The following paper attempts to situate the China-Africa story in the broader context of the global political economy by underlining the space that both China and Africa occupy in the hierarchical...Show moreThe following paper attempts to situate the China-Africa story in the broader context of the global political economy by underlining the space that both China and Africa occupy in the hierarchical world order. The paper will attempt to answer the question: How has the capitalist growth imperative and globalization informed the deepening of economic ties between China and African countries? It will be argued that the strengthening of ties between China and Africa was inevitable in the economically-integrated world, driven by the capitalist ethics of comparative advantage, accumulation for accumulation sake, and the transnationalization of capital.Show less
In this dissertation I will be evaluating whether and how moral-concept abolitionism can be a satisfactory answer to the now-what question for moral-error theory. The version of error-theory most...Show moreIn this dissertation I will be evaluating whether and how moral-concept abolitionism can be a satisfactory answer to the now-what question for moral-error theory. The version of error-theory most people will be familiar with was forwarded by Mackie (1977). Error-theorists are committed to the idea that first-order moral claims are truth-apt, they are trying to refer to some fact out there in the world, but since an ontological investigation does not provide one with moral facts, all moral claims are wrong by default. This leads into the ‘now-what’ question: what are we to do with our moral language once we accept the error-theory. I will forgo arguing that the known version of the error-theory is plausible or true, since I expect those interested in the now-what question to already have accepted the error-theory. Moral-concept abolitionism is one among the possible answers to the now-what question. It recommends we jettison moral concepts from our language for diverging reasons. I start my investigation with Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) in which I argue she forwards an error-theory and her own answers to the now-what question. Her error-theory follows from a historical analysis, rather than an ontological one like Mackie’s (1977). Second, I will evaluate how Anscombe’s abolitionism compares to the work of abolitionists that are responding to Mackie, as well as show their significant differences, their incommensurability. These differences lead me to demarcate two distinct forms of abolitionism. Anscombe’s version, soft-abolitionism, recommends we jettison moral language, but also provides criteria to meaningfully reacquire moral thoughts and talk. I argue these criteria would not be accepted by modern abolitionists for multiple reasons: moral language, as well as the positive account of virtue Anscombe envisions, is at risk of being elitist, authoritarian, and ineffective, which is detrimental to time-sensitive issues such as climate change. I call the position that recommends jettisoning moral language, full stop, hard-abolitionism. I will compare the nuances of both soft- and hard-abolitionism and conclude that while they offer different merits as an answer to the now-what question, the concerns raised by hard-abolitionists lead me to conclude that, at least when deciding between forms of abolitionism, the modern hard-abolitionist version holds the better cards. I conclude that while both forms of abolitionism could be a satisfactory answer to the now-what question, hard-abolitionism is the more viable abolitionism in the face of our current problems.Show less