The research question of this essay is: What was the attitude of the Dutch government and the Second Chamber towards eight Israeli-Arab conflicts? These conflicts were Israel’s War of Independence...Show moreThe research question of this essay is: What was the attitude of the Dutch government and the Second Chamber towards eight Israeli-Arab conflicts? These conflicts were Israel’s War of Independence from 15 May 1948 to 24 February 1949, the Suez Crisis from 29 October to 16 March 1957, the Six-Day War of June 1967, the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, the Israeli-Lebanese conflict from 6 June 1982 to 17 May 1983, the First Intifada from 9 December 1987 to 13 September 1993, the Second Intifada from 28 September 2000 to August 2005 and the Second Lebanon War from 12 July to 14 August 2006. The attitude and reactions from the Dutch government and political parties in the Second Chamber towards these conflicts are analyzed. More specifically, both the Israeli and Arab perspectives are taken into account. Based on this, conclusions can be drawn if these parties had taken in each conflict a pro-Israel, neutral or pro-Arabic attitude. After these research results, the hypotheses can be answered. In this research the political parties in the Dutch Second Chamber are divided into three important party families, which embody the political continuity in the Dutch politics. These party families, to which almost all political parties in the research can be divided in, are the Christian Democratic, the Social Democratic and the Liberal party families. The three most important political parties in the Netherlands in this research are called the ‘Big Three’, and are each the largest parties of their party families. These parties are the Christian Democratic Party (CDA), which is a fusion of the KVP, ARP and CHU, the Labour Party (PvdA) and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). The political parties that belong to the Christian Democratic party family besides the CDA and his predecessors KVP, ARP and CHU, were and are the SGP, GPV, ChristenUnie, KNP and the RKPN. The political parties that belong to the Social Democratic party family, besides the PvdA, were and are the CPN, DS’70, SP, PSP, PPR, EVP and GroenLinks. The party that belongs to the Liberal party family besides the conservative-liberal VVD is the social-liberal D66. The other parties in this research that didn’t belong to the three party families were the BP and LPF; they are classified as the Populist parties in this research. According to the research results the Dutch governments had taken more often a pro-Israeli, namely in four conflicts, than a pro-Arab, in two conflicts, or neutral, in two conflicts, attitude. There can be concluded that the Dutch government was in most conflicts in favor of Israel, but not in all conflicts. Therefore the first hypothesis, that the Dutch governments always had taken a pro-Israel attitude regarding all the eight conflicts, is not supported by these research results. The Christian Democratic Party CDA and its predecessors had taken five times a pro-Israeli, two times a neutral and one time a pro-Arab attitude. Therefore the second hypothesis, that the CDA and its three predecessors ARP, CHU and KVP, always had taken a pro-Israel attitude towards all the eight conflicts, is not supported by the research results. Despite the fact that the conservative-liberal VVD had taken most times, in comparison with the two other big parties CDA and PvdA, a pro-Israel attitude, she had not always taken a pro-Israel attitude towards the conflicts. Of the eight conflicts she had taken one time a neutral and one time a pro-Arab attitude. Therefore the third hypothesis, that the VVD always had taken a pro-Israeli attitude towards all the conflicts, is not supported by the research results. The social-liberal D66 only took once, during the Yom Kippur War, a pro-Israel attitude. This party had taken three times a pro-Arab and one time a neutral attitude towards the conflicts. Therefore there 55 can be concluded that the attitude of the conservative-liberal VVD and the social-liberal D66 regarding the conflicts differ a lot. Only during the Lebanon War of 1982 the VVD and D66 together took a pro-Arab attitude. Therefore the fourth hypothesis, that the VVD had taken more times a pro-Israel attitude than D66 towards the eight conflicts, is supported by the research results. The little Christian Democratic parties had never taken a pro-Arab attitude. Only during the Israeli War of Independence, and the GPV during the First Intifada, these parties had taken a neutral attitude. Despite the fact that these parties had taken more times a pro-Israel attitude towards the conflicts than the other parties, the fifth hypotheses; that these parties always had taken a pro-Israel attitude, is not supported by the research results. Within the Social Democrat parties it is most obvious that the PvdA has changed its attitudes towards Israel during the conflicts. While the PvdA took a pro-Israel attitude in three successive conflicts; the Suez, Sixth-Day and the Yom Kippur War, she took a pro-Arab attitude from the First Lebanon War to the Second Lebanon War. Therefor the sixth hypothesis, that the PvdA had changed on a current moment its attitude from pro-Israel to pro-Arabic, is supported by the results of the research. All the Social Democratic parties on the left side of the PvdA had taken the most pro-Arabic attitudes towards the eight conflicts, in comparison to the other political parties in the Second Chamber. Of all the parties on the left side of the PvdA only the PSP had once, during the Six-Day War, taken a pro-Israel attitude. From the First Lebanon War to the Second Lebanon War, these parties had all taken a pro-Arabic attitude towards these conflicts. The CPN had taken a neutral attitude three times and the PPR only took a neutral attitude during the Yom Kippur War. The seventh hypotheses, that the parties on the left side of the PvdA within the Social Democratic party family had always taken a pro-Arab attitude towards the eight conflicts, is not supported by these research results. The Populist BP had taken a neutral attitude one time and a pro-Israel attitude another time. The LPF however, merely took a pro-Israel attitude once.Show less
