This thesis investigates Habermas's approach to the role of religious reasons in public deliberation. A critique of Habermas's theory is developed along three lines. First, it is argued that...Show moreThis thesis investigates Habermas's approach to the role of religious reasons in public deliberation. A critique of Habermas's theory is developed along three lines. First, it is argued that Habermas's work oversimplifies religious reasons by treating 'religious reasons as a singular phenomenon. Thereby, Habermas underplaying the diversity of ways people practice religion. Second, this thesis argues that the translation of religious reasons to the language of public administration might prove harder than Habermas presents it. Third, Habermas's claim to have developed a 'postmetaphysical' theory fails to convince, as Habermas makes fundamental metaphysical assumptions. This undermines the neutral character of his account of religion in the public sphere. This thesis suggests an alternative approach may be available in the literature: instead of distinguishing between religious and non-religious reasons, we should distinguish authoritarian and non-authoritarian reasons. This preserves the deliberative spirit of Habermas's project, while more accurately filtering out the modes of reasoning that are unhelpful for advancing constructive deliberation.Show less
This thesis explores Habermas's ideas on the inherent tension between the rule of law and popular sovereignty. Habermas proposes a solution to this tension by introducing his theory of co...Show moreThis thesis explores Habermas's ideas on the inherent tension between the rule of law and popular sovereignty. Habermas proposes a solution to this tension by introducing his theory of co-originality. This thesis studies Habermas's account of the tension between facticity and validity and his proposal of how law can serve as a bridge between the two principles. This thesis also provides a critical assessment of Habermas's theory by studying two specific criticisms of Habermas's theory of co-originality. This thesis ends with the conclusion that Habermas's theory is coherent, but it is not entirely convincing.Show less
Elections provide the primary mechanism through which representatives are authorized to act. This dissertation asks which conditions the authorization must satisfy in order to have legitimate,...Show moreElections provide the primary mechanism through which representatives are authorized to act. This dissertation asks which conditions the authorization must satisfy in order to have legitimate, properly authorized representatives. In particular, it asks which design of the electoral system – the set of rules concerned with the aggregation of votes – best satisfies minimum conditions for authorizing legitimate representatives. The answer to this question lies at the interface of normative democratic theory and electoral design. It is, furthermore, both a response to and an extension of The Concept of Constituency by Andrew Rehfeld. Rehfeld is the first author to show that electoral design defines and shapes the electoral constituency, that group of people who authorize a representative. The objective electoral constituency – i.e., the group of voters who are eligible to vote for a particular representative – should be distinguished from the subjective electoral constituency – i.e., the group of voters who voted for a particular representative. This dissertation responds to Rehfeld by arguing that the purpose of authorizing legitimate representatives requires electoral design to define objective constituencies not as randomly and permanently assigned groups but rather as a single nation-wide group. This dissertation extends Rehfeld’s work by analyzing how three key components of electoral design – the electoral formula (plurality/majority/proportional), the ballot structure (categorical/ordinal vote) and the district magnitude (number of seats per objective constituency/district) – shape the formation of subjective constituencies that are successful in electing a representative of their choice. The analysis shows that, rather than a U.S.-like system with single-seat plurality/majority districts, the Dutch system of proportional representation with a nation-wide objective constituency is the most justifiable for the purpose of authorizing legitimate representatives.Show less
In a deliberative democracy, policy making is justified by the rational public deliberation of all those affected. To this end, the state provides procedural guarantees for continuous rational...Show moreIn a deliberative democracy, policy making is justified by the rational public deliberation of all those affected. To this end, the state provides procedural guarantees for continuous rational deliberation and collective opinion formation, aimed at reaching a collective decision. Apart from of these procedural features, a deliberative democracy also heavily relies on the personal rational abilities of its citizens. This requires certain common abilities, like certain standards of argumentation, the freedom of discussion and the possibility of rational deliberation. The structural inequality argument specifically focusses on this ‘difference blind’ approach to individuals’ abilities. This critique argues that deliberative democracy is unable to address underlying unequal societal structures. Consequently, the outcome of rational deliberation is no longer constructed by ‘all those affected’ but only by individuals who are able to make their voice heard in the public deliberation. This thesis focusses on this critique, examines possible solutions, and argues that structural inequality can never be completely eradicated in democratic deliberation. However, by realizing political equality as the equal opportunity for political effectiveness, the practice of democratic deliberation should not be regarded illegitimate.Show less
