At the beginning of the American Civil War (1861 – 1865), the North and South were locked in a stalemate. The military strength of both sides could be considered roughly the same, and on the...Show moreAt the beginning of the American Civil War (1861 – 1865), the North and South were locked in a stalemate. The military strength of both sides could be considered roughly the same, and on the battlefield, neither side could present a significant advantage over the other. Both sides raised vast armies and armed their soldiers with the rifled-musket, giving them increased firepower. In addition, the Union and Confederate soldiers shared the same military traditions, were trained in the same infantry tactics, and had either no combat experience or shared the same experience in federal service. The large scale and advanced weaponry presented opportunities as well as challenges. On the battlefield, commanding officers had to solve these ‘tactical problems’. The tactical insight of one officer, expressed by his ability and willingness to make effective use of those under his command, could mean the difference between victory and defeat. Therefore, on the battlefields of the Civil War, where both North and South were able to match each other’s military capacity, effective military command was pivotal. Still, how did an officer acquire the tactical insight to turn the tide of battle in his favour? Was it forged from the bottom up through the experience of combat, or did it descend from the top down revealed by the study of tactics?Show less
From the 1970s onwards, Britain’s weakened trade unions have attempted a rejuvenation of their orientations and strategies: chiefly in order to appeal to and represent precarity-prone workers in a...Show moreFrom the 1970s onwards, Britain’s weakened trade unions have attempted a rejuvenation of their orientations and strategies: chiefly in order to appeal to and represent precarity-prone workers in a more satisfactory manner than they had before. However, this rejuvenation process has occurred in a piecemeal and uncoordinated manner: orientations have only shifted partially, and certain rejuvenatory strategies have been far from effective. An interwoven process has occurred alongside, and helped necessitate, this attempted rejuvenation: Britain’s urban labour markets have become increasingly ‘ruralised’. That is to say, the British economy has been fundamentally restructured, and urban industrial relations in the ‘New Economy’ have come to increasingly resemble those long found in British agriculture. Britain’s Farmworkers’ Union has had to contend with ‘new economic’ institutional conditions – namely the norms of small-employee firms and interpersonal and/or triangular relations between employers and workers – for an extended period of time. It is therefore reasonable to assume that, from 1970 onwards, the Farmworker’s Union would have utilised those orientations and strategies adopted by Britain’s urban unions during their rejuvenation processes, but in a more systematic, coherent and effective manner, and from an earlier date. To interrogate this assumption I pose the following research question: in terms of form and effectiveness, how differentiated have the orientations and strategies of the Farmworkers’ Union been, with regards to precarity-prone workers, when compared to the wider Trade Union Movement, and why?Show less
