Research master thesis | Middle Eastern Studies (research) (MA)
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This thesis engages with Hebrew novels written by Israeli Arab authors. It investigates how the three Hebrew novels Beor Ḥadash (In a New Light), Tevilah Katlanit (Fatal Baptism) and Aravim Rokdim ...Show moreThis thesis engages with Hebrew novels written by Israeli Arab authors. It investigates how the three Hebrew novels Beor Ḥadash (In a New Light), Tevilah Katlanit (Fatal Baptism) and Aravim Rokdim (Dancing Arabs) by the authors Atallah Mansour, Naim Araidi and Sayed Kashua reflect the Arab experience in Israeli society. In order to answer this question an in depth analysis of the three novels as well as a research into the three authors was conducted.Show less
Research master thesis | Middle Eastern Studies (research) (MA)
open access
This thesis examines the political role of national celebrations after the Islamic Revolution (1979) in Iran. Particularly, this thesis focuses on how many national celebrations in the Islamic...Show moreThis thesis examines the political role of national celebrations after the Islamic Revolution (1979) in Iran. Particularly, this thesis focuses on how many national celebrations in the Islamic Republic of Iran are an opportunity for the Iranian government to promote a specific political agenda, to strengthen national identity, to consolidate the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, to mobilise people for different socio-political purposes, and to bolster state's legitimacy. The establishment of a new national calendar of celebrations in post-revolutionary Iran has been crucial for the construction of a collective memory based on the relationship between politics and religion and for the building of an Islamic society.Show less
Research master thesis | Middle Eastern Studies (research) (MA)
open access
Debates around water in the MENA region center on its potential for conflict or for cooperation, with predictions of future water wars. Water is presented as a natural resource or an economic or...Show moreDebates around water in the MENA region center on its potential for conflict or for cooperation, with predictions of future water wars. Water is presented as a natural resource or an economic or political commodity. The debate is mostly focused on the international, inter-state scale. In recent years, however, some scholars have argued that a focus on the national or local level would generate more interesting and useful research regarding the importance of water and water management. The Middle East is generally regarded as a very water-scarce and fragile region. Syria, that since the Arab Spring of 2010-2011 has been torn by civil war, is particularly interesting. Water scarcity and climate change have been mentioned in scholarly and popular discourse as possible factors for the Syrian population’s dissent. In this thesis I explore the theoretical and practical political dynamics of water within the paradigm of water as a tool for conflict or cooperation. Through an integrative historical framework I identify four possible political functions of water: water as a tool for diplomacy, development, democracy, or war. Political water management can be conducted at different scalar levels via pragmatic strategies that serve different political agendas. I argue that both the notion of relative availability of water and the appearance of pragmatic strategies in water management must be taken into account in the debate on water. Furthermore, through balancing theory and practice of Syrian water management, both abstract and concrete political dynamics are revealed.Show less
Research master thesis | Middle Eastern Studies (research) (MA)
open access
The implementation of the Taksim water network was initiated near the end of the reign of Ahmed III, but was interrupted as a consequence of the Patrona Revolt in September 1730. The uprising...Show moreThe implementation of the Taksim water network was initiated near the end of the reign of Ahmed III, but was interrupted as a consequence of the Patrona Revolt in September 1730. The uprising brought about the deposal of Ahmed III in favor of his nephew Mahmud I who continued the Taksim project sometime after the unrest in the capital was suppressed. The water network supplied the neighborhoods of Kasımpaşa, Galata, Tophane, Fındıklı, and Kabataş, and was primarily financed from the privy purse of Saliha Valide Sultan. In addition, the queen mother selected a number of wealthy and loyal dignitaries to invest in the project by means of a monumental fountain. The fountain network confirmed the social contract that was negotiated between the sultan and his favorites, and put the social network of the former at the center of a "negotiated empire". The Taksim water project sheds new light on the concept of centralization in historiography, and expands our understanding of the processes through which wealth, power, and prestige were regulated in Ottoman society.Show less
Research master thesis | Middle Eastern Studies (research) (MA)
closed access