Hannah Arendt did more than write philosophy and publishes books; she rescued conceptions of the public and recovered the problem of thinking and judging in politics as a manner to make sense of a...Show moreHannah Arendt did more than write philosophy and publishes books; she rescued conceptions of the public and recovered the problem of thinking and judging in politics as a manner to make sense of a world that shattered the political tradition. The current thesis will present a reading of Arendt’s political judgment and publicness by taking some elements of the Cambridge Intellectual History approach. The goal of using this approach is not a way of declaring itself as the true interpretation, but a manner of relating Arendt’s work to a proper understanding of her words and actions as part of a context for the enunciation. By using this method we are proposing a perspective of Arendt late work as a crucial shift in her notion of freedom and its relation with politics. This shift starts with some undeveloped intuitions from her early work, mostly The Origins of Totalitarianism and The human Condition, to her essays such as Between Past and Future and Responsibility and Judgment, to finish in her later works such as On Revolution, Crises of the Republic, The Life of the Mind, and her Lectures on the Political Philosophy of Kant. We can notice a shift from narration to judgment in Arendt’s theory. By relating to this topics we propose a reading of publicness as a central element of Arendt’s work that appeals to the space of appearances that is opened in judgment and action, and at the same time a certain urge for courage required for politics; for leaving the comfort of the private space and take responsibility to appear with others and be judged and remembered in public. This notion of publicness changed or is complemented by a different one in her later work where we find instead a shift towards the attitude of the spectator and the disinterestedness of judgment. Disinterestedness is an aesthetical attitude that Arendt recovers from Kant’s discussion on his Third Critique and refers to a certain distance regarding interest and necessity. This notion is expressed in her appropriation of Kant’s idea of reflective judgment and her reflections on taste related to Kant’s concern with sensus communis and her own concept of common sense. In these elements we see judgment in the attitude of the spectator along with a certain taste and preoccupation for the human-made artifacts and the grounding for a space of appearances. These elements and shifts in Arendt’s work are discussed by using the Cambridge Intellectual Approach; we read Arendt texts in its relation to a context and as deeds as a way to answer the question regarding what was Arendt doing or performing while she was discussing publicness and judgment.Show less
This thesis explores the intersection of agonistic theory and legal practice, by examining the position of the judge in adjudicating constitutional rights. It does so from the perspective of the...Show moreThis thesis explores the intersection of agonistic theory and legal practice, by examining the position of the judge in adjudicating constitutional rights. It does so from the perspective of the agonistic paradox: any contesting act will have to refer to the discourse it aims to contest by claiming to have always belonged to it, thereby legitimizing it in the first place. Accordingly, rights are the internal product of a contestatory practice of rights claiming. Although their true legitimacy is ever deferred, they are constantly affirmed as part of our legal order through the process of claiming hegemonic rights and counter-claiming emancipatory rights. This thesis locates the position of the judge in the middle of this impossible paradox: he has to pin down the content of rights, which is at the same time undecidable. Still, these contradicting sides of the paradox together push him towards the horizon of legitimacy and give him his value within the agonistic framework: he both judicializes (giving the order its necessary stability) and dejudicializes (offering the excluded a forum for new interpretations). The thesis concludes with several observations on contemporary rights adjudication: in hegemonically producing law, the judge risks losing legitimacy and turning those disagreeing against him; yet neither can he simply affirm democratic outcome. He has to walk the fine line between both, which is constantly, but always temporarily, being drawn by his (de)judicializing decisions, for which he can only be responsible himself.Show less
In this thesis I defend the claim that globalization, capitalism and consumerism are determining factors in contemporary society and therefore a normative political theory ought to incorporate an...Show moreIn this thesis I defend the claim that globalization, capitalism and consumerism are determining factors in contemporary society and therefore a normative political theory ought to incorporate an answer to how these factors must be dealt with. Agonists must either revise their agonistic democratic theories or oppose globalization, capitalism and consumerism all together. I have chosen the views of William Connolly and James Tully.Show less
