Making a decision on participation in crisis-management operations is part of foreign policy of a country. It is a government decision and in the Netherlands there has been an art.100procedure...Show moreMaking a decision on participation in crisis-management operations is part of foreign policy of a country. It is a government decision and in the Netherlands there has been an art.100procedure developed. With the final evaluation of the operation the art.100procedure is completed. Central to the study is if the political result, which is the outcome of the interaction between the government and parliament during the parliamentary debate on the art.100letter, is part of the final evaluation of the crisis-management operation. On the basis of case studies, document analysis and interviews, the study was conducted within a specific framework of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) as developed by Carlsnaes, namely the intentional and the structural dimension. The cases are three crisis-management operations, namely EUFOR Chad, SFIR/Iraq, ISAF/Uruzgan. To determine the political result the relevant parliamentary publications were analysed for each case, with an analysis scheme and within the framework of the FPA. This scheme has criteria that are derived from three main categories, namely international relations theories, the assessment framework of 2001, and subjects from the self-reflection of the Lower House. The empirical analysis (the case studies) surprisingly shows that the political result is almost not visible in the final evaluation.Show less
This study aim at providing an answer to the core research question “What is the role of Twitter in the conduct of public diplomacy in The Netherlands?” On the basis of qualitative interviews with...Show moreThis study aim at providing an answer to the core research question “What is the role of Twitter in the conduct of public diplomacy in The Netherlands?” On the basis of qualitative interviews with foreign diplomats and experts on public diplomacy in The Netherlands, it was discovered that they use Twitter as a tool for providing the local communities with information about the advocated countries and their foreign policies. The foreign officials also employ Twitter to address certain members of the Dutch general public, attract their attention to specific topics and engage in discussions with them to enhance their perceptions of the represented states. The conducted content analysis of the Tweets posted by diplomats from the Embassy of Ecuador, the Embassy of Poland, the Embassy of Sweden, and the Embassy of the USA to the Netherlands also demonstrated that they post direct Tweets and personal messages concerning important topics to engage with the foreign publics. However, it is also found that only a small number of them use the language of the local community members, namely Dutch, to disseminate information about their foreign policies. Some of the interviewees explained that they translate only content that is relevant to the Dutch audiences in Dutch. Nevertheless, to engage in more debates with the local communities and enhance their understanding and image of the represented countries, it is recommended that foreign diplomats should provide all messages on Twitter in the language of the host state. Thus, they can use it as an effective tool for accomplishing their public diplomacy goals.Show less
Trust in political parties is declining and with it the relevance of parties, or so the de-alignment hypothesis claims. Using data from recent World Values Surveys, this paper provides evidence...Show moreTrust in political parties is declining and with it the relevance of parties, or so the de-alignment hypothesis claims. Using data from recent World Values Surveys, this paper provides evidence that the assumption is rather problematic. Longitudinal data shows that confidence is neither increasing nor declining but languishing at high levels. Additionally, cross-sectional data from the 2005-2008 WVS was analyzed using statistical tests at the individual and country level. The results demonstrate that one important factor increasing distrust is electoral disproportionality. Regime durability, interpersonal trust, and perceived democraticness reduce such sentiments. Corruption perception notably has no effect on individual respondents but decreases distrust on the national level. The results pose the question whether distrust is a reason for concern or just a phenomenon natural to representative democracy.Show less
