Liberal democracies are under immense pressure. Apart from threatening exterior forces, it seems that interior forces are rising and increasingly threatening democracy from inside out. Public...Show moreLiberal democracies are under immense pressure. Apart from threatening exterior forces, it seems that interior forces are rising and increasingly threatening democracy from inside out. Public officials are receiving more threats than ever and even parliaments are attacked. Within public and academic debate, the question rises how to react. Scholars are referring and reacting to the theory of ‘militant democracy’, a democracy which allows for suspension of political rights, albeit under certain conditions. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the self-limiting theory of militant democracy by Kirshner (2014) as one of the most prominent recent academic accounts to the theory of militant democracy. What makes the theory notable, is that his work aims to offer a framework for liberal democracies on when and how to react to so-called ‘antidemocrats’. This thesis provides for a concrete definition of the term antidemocrat, links the three principles of Kirshner’s self-limiting theory of militant democracy with basic liberal principles, critically evaluates each of the principles and, where needed, expands or adjusts them, and expands the theory by adding a fourth principle.Show less
The (hypothetical) deployment of Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) challenges the way in which we conceptualize moral responsibility. The emergence of LAWs have added an autonomously acting non...Show moreThe (hypothetical) deployment of Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) challenges the way in which we conceptualize moral responsibility. The emergence of LAWs have added an autonomously acting non-human entity to a moral responsibility framework which is inextricably linked to human nature and moral capacity, which LAWs neither have nor possess. This leaves open a responsibility gap in which it becomes unclear who exactly is responsible for the outcome of the decisions made by LAWs. Although several solutions have been proposed to solve the gap, such as the concept of meaningful control or role-specific responsibility, I find that they cannot sufficiently address the responsibility gap. The concept of meaningful human control is inadequate for the complex and chaotic environment of warfare, particularly when introducing powerful weapons that push the boundaries of human capability. While role-responsibility considers the collective nature of the military and the entire chain of command, it faces challenges in accounting for the problem of many hands and the emergent behavior of autonomous weapons that cannot be directly attributed to a specific part of the system or individual. Especially in a value-loaded and ethically charged environment such as war, where choices regarding life or death are a routine matter, there is no room for obscured responsibility. Without proper responsibility, one cannot justify the introduction of LAWs onto the battlefield.Show less
The current debate on nudging is dichotomous since it either mentions the arguments in favor of or opposed to nudging. Proponents of nudging also assume that nudges should pursue the goal to...Show moreThe current debate on nudging is dichotomous since it either mentions the arguments in favor of or opposed to nudging. Proponents of nudging also assume that nudges should pursue the goal to produce certain desired outcomes. This paper questions the current dichotomy of the debate and the assumption on the goal of nudges by differentiating between an output-oriented and a process-oriented conception of nudging. The aim of the thesis is to argue that process-oriented nudges rather than output-oriented nudges are desirable because they can promote the autonomy-based freedom of individuals. The thesis formulates three conditions that process-oriented nudges should satisfy in order to promote autonomy-based freedom and it applies the process-oriented conception of nudging to three different nudges. The paper concludes that especially the nudges that make relevant information salient and that change defaults are compatible with a process-oriented conception of nudging. The process-oriented conception of nudging was applied to the empirical case of vaccination policies in order to find out what kind of nudges would be compatible with a process-oriented conception of nudging.Show less
In a context of insufficient climate action on the part of governments, the question of whether individuals have any underlying moral responsibility concerning climate change has become...Show moreIn a context of insufficient climate action on the part of governments, the question of whether individuals have any underlying moral responsibility concerning climate change has become increasingly relevant. However, despite various theoretical attempts to ground such responsibility, none of them has been completely satisfactory, resulting in a lack of consensus in the scholarly literature. In this thesis, I engage with this debate, guided by the following research question: what is the nature of individual responsibility for climate change? I build on Iris Marion Young’s Social Connection Model (SCM) of responsibility to respond to this question. I argue that using Young’s SCM to conceptualize individual responsibility to face climate injustice is appropriate because it captures the structural nature of the problem. The shared and forward-looking responsibility it entails and its focus on collective political action provide a framework to respond to climate injustice meaningfully. However, while Young sees the nature of such responsibility as being strictly political, I engage critically with the author and argue that, instead, the responsibility we bear to face climate injustice is moral. Despite concerns about moral responsibility and the blameworthiness it entails, I explore how blame can be a mechanism of accountability and social enforceability, fundamental for ensuring effective collective climate action.Show less
