This paper is to illuminate the social significance of positional goods and to assess the desirability of equality of these goods. I begin with a characterization of strict and moderate...Show moreThis paper is to illuminate the social significance of positional goods and to assess the desirability of equality of these goods. I begin with a characterization of strict and moderate egalitarianism and their implications about equality; and I discuss the leveling down principle as well as its objection. Further, I turn to the issue of positionality and non-positionality; define positional goods; clarify the distinction between positional goods with non-positional aspect and non-positional goods with positional aspect; and demonstrate what a notable case equality (and leveling down) of positional goods is in the field of political philosophy and economics. I then proceed to an elaborate discussion about the desirability of equality of positional goods. I conclude that equality of these goods is not desirable and defend this claim on three egalitarian grounds: (1) non-positionality; (2) social growth; and (3) fair competition.Show less
This paper looks at several voting power indices based upon the Banzhaf power index that take into account the ideology of voters. It then applies these indices to a voting body that is divided...Show moreThis paper looks at several voting power indices based upon the Banzhaf power index that take into account the ideology of voters. It then applies these indices to a voting body that is divided ideologically, the European Parliament. The modified power indices tend to reduce the voting power of party groups in extreme ideological positions, to the benefit of the median party group.Show less