Met enige regelmaat duiken verontrustende berichten op die zouden duiden op politiek cynisme. In media maar ook in wetenschappelijke literatuur wordt dit cynisme in verband gebracht met lage...Show moreMet enige regelmaat duiken verontrustende berichten op die zouden duiden op politiek cynisme. In media maar ook in wetenschappelijke literatuur wordt dit cynisme in verband gebracht met lage politieke betrokkenheid en onvrede onder veel burgers over de politiek. Politiek cynisme is in de wetenschappelijke literatuur een bekend concept. Veelal gaan de onderzoeken over de oorzaken, aanwezigheid en gevolgen van politiek cynisme. Dit onderzoek vult dit pallet aan onderzoeken aan door na te gaan of de mate waarin jongeren politiek cynisch zijn verandert na het volgen van een les over politiek cynisme. De verwachting is dat het cynisme afneemt doordat de kennis over dit onderwerp toeneemt. Hiervoor zijn vier onderzoeksgroepen samengesteld bestaande uit vmbo, havo en vwo leerlingen. De eerste groep kreeg een voormeting, een les en een nameting. De tweede groep kreeg een voormeting en een nameting. De derde groep kreeg een les en een nameting. De vierde groep kreeg alleen een nameting. Tijdens elke meting werd het cynisme gemeten aan de hand van 26 vragen. Elk antwoord stond gelijk aan een bepaalde score. Door het optellen van de scores ontstond een cynisme-schaal met schaalwaarde variërend van 26 (niet-cynisch) tot 130 (wel-cynisch) punten. De gemiddelde scores van de vier onderzoeksgroepen zijn in het programma SPSS met elkaar vergeleken. Groep 1 heeft een significant lagere cynismescore bij de nameting dan bij de voormeting. Groep 2 heeft geen significant andere cynismescore bij de nameting dan bij de voormeting. Groep 2 heeft een significant hogere cynismescore bij de nameting dan groep 1. Groep 4 heeft een significant hogere cynismescore bij de nameting dan groep 3. Het lijkt er dus sterk op dat de les leidt tot minder cynisme onder jongeren op de korte termijn. Wanneer onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen de verschillende opleidingsniveaus vinden we de sterkste significante resultaten onder vwo leerlingen. Uit een vergelijking tussen leerlingen van de drie opleidingsniveaus van groep 1 blijkt dat de cynismescore van vwo leerlingen significant lager is na de les dan de cynismescore van vmbo en havo leerlingen. Omdat uit dezelfde test blijkt dat de cynismescore van vmbo leerlingen significant lager is na de les dan de cynismescore van havo leerlingen kunnen we niet concluderen dat de les meer effect heeft op hoger opgeleide jongeren dan op lager opgeleide jongeren. Uit correlatietests blijkt er geen significante correlatie te bestaan tussen de toename van kennis over politiek cynisme en een verandering van het cynisme onder leerlingen. De les heeft dus effect maar de verwachting dat het effect wordt veroorzaakt door een toename van kennis is niet bewezen. Het onderzoeksresultaat is interessant en biedt aanknopingspunten voor verder onderzoek waarin meer aandacht kan worden besteed aan het lange termijn effect van een les over politiek cynisme en waarin politiek cynisme wordt gemeten volgens de methoden die gebruikelijk zijn bij het meten van impliciete attitudes.Show less
The research question of this essay is: What was the attitude of the Dutch government and the Second Chamber towards eight Israeli-Arab conflicts? These conflicts were Israel’s War of Independence...Show moreThe research question of this essay is: What was the attitude of the Dutch government and the Second Chamber towards eight Israeli-Arab conflicts? These conflicts were Israel’s War of Independence from 15 May 1948 to 24 February 1949, the Suez Crisis from 29 October to 16 March 1957, the Six-Day War of June 1967, the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, the Israeli-Lebanese conflict from 6 June 1982 to 17 May 1983, the First Intifada from 9 December 1987 to 13 September 1993, the Second Intifada from 28 September 2000 to August 2005 and the Second Lebanon War from 12 July to 14 August 2006. The attitude and reactions from the Dutch government and political parties in the Second Chamber towards these conflicts are analyzed. More specifically, both the Israeli and Arab perspectives are taken into account. Based on this, conclusions can be drawn if these parties had taken in each conflict a pro-Israel, neutral or pro-Arabic attitude. After these research results, the hypotheses can be answered. In this research the political parties in the Dutch Second Chamber are divided into three important party families, which embody the political continuity in the Dutch politics. These party families, to which almost all political parties in the research can be divided in, are the Christian Democratic, the Social Democratic and the Liberal party families. The three most important political parties in