Parliamentary committees are a crucial feature of legislative organization in European democracies. Increasing electoral volatility and new roles of emerging parties effect the nature of the...Show moreParliamentary committees are a crucial feature of legislative organization in European democracies. Increasing electoral volatility and new roles of emerging parties effect the nature of the legislative proceedings that take place in committee meetings. This thesis assesses the consequences of the drastic changes in the Dutch party system (large traditional centrist parties losing ground to the upcoming middle-sized parties) for the legislative process. By looking at the proceedings of committee meetings in two different periods of fragmentation (2005 and 2011), this study explores the contribution and participation of the different parties in the committee phase in parliament. A general correlation between smaller party sizes and a decline in the seats that are represented in committee meetings is detected. Furthermore, it is found that MPs of parties with centrifugal tendencies (towards the extremes of the political spectrum) are less likely to participate in committee meetings than MPs that are closer to the political center.Show less
Het centrale onderwerp van deze scriptie is de invloed van de oppositiepartijen in de Tweede Kamer op wetgeving. Het startpunt van het onderzoek wordt gevormd door een uitspraak van Gerard Visscher...Show moreHet centrale onderwerp van deze scriptie is de invloed van de oppositiepartijen in de Tweede Kamer op wetgeving. Het startpunt van het onderzoek wordt gevormd door een uitspraak van Gerard Visscher, die in zijn proefschrift (1994) concludeerde dat de invloed van het parlement op het regeringsbeleid sinds de jaren zeventig van de vorige eeuw is toegenomen en dat deze invloed voor een aanzienlijk deel van de kant van de oppositie komt. Door de invloed van oppositiepartijen in de Tweede Kamer op wetgeving tijdens de kabinetten-Balkenende II en –Balkenende IV - kabinetten met een meerderheid in beide Kamers - te onderzoeken, is bekeken of deze conclusie nog steeds opgaat voor meerderheidskabinetten.Show less
In this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic)...Show moreIn this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic) narrative. He focuses on two arguments: (1) domestic politics cause friction for both actors, (2) international pressure (from state and non-state actors) causes friction for both actors. This international pressure also includes image. Using a variety of observation techniques and limited quantitative analysis, the author finds that (1) domestic political rivalry facilitates escalation for the strong and the weak actor and has no bearing on de-escalation; escalation erodes and diminishes domestic political rivalry. (2) International pressure and image facilitates de-escalation on both sides in order to maintain a positive image. (3) The weak actor must start de-escalating in response to the strong actor’s de-escalation; else it may very well damage its own capacity to achieve its political objectives. He then discusses the policy implications that this conclusion has, most notably (1) the way that policy-makers may change their behavior in order to improve their own image, or the image of the actor they represent. (2) They may or may not be more cautious when dealing with domestic rivalry, as they may seek to avoid escalating, and would rather tackle the actual cause of domestic rivalry. Opportunities for future research in the thesis. Most notable opportunities for future research include (1) the relationship between strong actor de-escalation and weak actor de-escalation and the way the former enables the latter. (2) The effect of the situation on the ground, rather than on the purely political level, on each actor’s decision to de-escalate.Show less
Recent studies in political demography have concluded that young adults, when overrepresented in a country's population, form an obstacle to democracy. After performing linear regressions on a new...Show moreRecent studies in political demography have concluded that young adults, when overrepresented in a country's population, form an obstacle to democracy. After performing linear regressions on a new global database using data from Polity IV, UNPD, and IIASA/VID, it is demonstrated that the role of young adults cannot unanimously be dismissed as obstructive in the democratization process. Instead, a new variable indicating the percentage of a country’s population that is both young and highly educated is introduced. This variable is proved to offer stable predictions on that country's level of democracy across time and space.Show less