In this thesis, I will defend the epistemic and moral value of democratic government, and oppose claims that there are legitimate grounds to replace democratic elections or restrict universal and...Show moreIn this thesis, I will defend the epistemic and moral value of democratic government, and oppose claims that there are legitimate grounds to replace democratic elections or restrict universal and equal suffrage to ensure the epistemic value of political decision-making. If one takes the principles normative authority and legitimacy into account, then any restriction on equal voting rights on the grounds of elitism will result neither in a rule of government that is intrinsically better nor a rule of government that is superior in producing better outcomes than a democratic system.Show less
The democratic legitimacy of political representation is not obvious. In the literature, however, it is often treated as such, mostly because the alternative of direct democracy is deemed...Show moreThe democratic legitimacy of political representation is not obvious. In the literature, however, it is often treated as such, mostly because the alternative of direct democracy is deemed unfeasible. In this thesis, I approach this issue based on the fundamental critique of representation as made by Rousseau, according to which democracy and representation are mutually exclusive, and representative democracy thus a contradiction in terms. I compare Rousseau’s position, supported by a more modern argument by Hanna Pitkin, to an attempt by modern authors in defending representation, which started with David Plotke. I support Plotke’s ideas with those put forward by Nadia Urbinati and Mark Warren, and also look at a more extreme position as argued by Frank Ankersmit. Comparing these positions to the critique by Rousseau and Pitkin, it becomes clear that defence of representation is lacking democratic justification that can withstand Rousseau’s fundamental critique. Finally, I discuss a potentially strong argument at providing such a justification, based on arguments by Laura Montanaro and Clarissa Hayward, which emphasizes the constructive role that representation plays in the shaping of people’s interests. Until the representative turn provides a substantial argument that people do not have politically relevant interests prior to representation, I argue, Rousseau’s critique remains intact, and we need to be more careful in ascribing democratic properties to representative systems.Show less
In order to comprehend the current form of neoliberal policies, an examination of neoliberalism’s theoretical foundation is necessary. Located in the immediate post war years and mostly in F.A....Show moreIn order to comprehend the current form of neoliberal policies, an examination of neoliberalism’s theoretical foundation is necessary. Located in the immediate post war years and mostly in F.A. Hayek’s work, neoliberalism is treated as an attempt of ‘liberal revival’ based primarily on classical British liberalism and contrasted with continental liberalism and welfare politics. Hayek’s attempts to establish the link of neoliberalism and classical liberalism based upon three main pillars: individual freedom, spontaneous order of the market and the rule of law. The first part of the research is devoted to analyzing the core concepts under a Hayekian light by providing historical contextualisation. In the second part, the three core concepts are examined based Michel Foucault’s Birth of Biopolitics. Foucault’s Birth of Biopolitics assists the current research in challenging the Hayekian construction of linking neoliberalism with classical liberalism. The main observation made by Foucault is the accentuation of the economic aspect of liberalism in the neoliberal construction; the ‘economization of the non-economic’. The conclusions drawn from the second part of the research, based on the Foucauldian approach of the core concepts of neoliberalism, endeavour to challenge the Hayekian rationale in constructing our current understanding of neoliberalism; although neoliberalism is built upon the notion of freedom, we are inevitably controlled through freedom.Show less
Carl Schmitt has long been considered as one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century, with his influential analysis of the paradoxes of liberal democracy. The thesis aims to...Show moreCarl Schmitt has long been considered as one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century, with his influential analysis of the paradoxes of liberal democracy. The thesis aims to structure Schmitt's theories of such paradoxes and analysis some criticism against them. In the end, the thesis argues that the crisis of liberal democracy lies in its ignorance of egalitarian principles that are central to democracy. Therefore, if democracy is still valued as the best form of governance, it should be protected from liberalism.Show less
In this thesis, I claim that the recently emerged perspective of environmental pragmatism is nonviable. For many years, it was deemed impossible for environmental ethics to formulate justified...Show moreIn this thesis, I claim that the recently emerged perspective of environmental pragmatism is nonviable. For many years, it was deemed impossible for environmental ethics to formulate justified environmental policy. Environmental pragmatism, and its primary scholar Bryan G. Norton, has promoted a new outlook in that debate by proposing an ideal methodology based upon classic American pragmatism. In this methodology, a community can determine what is morally righteous by (i) conducting open-ended inquiry and (ii) considering all relevant stakeholders in a rational discourse. Environmental pragmatism must therefore accommodate reasonable value pluralism. Moreover, Norton claims that these criteria should be complemented with what I call the ‘sustainability criterion’. However, this principle of righteous decisionmaking appears inconsistent with the two aforementioned commitments. This thesis considers the extent to which this is the case. As it turns out, environmental pragmatism is unable to reconcile the commitment of sustainability with reasonable value pluralism, when its ideal methodology is applied in practical terms. And, because environmental pragmatism aims to do so, I conclude that it is nonviable.Show less
