This thesis delves into the moral dimensions of political authority, particularly focusing on the absence of political obligation and state illegitimacy as proposed by Alan John Simmons, a...Show moreThis thesis delves into the moral dimensions of political authority, particularly focusing on the absence of political obligation and state illegitimacy as proposed by Alan John Simmons, a prominent advocate of philosophical anarchism. It inquires whether Simmons' philosophical anarchism implies political anarchism— involving a duty to oppose and undermine the state. The thesis critically examines Simmons' arguments and counterarguments against critics Joseph Wellman and Thomas Senor, who assert that Simmons' position results in justified disobedience and a moral duty to resist the state. By viewing the moral implications of state illegitimacy within Simmons' 'balance-of-reasons' approach, this thesis contends that Simmons fails to defend his framework against implying political anarchism. Additionally, it proposes the concept of an 'adaptive duty to oppose and undermine the state,' a nuanced approach in response to non-consensual state coercion that acknowledges moral concerns while striving for peaceful yet effective political reform.Show less
The thesis will defend the idea that experiencing meaning can only ensue as a consequence of assuming full responsibility for one’s identity as a person. Frankl’s logotherapy establishes how humans...Show moreThe thesis will defend the idea that experiencing meaning can only ensue as a consequence of assuming full responsibility for one’s identity as a person. Frankl’s logotherapy establishes how humans are capable of being free. As I think there are valid parallels to be made with Kantian moral philosophy, I will show how Kantian-inspired concepts can help us understand in what way human beings carry responsibilities for their identity as persons. However, logotherapy’s ambiguous account of meaning will be re-interpreted to accommodate the subjectivist notion of wilfully striving into a hybrid notion in line with Susan Wolf. Objective formulae of evaluative standards of value constrain and inform the subjectively motivated grounds for actions that are a necessary part of being a person. I will opt for a Kantian formula of value because of its conduciveness to logotherapy’s assumption of human freedom and humanity as an end in itself. As for the notion of subjective striving, I will argue along the lines of Christine Korsgaard that being a person means acting in a way that endorses on what grounds we wish to define ourselves as persons. As such, meaning comes as a by-product of an agent taking responsibility for acting to constitute himself into a particular identity.Show less
In this thesis I aspire to contribute to the existing literature on Schelling's 1809 Freedom Essay by providing an interpretation that explicitly focusses on the resulting view on freedom in...Show moreIn this thesis I aspire to contribute to the existing literature on Schelling's 1809 Freedom Essay by providing an interpretation that explicitly focusses on the resulting view on freedom in connection with Schelling’s overarching attempt at a system of freedom. To this end, the thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter aims to bring out the way in which the central problem of Schelling’s Freedom Essay – that is, the task of thinking freedom systematically – is not an isolated phenomenon but rather gradually emerges as the fundamental problem of the philosophical context to which Schelling belongs, that is, of German Idealism. The second chapter aims to introduce the essential elements of Schelling’s attempt at thinking a system of freedom through the lens of the question of a living, as opposed to a dead, philosophy. The third chapter aims to defend the central claim of the thesis, namely that Schelling’s attempt to think freedom systematically transforms the very meaning of system, freedom and necessity. On my interpretation, as developed in this thesis, the meaning of system is not to be understood as a closed totality, springing from a self-evident first principle from which everything follows with mechanical necessity. Rather, Schelling’s system is the whole, a whole within which every part is connected to every other part, grounded by the elusive groundless ground of grounds: the Ungrund. Within this system, human freedom is not merely freedom of choice, that is, the capacity to choose without a determining ground, merely because it is willed, between either A or B. Rather, human freedom is the capacity for good and evil. Each and every individual self-determines her own essence through an eternal act independent from temporal and causal relations. On such a view, freedom and necessity are one. We freely determine ourselves to be the kind of individual that we are, that is, must be. As such, it is not an estranged mathematical necessity that rules Schelling’s system. Rather, the contradiction between freedom and necessity, groundlessly grounded by a fundamental willing, forms the beating heart of Schelling’s living system.Show less
In this thesis, I will discuss what the self-image is and what it can tell us about the position of the self in intersubjective relations. I will do this by answering the question: What is the self...Show moreIn this thesis, I will discuss what the self-image is and what it can tell us about the position of the self in intersubjective relations. I will do this by answering the question: What is the self-image? It is by its very definition, not an individualising image, which means it is a process that puts the self as being opposed to its surroundings but is a connecting and inherently harmonising mental process. It is inherently an image both of, and formed by, the horizon of the self. To explain this, I will use the understanding of a horizon given to us by Edmund Husserl. Even though this concept is found in a theory that gives us an individualising understanding of the self-image, it will show us that it is indeed not individualising but harmonising. By individualising I mean the affirmation of the identity of the self as a being moving through a space full of Others and objects alien to him. As such the self-experiences themselves as being opposed to them and in some cases clearly in a power struggle with the Other. Harmonising means that the world within the horizon appears as being inherently part of the identity of the self. As such it shows the self as not being surrounded by foreign things but by things that are already a part of it.Show less