Articles that investigate minority influence on foreign policy-making have mainly concentrated on minorities living in the United States. Research on national minorities outside the United States...Show moreArticles that investigate minority influence on foreign policy-making have mainly concentrated on minorities living in the United States. Research on national minorities outside the United States has been limited. This paper tries to compare two cases that are dissimilar to the United States, namely Turkey and Israel and this essay asks the question: to what extent do the Kurdish and Arabic minorities influence Turkish and Israeli foreign policy? There is a particular emphasis on foreign policy influence of Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Arabic political parties. The party websites of the Pro-Arabic, Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) and Meretz are looked into. With regard to Turkey, the party website of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is examined. The BDP has been established in 2008, which is considerably later compared to the pro-Arabic political parties in Israel. Unfortunately, it is impossible to investigate pro-Kurdish parties from before 2008, as these parties were banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court. It is argued in this paper that no proof can be found of pro-Arabic and pro-Kurdish political parties influencing foreign policy. Since Israel and Turkey are truly dissimilar to the United States, other cases need to be examined in order to find out whether minorities in other countries influence foreign policy. Moreover, international organizations, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union, can play a role in accommodating minorities. More research is necessary to find out whether international organizations, as the Council of Europe and the EU, play a role in protecting minority rights.Show less
In late January 1996, Greece and Turkey were literally hours from conflict after the landing of a helicopter with Turkish journalists on one of the two rocky islets in Northeastern Aegean Sea which...Show moreIn late January 1996, Greece and Turkey were literally hours from conflict after the landing of a helicopter with Turkish journalists on one of the two rocky islets in Northeastern Aegean Sea which are known in Greek as Imia and in Turkish as Kardak. Turkey’s intentions to dispute the Greek sovereignty of those islets led to the biggest crisis between the two countries after the Turkish invasion to Cyprus. The mediation of the US finally brought the deterrence of the war which was really close as Greek and Turkish troops had gathered on the islets and close to them. The fact that there was political instability in both countries at the time of the crisis creates a big question that is still to be answered: where the reasons of this crisis political? Domestic problems sometimes lead to external conflicts and the probability of the existence of a relationship between the domestic unrest mainly in Turkey and incidentally in Greece and the Imia/Kardak crisis still remains vague. This research will try to clarify the reasons of the Imia/Kardak crisis and to examine whether the diversionary theory of war has an application in it or not. Through the analysis of this theory and the description of the political situation in both countries we will try to come to a conclusion about the political dimension of this crisis.Show less
Wars have substantial consequences for the consolidation of democracy, and have caused demographic, socio-economic and social problems in the countries of the Former Yugoslavia. However, what is...Show moreWars have substantial consequences for the consolidation of democracy, and have caused demographic, socio-economic and social problems in the countries of the Former Yugoslavia. However, what is striking is that not only has their Europeanization process differed from other Central and Eastern European countries, but also that among them a differentiated form of integration has taken place. On the one hand there are countries like Slovenia, a full EU member state, and Croatia, an acceding country set to join in July 2013, and on the other hand, countries like Serbia, a candidate country, and Bosnia i Herzegovina, a potential candidate, which have a long way to go on the path to membership. What are the reasons for these differences? How can we explain such variation in degrees of EU membership given that these countries were part of the same state a mere twenty-two years ago? What factors explain the quick democratic consolidation and compliance with EU conditionality of some FY states, on one hand, and the fragmented, problematic and generally slow Europeanization process of other FY states on the other? In order to answer these questions, this thesis examines the role of two key factors in determining different degrees of EU membership – the role of ethnicity, and the legacy of civil war in the internal political environment.Show less
One of the foremost controversies apparent following the 2011 intervention in Libya, was the outcome of regime change. Critics charge the facilitation of the Gadaffi regime's overthrow was not...Show moreOne of the foremost controversies apparent following the 2011 intervention in Libya, was the outcome of regime change. Critics charge the facilitation of the Gadaffi regime's overthrow was not justifiable under the United Nations mandate, not justifiable under the prominent 'Responsibility to Protect' norm and may have undermined efforts to resolve the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria. However, it is asserted that in situations where intervention is undertaken to stop atrocities committed by a government, the removal of that regime is necessary in achieving its aims. In exploring this link between humanitarian intervention and regime change, this piece analyses how the academic literature can justify the enactment of regime change in instances of intervention. This relationship otherwise lacks a sustained analysis in the academic literature. Whilst regime change is often difficult to justify in instances of humanitarian intervention, and inevitably controversial, this analysis will demonstrate that it is also often a necessity in achieving an intervention's humanitarian goals.Show less
