The year 2010 inaugurated a tumultuous period for a range of countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Protests compelling for democratization culminated in violent clashes between rebels...Show moreThe year 2010 inaugurated a tumultuous period for a range of countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Protests compelling for democratization culminated in violent clashes between rebels and authoritarian regimes across the region. In response to the escalation of violence in Libya, an alliance of countries established a no-fly zone for halting the exorbitant regime violence against the rebels and the population. Shortly after, NATO took over command. A similar intervention in Syria did not occur, in spite of the widespread human rights violations and grave human suffering. A comparison between the cases of Libya and Syria sheds light on the factors that shaped the different international community responses to the conflicts and also contributes to the greater puzzle of why states intervene in some atrocities but not in others. This study found that a prime factor impacting humanitarian intervention occurrence in Libya and Syria is the UN Security Council’s task to provide authorization within a context of disputed legality of humanitarian interventions. In addition, it is concluded that UNSC member’s positions with respect to intervening were guided by their political interests and to a lesser extent by their economic interests. Finally, the anticipated outcomes of the two humanitarian intervention scenarios influenced intervention behavior, which explains why only one intervention was conducted. All these factors are indispensable components of an inclusive explanation for the different responses to the civil wars in Libya and Syria.Show less
Through quantative analysis Siri Aas Rustad and Helga Malmin Binningsbø, in their 2012 joint study ‘A price worth fighting for? Natural resources and conflict recurrence’, find that there is a...Show moreThrough quantative analysis Siri Aas Rustad and Helga Malmin Binningsbø, in their 2012 joint study ‘A price worth fighting for? Natural resources and conflict recurrence’, find that there is a significant correlation between conflict recurrence and conflicts over natural resource revenue distribution. This paper takes this study and tests whether their quantative findings can be applied to two cases. The aim of this paper is to gain a greater understanding of the motivations of actors who spoil peace agreements concerning petroleum conflicts. The motivations tested are economic grievance over distribution of oil, greed displayed by belligerents wanting a greater share of wealth than they are entitled to, and political motives of actors who use a recurrence of conflict to achieve or promote their political goals. The two case studies considered are the Aceh conflict concerning the breakdown of the 2002 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and the Chechen conflict featuring the breakdown of the 1996 Khasavyurt Agreement and the peace process thereafter.Show less