In 'The Man Without Content' (1994), an essay on aesthetics written by Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, the author asks wether works of the imagination will ever regain the existential power...Show moreIn 'The Man Without Content' (1994), an essay on aesthetics written by Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, the author asks wether works of the imagination will ever regain the existential power they once held. And if so, what conditions will enable this transformation in a way that accounts for the historic changes that shaped the face of art as we see it today. What is useful in Agamben’s essay, often wanting in the works of like-minded thinkers sharing a similar dissatisfaction with contemporary art, is the schematised overview he gives of the various internal scissions that befell the production and reception of art since the Renaissance. The former unity of the work of art has been lost, fragmenting into polarised coordinates of artist versus spectator, taste versus genius, form versus content. This disunity, Agamben maintains, finds its beginnings in the loss of tradition. We can no longer identify with the content of the work of art, for the content which made up traditional societies is no longer transmissible. As such, we are left with the free creative principle of the artist on the one hand, and the passive role of the spectator on the other. The work of art is no longer a shared space and has lost its original power. Agamben finds the solution to this impasse in an abstraction: the work of art is to transmit the 'untransmissibility' of tradition (content) and in so doing regains its 'poietic' power. Although Agamben touches upon fundamental issues that do help to make sense of our current artistic landscape, I argue that his diagnosis of modernity is too radical, that the implications for the work of art are untenable, and that the solution offered requires a price much too high to pay. Instead, we can take what is useful in Agamben’s essay and supplement it with a view that offers a more fruitful solution for re-imagining our relationship to the work of art and its value. This supplementation will come from Hamann’s Aesthetica in Nuce.Show less
The thesis discusses the importance of political institutions in a democratic country and the challenges of fulfilling the criteria for a sound democratic process. Focused on the notion of...Show moreThe thesis discusses the importance of political institutions in a democratic country and the challenges of fulfilling the criteria for a sound democratic process. Focused on the notion of enlightened understanding, it emphasizes the need for democratic institutions to support the development of all democratic citizens while acknowledging intellectual differences among citizens. This thesis identifies an erosion of institutions responsible for the task of bringing about enlightened understanding. From here, this thesis delves into the recent emergence of Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) as a tool to assist voters in decision-making and discusses its potential and the potential of incorporating conversational agents within VAAs to enhance citizens' enlightened understanding. Moreover, this thesis argues for the integration of (CA)VAAs as an essential part of the institutional structure of modern democracies, given the ongoing corroding of traditional institutions. The thesis explores the concept of democracy, address potential issues, examine various institutional approaches, analyze technological advancements, and assess the implementation of (CA)VAAs.Show less
Unbeknownst to many today, world-renowned physicist Erwin Schrödinger not only engaged in physics and mathematics but was deeply committed to the Indian philosophical school of Advaita Vedānta. In...Show moreUnbeknownst to many today, world-renowned physicist Erwin Schrödinger not only engaged in physics and mathematics but was deeply committed to the Indian philosophical school of Advaita Vedānta. In this study, I aim to understand the relation between Schrödinger’s physics and his embrace of Indian philosophy. By showing how Schrödinger embedded his physics in his overarching philosophical worldview, I argue that Indian philosophy takes up a seemingly modest yet ever-so-important role in Schrödinger’s life and work. I show in this thesis how Advaita Vedāntin insights on monism and the illusory character of distinct phenomena form the core of Schrödinger’s metaphysics. In turn, this worldview serves as a guiding framework in his life, thought, and professional work, including his physics. This thesis clarifies the existing confusion in current scholarship on Schrödinger’s use of Indian thought. Furthermore, as an interdisciplinary and intercultural case-study, this thesis sheds light on debates on the role of philosophy in physics, specifically the role of Indian and intercultural philosophy in contemporary thought.Show less
In this paper, I shall argue that in Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom (Henceforth referred to as the Freedom Essay), Schelling oscillates between two incompatible...Show moreIn this paper, I shall argue that in Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom (Henceforth referred to as the Freedom Essay), Schelling oscillates between two incompatible concepts of freedom: radical and limited. Radical freedom is spontaneous and identical to the agent's own act. It is founded on undetermined intelligibility and stands outside the theological system's domain. Limited freedom is a decided intelligibility that one-sidedly determines human actions. It is located within the domain of the theological system and meets its requirements. I will make the case that these two concepts of freedom are vulnerable to the charge of arbitrariness. First, I shall argue that equating radical freedom with the agent's own act does not provide determinacy for this concept of freedom. Second, I shall contend that the agent's decision on her intelligibility in limited freedom is undetermined, which consequently renders this freedom undetermined. I will suggest the source of Schelling's oscillation in the Freedom Essay is the existence of two incompatible tendencies: a commitment to provide a concept of freedom with unlimited power, and to indwell that freedom in an ordered theological system. I maintain that the simultaneous fulfilment of these two tasks is impossible.Show less