The expression of public opinion varies depending on the issue. This variation could be linked to highly salient issues. We argue that public opinion will be more involved in the case of highly...Show moreThe expression of public opinion varies depending on the issue. This variation could be linked to highly salient issues. We argue that public opinion will be more involved in the case of highly salient issues. In such circumstances, it would be interesting to examine if a higher saliency leads to a more accountable government. While some scholars link foreign policy with domestic debate, few of them link accountability with saliency as a means to verify the importance of domestic factors. Therefore, we will add new elements to the existing literature by focusing on this link. The question guiding our research will try to confirm that governments give more account when facing a salient issue within public opinion. Our question is the following: Does the high salience of a foreign policy issue have an influence on the extent of account-giving by democratic governments to citizens?Show less
Despite the extensive literature on the democratisation in the post-Soviet region, little effort has been dedicated to the issue of historical institutional legacies. Many designs stress national...Show moreDespite the extensive literature on the democratisation in the post-Soviet region, little effort has been dedicated to the issue of historical institutional legacies. Many designs stress national-level variation in performance and therefore cannot easily explain the differences among the countries emerging from the former Soviet Union. This paper uses process-tracing in a case study of the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to test the variable of institutional legacies as a possible causal mechanism that aids the transition from authoritarian rule to consolidation of democracy. The analysis aims to contribute to the post-communist democratisation literature by extending the scope to new, unexplored cases and by stressing the importance of pre-communist historical legacy factor for modern institutional design. The analysis finds that the restoration of democratic institutions has pushed the character of the states toward consolidated democracies. Lasting effective governance, with the possible exception of citizenship laws, has in due course been achieved as the character of democratic values has survived Soviet homogenising polices. The conclusion proposes an analysis to measure significant variation between cases with regard to strength of legacy and strength of democratic consolidation in the post-Soviet region and predicts a correlation between these variables.Show less
In ‘de rol van de kerk op het politieke toneel’ wordt een mogelijke revitalisering van de kerkelijke lobbyactiviteit meetbaar gemaakt. Het onderzoek sluit hiermee nauw aan op de maatschappelijke...Show moreIn ‘de rol van de kerk op het politieke toneel’ wordt een mogelijke revitalisering van de kerkelijke lobbyactiviteit meetbaar gemaakt. Het onderzoek sluit hiermee nauw aan op de maatschappelijke discussie, die er bestaat over de toenemende zichtbaarheid van religie in de publieke ruimte. Met het onderzoek wordt ook de ‘traditionele secularisatiethese’ in twijfel getrokken. De traditionele secularisatiethese veronderstelt namelijk dat seculiere differentiatie (de opdeling van het leven in verschillende sferen), ontkerkelijking en privatisering van religie gelijk tred houden, terwijl de revitaliseringsthese seculiere differentiatie en ontkerkelijking juist ziet als katalysatoren van deprivatisering van religie.Show less
In 2002, a new Local Government Act (LGA) was introduced in Dutch legislation. An important objective of the LGA was to improve the councillors’ representative role and to revive local governance...Show moreIn 2002, a new Local Government Act (LGA) was introduced in Dutch legislation. An important objective of the LGA was to improve the councillors’ representative role and to revive local governance for citizens. Ten years have passed since the introduction of the law, but not all of its objectives have been reached, in particular with regard to the strengthening of the representative role of councillors. Citizens still judge councillors the same as before the introduction of the LGA. Although the position of the council towards the Board of Mayor and Aldermen did improve, councillors did not enhance their external orientation in their relation to the citizenry. It seems that in the realization of the LGA, the political-philosophical foundation of the term ‘representative’ has barely been discussed. Neither the Royal Committee that proposed the legislative reforms or the Dutch government stated their definition and objectives with regard to the representative role explicitly. As a result, the LGA was manifested in municipalities in various ways and the representative role of councillors in particular became the least improved function. I argue that with respect to introducing measures to strengthen the representative role, it is inevitable to first and foremost discuss the political-philosophical background of this term. It becomes clear that because of ideological differences, representatives will implement this function in various ways. It remains to be seen whether it is possible and desirable to define measures in order to ‘improve’ the representative role.Show less