This thesis asks whether power inequities in the real-world entail that deliberative democracy cannot serve as a non-ideal theory, and instead is purely of limited value as an ideal theory with...Show moreThis thesis asks whether power inequities in the real-world entail that deliberative democracy cannot serve as a non-ideal theory, and instead is purely of limited value as an ideal theory with which to critique current practices. I argue that fundamentally there is no position free from power inequities from which we can develop a deliberative theoretical framework - nor through which we can apply such a framework in real-world conditions. Practically, this means that deliberative democracy could only ever be an imperfect model for challenging these same power inequities, and moreover that it will perpetually run the risk of reaffirming power inequities. However, principles internal to deliberative democracy – the principles of fallibility and fidelity – provide exactly the tools required for embracing this fundamental challenge which deliberative democracy faces. Through confrontation with the challenge of power, I shall therefore draw out a key strength of this theoretical approach.Show less
The all subjected principle aims to overcome the democratic boundary problem from within democratic theory. At the core of the principle lies the concept of personal autonomy. The principle...Show moreThe all subjected principle aims to overcome the democratic boundary problem from within democratic theory. At the core of the principle lies the concept of personal autonomy. The principle contains an issue-specific demarcation strategy by which the demos will transcend community boundaries. In other words, a consequence of implementing the principle will be that the demos will be disconnected from the community. The objective of this thesis is to determine whether or to which extent the principle and its consequences do justice to the personal autonomy of the agents involved. This thesis will argue that, on the one hand, the principle has direct effects that seem to do justice to the personal autonomy of agents since it makes them co-author of the formal laws and policies within which their personal autonomy is embedded. Moreover, it provides them a de jure position to (co-)govern the social conditions of personal autonomy. In that sense, it promotes the self-governance of agents and, thus, their personal autonomy. On the other hand, the principle seems limited for the indirect effects of the disconnection of the demos from the community: firstly, it only makes agents co-author of the formal laws and policies and not of the informal rules of society. The informal rules of society, however, are affected by the formal laws and policies. Therefore, implementing the principle would open up the possibility of a situation in which an agent is not included into the demos because a particular law or policy does not potentially undermine her personal autonomy in the local sense, but will indirectly affect the informal rules of society within which the personal autonomy of agents in the global sense is embedded. Such a situation would not improve the extent to which an agent is capable of governing herself. And secondly, although the all subjected principle might provide agents a de jure social position by including them into the demos, this does not guarantee that these agents will also possess a de facto social position to (co-)govern the social conditions within which their personal autonomy is embedded. According to Oshana’s interpretation of the communitarian claim, such a de facto social position is a requirement of genuine self-government. As the principle is unclear to which extent it provides agents such a social position, in the sense that it only guarantees an inclusion into the demos, it remains unclear to which extent it does justice to the personal autonomy of the agents involved.Show less
Institutional corruption is a prevalent issue in many societies. Institutional corruption can harm the solidarity that is vital to a society. However, institutional corruption is underdeveloped as...Show moreInstitutional corruption is a prevalent issue in many societies. Institutional corruption can harm the solidarity that is vital to a society. However, institutional corruption is underdeveloped as a concept. The main reason is that it lacks a proper moral foundation. A clear moral foundation is necessary in order to identify and effectively address institutional corruption. In this research, I ask what the moral foundation of institutions is and how we can form a proper moral judgement about institutional functioning. To answer this question, I firstly review several concepts of corruption that are dominant in academic literature. Secondly, I discuss with institutional theory what is ‘institutional’ about institutional corruption. This includes a discussion about what is institutional legitimacy. Thirdly, I discuss what is ‘corruptive’ about institutional corruption. I formulate a proper moral foundation for institutional functioning in a Kantian and Habermassian tradition. Within these traditions, a proper way of judging institutional functioning from a moral perspective emerges. Finally, with the moral foundation and the method for judging institutional corruption, I present a clear concept of institutional corruption.Show less
