More than twenty years ago, Fearon (1994; 1997) has argued that democracies are more likely to successfully compel a target state than nondemocracies. However, empirical evidence suggests that this...Show moreMore than twenty years ago, Fearon (1994; 1997) has argued that democracies are more likely to successfully compel a target state than nondemocracies. However, empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case (Snyder & Borghard, 2011; Trachtenberg, 2012; Downes & Sechser, 2012; Sechser, 2018, 335). Consequently, a new understanding of the relationship between regime type and compellence outcomes is needed (Gartzke & Lupu, 2012). I argue that democratic leaders have more incentives to keep the costs of conflict low. Consequently, they will want to prevent disputes from escalating. Hence, they are more likely to not mobilise their troops or to mobilise air troops during a conflict. These options have a lower risk of escalating the conflict than the mobilisation of land or naval troops (Pfundstein Chamberlain, 2016; Post, 2019a). By choosing the careful option, democratic leaders will not be perceived as resolved by the target state (Fearon, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Pfundstein Chamberlain, 2016; Post, 2019a). As a result, compellent threats issued by democracies will have a lower chance to be successful in comparison to threats issued by nondemocracies. I have tested this hypothesis by the Militarised Compellent Threat (MCT) database (Sechser, 2011b).Show less
This research compares the response of the United Nations during the Arab spring of 2011. I try to find an answer to the question of why the United Nations did intervene in Libya and not in Syria....Show moreThis research compares the response of the United Nations during the Arab spring of 2011. I try to find an answer to the question of why the United Nations did intervene in Libya and not in Syria. With this research, I try to contribute to the earlier research of Hultman (2012) were she argues that one-sided violence is a strong predictor for United Nations interventions. I analyze the cases of Libya and Syria with a comparative case study design. Libya and Syria have a lot of similarities in the start and outcome of the conflicts. The only thing different is the response of the international community. In Libya the United Nations did intervene, in Syria they did not. I found that in the case of Libya one-sided violence was indeed the reason of intervention. However, in the case of Syria, it was not. I found that all (draft) resolutions on Syria and Libya were related to one-sided violence. However, in the case of Syria, one-sided violence did not result in an United Nations intervention. I argue that although one-sided violence is a great concern to all member states of the United Nations Security Council, it is for several members of the Security Council not always important enough to start an intervention.Show less
Forced marriage of girls under the age of eighteen is regarded as a fundamental violation of the rights of the child. Despite this fact, armed groups are known to use it as a strategic tactic. They...Show moreForced marriage of girls under the age of eighteen is regarded as a fundamental violation of the rights of the child. Despite this fact, armed groups are known to use it as a strategic tactic. They abduct large groups of girls with the intention to marry them off to members of their rebel group. Yet this is not the case in all armed groups, as there are armed groups who do not show a single case of forced marriages. In this thesis, I will research why this variation occurs. I will argue that the use of forced recruitment by an armed group will influence the use of forced marriages. Groups that use forced recruitment often struggle with group cohesion. Forced marriages can be used to solve this problem through social bonding, the establishment of a family unit and making connections to the local population. This theory will be tested though process tracing using a comparative case analysis of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Civil Defence Force (CDF) in Sierra Leone during the civil war from 1991 to 2001.Show less
In the literature it is argued that economic and political uncertainty induced by political instability has adverse effects on investments of corporations. Political instability in the form of...Show moreIn the literature it is argued that economic and political uncertainty induced by political instability has adverse effects on investments of corporations. Political instability in the form of civil wars, political violence and political unrest has long been a factor for companies in deciding whether to continue or discontinue their investments. Although scholars are divided whether uncertainty leads to higher or lower levels of private investment, the majority concur that the latter is more likely in sub-Sahara Africa. However, the case of Heineken N.V. and its subsidiary Bralirwa in Rwanda forms an anomaly in the literature on investment under uncertainty. Despite the outbreak of the Rwandan civil war followed by the Rwandan genocide, Heineken remained active when the mass slaughter was going on. In this thesis, I will analyze the Heineken case by using a neo-classical model based on the option pricing theory where there is an option to shut down operations during uncertainty. I argue that although it is an anomaly for the investment literature, this case can be elucidated with Dunning’s Ownership Location Internalization framework. The results indicate that Heineken remained operational in Rwanda due to ownership and internalization advantages. Furthermore, the case presents evidence against the notion of political instability lowering private investment in sub-Sahara Africa.Show less
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC, 2004) is the only legally binding instrument committed to fighting corruption worldwide, a practice that corrodes and democratic values....Show moreThe United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC, 2004) is the only legally binding instrument committed to fighting corruption worldwide, a practice that corrodes and democratic values. Previous research into corruption has mainly focused on defining corruption and the consequences of corruption. This field has broadly overlooked the relationship between political corruption and armed conflict onset, which is this thesis’ focus. The theory is built on separate fields of study often studied in isolation; the consequences of corruption and the causes of armed conflict onset. Compared to previous research, this research has a more comprehensive approach, by incorporating insights of multiple theories, exploring the positive and negative direct effects of political corruption on conflict onset, and by including a large timeframe and data for 205 countries. Using a logit model on data from 1984 to 2017, this thesis finds that political corruption increases the chances of armed conflict onset. Unequal distribution of resources, rights and freedoms may lead to conflict as marginalised groups experience grievances. Political corruption also damages political trust which results in pressures on state legitimacy. Governments, perceived less legitimate, may find it hard to mediate between competing groups which increases the chance of armed conflict onset.Show less
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains unresolved for more than three decades. Previous studies on frozen conflicts focus on various aspects contributing to their...Show moreThe Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains unresolved for more than three decades. Previous studies on frozen conflicts focus on various aspects contributing to their prolongation but largely neglected the influence of public opinion. However, existing studies on the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy argue that public preferences and attitudes may have a significant impact on elites’ decisions concerning conflicts’ development and resolution talks. In this thesis, I argue that studying public opinion in Armenia and Azerbaijan towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can have wide-ranging implications for our understanding of frozen conflicts duration. The analysis shows that negative public opinion has a profound effect on the conflict prolongation, both directly and indirectly. Directly, by constraining policy-makers in their attempts to resolve the conflict and indirectly by providing the elites with incentives to perpetuate the conflict .Show less
How a state responds to protests can have profound consequences, since the violent repression of protests may cause an escalation into armed conflict and diffusion to neighboring countries. State...Show moreHow a state responds to protests can have profound consequences, since the violent repression of protests may cause an escalation into armed conflict and diffusion to neighboring countries. State violence against protesters is an important topic of research, considering its potential to result in many civilian deaths. Even so, the literature on state repression and dissent does not explain variations in the lethality of state violence against protesters. Instead, existing studies only differentiate between violent and non-violent state responses to protests. I address this shortcoming by testing the theory that the lethality of state violence is influenced by protestergenerated concession costs. To examine my argument, I analyze state responses to Iranian protest events in 2009 and 2019. In 2019, state violence against protesters was significantly more lethal than in 2009. I compare both events using a process tracing method. The analysis shows that in 2019, protester demands were more radical and more recurrent, and protesters were more violent. This confirms that concession costs influence the lethality of state violence against protesters. These results provide substantial insights into the dynamics of protests and repression, which are useful for scholars, activists, and policy makers.Show less