the Netherlands in this research are called the ‘Big Three’, and are each the largest parties of their party families. These parties are the Christian Democratic Party (CDA), which is a fusion of the KVP, ARP and CHU, the Labour Party (PvdA) and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). The political parties that belong to the Christian Democratic party family besides the CDA and his predecessors KVP, ARP and CHU, were and are the SGP, GPV, ChristenUnie, KNP and the RKPN. The political parties that belong to the Social Democratic party family, besides the PvdA, were and are the CPN, DS’70, SP, PSP, PPR, EVP and GroenLinks. The party that belongs to the Liberal party family besides the conservative-liberal VVD is the social-liberal D66. The other parties in this research that didn’t belong to the three party families were the BP and LPF; they are classified as the Populist parties in this research. According to the research results the Dutch governments had taken more often a pro-Israeli, namely in four conflicts, than a pro-Arab, in two conflicts, or neutral, in two conflicts, attitude. There can be concluded that the Dutch government was in most conflicts in favor of Israel, but not in all conflicts. Therefore the first hypothesis, that the Dutch governments always had taken a pro-Israel attitude regarding all the eight conflicts, is not supported by these research results. The Christian Democratic Party CDA and its predecessors had taken five times a pro-Israeli, two times a neutral and one time a pro-Arab attitude. Therefore the second hypothesis, that the CDA and its three predecessors ARP, CHU and KVP, always had taken a pro-Israel attitude towards all the eight conflicts, is not supported by the research results. Despite the fact that the conservative-liberal VVD had taken most times, in comparison with the two other big parties CDA and PvdA, a pro-Israel attitude, she had not always taken a pro-Israel attitude towards the conflicts. Of the eight conflicts she had taken one time a neutral and one time a pro-Arab attitude. Therefore the third hypothesis, that the VVD always had taken a pro-Israeli attitude towards all the conflicts, is not supported by the research results. The social-liberal D66 only took once, during the Yom Kippur War, a pro-Israel attitude. This party had taken three times a pro-Arab and one time a neutral attitude towards the conflicts. Therefore there 55 can be concluded that the attitude of the conservative-liberal VVD and the social-liberal D66 regarding the conflicts differ a lot. Only during the Lebanon War of 1982 the VVD and D66 together took a pro-Arab attitude. Therefore the fourth hypothesis, that the VVD had taken more times a pro-Israel attitude than D66 towards the eight conflicts, is supported by the research results. The little Christian Democratic parties had never taken a pro-Arab attitude. Only during the Israeli War of Independence, and the GPV during the First Intifada, these parties had taken a neutral attitude. Despite the fact that these parties had taken more times a pro-Israel attitude towards the conflicts than the other parties, the fifth hypotheses; that these parties always had taken a pro-Israel attitude, is not supported by the research results. Within the Social Democrat parties it is most obvious that the PvdA has changed its attitudes towards Israel during the conflicts. While the PvdA took a pro-Israel attitude in three successive conflicts; the Suez, Sixth-Day and the Yom Kippur War, she took a pro-Arab attitude from the First Lebanon War to the Second Lebanon War. Therefor the sixth hypothesis, that the PvdA had changed on a current moment its attitude from pro-Israel to pro-Arabic, is supported by the results of the research. All the Social Democratic parties on the left side of the PvdA had taken the most pro-Arabic attitudes towards the eight conflicts, in comparison to the other political parties in the Second Chamber. Of all the parties on the left side of the PvdA only the PSP had once, during the Six-Day War, taken a pro-Israel attitude. From the First Lebanon War to the Second Lebanon War, these parties had all taken a pro-Arabic attitude towards these conflicts. The CPN had taken a neutral attitude three times and the PPR only took a neutral attitude during the Yom Kippur War. The seventh hypotheses, that the parties on the left side of the PvdA within the Social Democratic party family had always taken a pro-Arab attitude towards the eight conflicts, is not supported by these research results. The Populist BP had taken a neutral attitude one time and a pro-Israel attitude another time. The LPF however, merely took a pro-Israel attitude once.Show less