In 2011 an unprecedented wave of protests erupted from Tunisia and soon spread throughout the Arab World. While the initial euphoria was backed by the revolutions in Tunis and Cairo, the course of...Show moreIn 2011 an unprecedented wave of protests erupted from Tunisia and soon spread throughout the Arab World. While the initial euphoria was backed by the revolutions in Tunis and Cairo, the course of events in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and ultimately Syria began to highlight that a romantic view of revolutions seems out of place. The two kingdoms of Jordan and Morocco have also witnessed significant protests in 2011 especially. However, these did not lead to a revolution – in fact, this was not their goal. The vast majority of those rallying in the streets demanded reforms of Jordan's and Morocco's political institutions, including the parliament, the electoral law and the constitution. This development, combined with the resilience of the Gulf monarchies (with Bahrain as a critical case), has once again brought the monarchy debate back into the limelight. The major underlying question here is does monarchy matter? Facing protests, both Abdullah II and Muhammad VI responded by reforming institutions. In Jordan, the constitution was amended and elections were held. In Morocco, the people could decide on a new constitution by means of a referendum and early elections were held. While ostensibly giving in to the demands of the protesters, these changes did not challenge the status quo but left Abdullah II and Muhammad VI with their almost omnipotent power. From a theoretical perspective this seems particularly interesting. Different approaches, stressing the impact of rentierism, foreign support or family participation, have attempted to explain the survival of monarchies in the Arab World over the past decades. The euphoria of the 'third wave of democratization' (Huntington) and the 'end of history' (Fukuyama) then transcended into scholarly publications during the 1990s, fostering the idea of institutions, once in place, contributing to a gradual process of democratization. During the second half of the 2000s scholars then began to realize that such effects failed to materialize in many cases. In fact, incumbents seemed to have employed democratic rhetoric and (re-)installed parliaments as well as elections while at the same time limiting their power and impact. In Jordan and Morocco these institutions also included another crucial function to Abdullah II and Muhammad VI respectively: they provided an intermediary level between king and people that can be criticized. In order to underpin this analysis, several primary sources for selected key dates since 2011 were taken into account besides the secondary literature. For Jordan, speeches of Abdullah II were considered as well as the text of the constitution, seeing that the latter was subject to change in 2011. Moreover, the coverage of the pro-monarchy newspaper Al-Dustour, the independent Ammon News and the country's main political opposition, the Islamic Action Front IAF, was analyzed. In a similar fashion, the statements of Muhammad VI and the kingdom's constitution were looked at for Morocco. Furthermore, the pro-monarchy newspaper Al-Sabah and the independent Al-Masa' were part of the analysis as well as Morocco's Islamist political opposition party, the Parti de la Justice et du Développement PJD, and the 20 February Movement, a youth group that was founded in early 2011. As the analysis suggests, the discourse about changes in the political system that erupted again in 2011 was almost entirely directed at reforming political institutions. Across the board official statements, pro-monarchy newspapers, but also independent and oppositional groups, made use of a technical language that focused on reforming the parliament, the electoral law or the constitution. These actors also approved the changes made respectively, seeing a solution and a step forward in them. Here, only little demands for a continued reform were raised. All these actors seemed to operate within the boundaries defined by the palace. The example of the 20 February Movement in Morocco stressed how deviating from this public reform discourse can result in selective repression and crackdown. The monarchies Jordan and Morocco have dodged the Arab Spring by allowing and engaging in institutional reforms. Although constitutions were amended or changed and elections were held the power balance has not changed. Accordingly, these institutions have helped Abdullah II and Muhammad VI to maintain their hold onto power rather than lowering it. Such an understanding of political institutions challenges the idea of them ultimately bringing about democratic change. Moreover, with regards to the monarchy debate the findings suggest that such a political setup, in which institutions serve as intermediary between king and people, allows the kings to remain seemingly distant from daily politics. It appears more difficult for presidents or prime minister, as heads of states in republics, to act in a similar fashion as they are by definition presiding the government.Show less
