In this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic)...Show moreIn this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic) narrative. He focuses on two arguments: (1) domestic politics cause friction for both actors, (2) international pressure (from state and non-state actors) causes friction for both actors. This international pressure also includes image. Using a variety of observation techniques and limited quantitative analysis, the author finds that (1) domestic political rivalry facilitates escalation for the strong and the weak actor and has no bearing on de-escalation; escalation erodes and diminishes domestic political rivalry. (2) International pressure and image facilitates de-escalation on both sides in order to maintain a positive image. (3) The weak actor must start de-escalating in response to the strong actor’s de-escalation; else it may very well damage its own capacity to achieve its political objectives. He then discusses the policy implications that this conclusion has, most notably (1) the way that policy-makers may change their behavior in order to improve their own image, or the image of the actor they represent. (2) They may or may not be more cautious when dealing with domestic rivalry, as they may seek to avoid escalating, and would rather tackle the actual cause of domestic rivalry. Opportunities for future research in the thesis. Most notable opportunities for future research include (1) the relationship between strong actor de-escalation and weak actor de-escalation and the way the former enables the latter. (2) The effect of the situation on the ground, rather than on the purely political level, on each actor’s decision to de-escalate.Show less
In late January 1996, Greece and Turkey were literally hours from conflict after the landing of a helicopter with Turkish journalists on one of the two rocky islets in Northeastern Aegean Sea which...Show moreIn late January 1996, Greece and Turkey were literally hours from conflict after the landing of a helicopter with Turkish journalists on one of the two rocky islets in Northeastern Aegean Sea which are known in Greek as Imia and in Turkish as Kardak. Turkey’s intentions to dispute the Greek sovereignty of those islets led to the biggest crisis between the two countries after the Turkish invasion to Cyprus. The mediation of the US finally brought the deterrence of the war which was really close as Greek and Turkish troops had gathered on the islets and close to them. The fact that there was political instability in both countries at the time of the crisis creates a big question that is still to be answered: where the reasons of this crisis political? Domestic problems sometimes lead to external conflicts and the probability of the existence of a relationship between the domestic unrest mainly in Turkey and incidentally in Greece and the Imia/Kardak crisis still remains vague. This research will try to clarify the reasons of the Imia/Kardak crisis and to examine whether the diversionary theory of war has an application in it or not. Through the analysis of this theory and the description of the political situation in both countries we will try to come to a conclusion about the political dimension of this crisis.Show less
This thesis is inspired by the will to understand why the international community stands by while mass atrocities are committed by the Syrian government. My research question ‘Why does the...Show moreThis thesis is inspired by the will to understand why the international community stands by while mass atrocities are committed by the Syrian government. My research question ‘Why does the international community not intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Syria?’ forms the premise for this thesis. My main argument is that because of the non-consensus within the international community about R2P as a norm, there is a lack of political will to intervene in the situation in Syria. Furthermore, I argue that this lack of consensus is caused by the protection of the national interests of the states involved, especially the security of their sovereignty. These arguments are substantiated by the acceptance of my hypotheses which are based on the core assumptions of realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These hypotheses show that the protection of sovereignty, the lack of a common interest, and the non-consensus about R2P are crucial aspects in the decision not to intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Syria.Show less
During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union demonstrated a shared interest in a military status quo in Earth orbit and exercised considerable restraint by not placing weapons in space....Show moreDuring the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union demonstrated a shared interest in a military status quo in Earth orbit and exercised considerable restraint by not placing weapons in space. However, despite ever-increasing state dependency on civilian space applications, militarisation efforts have accelerated in recent decades, heightening fears that one or more states may deploy space weapons. Indeed, the catastrophic consequences of a space war appear to provide the world with an interest in keeping space conflict free but key space power states have been reluctant to implement a prohibition on weapons in space. To understand why, this paper analyses the history of space militarisation and arms control and the two most prominent explanations offered to date – that the United States has acted as a non-status quo state and that international governance has failed to deliver on its promise. Finding these unsatisfactory, the paper proposes that the absence of a space weapons prohibition is instead best understood as the product of security dilemma dynamics. These can lead even benign states with significant common interests to a self-reinforcing spiral of insecurity driven by uncertainty and fear.Show less
This thesis deals with the issue of the Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands. These islands are disputed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, who currently occupies them, and the United Arab...Show moreThis thesis deals with the issue of the Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands. These islands are disputed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, who currently occupies them, and the United Arab Emirates, who to this day claim the islands as theirs. The strategic significance of the islands is not to be underestimated, as they lay directly in the main shipping lanes through which a significant portion of the world’s oil is transported. This paper has looked at the historical events that shaped the situation today, with a focus on the period between independence of the United Arab Emirates and the mid-1990’s. This timeframe is further divided in three parts, the events surrounding independence, the period of upheaval attempted détente during the late 1970’s and 1980’s and finally the reescalation of the issue after the First Gulf War of 1991.Using the theory of offensive realism as devised by John Mearsheimer and the associated concepts of power balancing, buck passing, off shore balancing and the role of the off shore balancer the events during this period have been analysed to answer the question whether this theory can explain the absence of warfare between the U.A.E. and Iran. Even though at times the situation seemed to be heading for war, the simple discrepancy between the capabilities of the U.A.E. and Iran resulted in a carefully balanced status quo that has been maintained since 1971 thereby weakening the key offensive realist assumption that the offensive is always profitable.Show less
