Of all the parties on the left side of the PvdA only the PSP had once, during the Six-Day War, taken a pro-Israel attitude. From the First Lebanon War to the Second Lebanon War, these parties had all taken a pro-Arabic attitude towards these conflicts. The CPN had taken a neutral attitude three times and the PPR only took a neutral attitude during the Yom Kippur War. The seventh hypotheses, that the parties on the left side of the PvdA within the Social Democratic party family had always taken a pro-Arab attitude towards the eight conflicts, is not supported by these research results. The Populist BP had taken a neutral attitude one time and a pro-Israel attitude another time. The LPF however, merely took a pro-Israel attitude once.Show less
This thesis argues that previous literature dealing with water scarcity conflicts and politics inside river basins misses out on important factors determining water scarcity. Hence, a political...Show moreThis thesis argues that previous literature dealing with water scarcity conflicts and politics inside river basins misses out on important factors determining water scarcity. Hence, a political geography and political ecology perspective is utilized in order to link international relations, political economy and geography. With this combination, concepts like food security, land-lease deals and their link with water scarcity are examined in order to illustrate that water scarcity is much more than water equity principles often found in transboundary river interaction between specific states. This thesis specifically focuses on the Nile Basin, most notably Egypt and Ethiopia in particular, and argues that many players from all over the world through investments and discursive practices interfere with Nile water allocation indirectly and obscurely. Hence, just hammering out a legal framework with Nile Basin riparians in not enough and should looked for in economic and discursive practices surrounding water scarcity.Show less
The European Union has become increasingly important in Dutch politics. The Dutch referendum on the Constitutional Treaty of 2005 marked a turning point, with a growing resistance to European...Show moreThe European Union has become increasingly important in Dutch politics. The Dutch referendum on the Constitutional Treaty of 2005 marked a turning point, with a growing resistance to European integration emerging. This study looks at the gap between Dutch MPs and Dutch voters in positions on European integration and finds that since the 2005 referendum the gap has all but closed.Show less