In conventional political philosophy, political moralism takes the forefront; the theory that moral normativity takes priority in political action. This essay wishes, in the first place, to...Show moreIn conventional political philosophy, political moralism takes the forefront; the theory that moral normativity takes priority in political action. This essay wishes, in the first place, to critically analyze current politics, as well as political moral theory, with regards to political (in)action with regards to climate change. In particular, if it is the case that moral theory could provide us with strong arguments for (proper) action against climate change, why is not enough being done? I will argue that many moralist theories are too ideal – i.e. too fact-insensitive – which causes a number of problems. In order to provide the necessary practical strength to political action against climate change, I will develop a non-ideal, realist argument for climate resilient development. In particular, I relate climate change policy to legitimacy of states such that, if states do not do enough to combat climate change, their very authoritative power is illegitimate. I will consider a few possible criticisms against this view, after which I will further developed this view from a cost-sensitive perspective, as well as from a global collective action perspective. It is my view that this realist perspective is both fact-sensitive and practice-focused enough to provide the necessary normative force to take proper action with regards to climate change.Show less
In this thesis, I will discuss Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice as developed in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Specifically, I will examine his theory of justice in holdings and its...Show moreIn this thesis, I will discuss Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice as developed in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Specifically, I will examine his theory of justice in holdings and its three constituent principles of justice in acquisition, justice in transfer, and the principle of rectification. The core focus of this thesis is, however, on Nozick’s principle of rectification, which ties his entitlement theory together. As part of this analysis, I will also explore questions concerning how far back one must and can go, what a victim may require as rectification for an injustice, and various other complications that cannot be simply ignored in the face of practical real-world applications. Specifically, I will consider the injustice of slavery as it existed in the United States from its foundation in 1776 up until 1865, when the Thirteenth Amendment proclaimed that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, […] shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” For the injustice of slavery during this time period, I will provide an empirical and data driven analysis to quantify the requisite Nozickian rectification. Having examined the question of how large rectification for slavery ought to be, I conclude that it should be minimal or nil if the question is analyzed under Nozickian libertarian principles. My conclusion is based on (a) a review of the conceptual problems with claims for rectification, and (b) an empirical analysis that provides a rough estimate of how much claimants can possibly expect to receive for rectification.Show less
This thesis puts forward a dialogue between postcolonial philosophy and psychoanalysis as a way of furthering the development of contemporary decolonial theory. Analysing the example of the Dutch...Show moreThis thesis puts forward a dialogue between postcolonial philosophy and psychoanalysis as a way of furthering the development of contemporary decolonial theory. Analysing the example of the Dutch king Willem-Alexander offering official appologies to the Indonesian state, a reading of Frantz Fanon through the lens of Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theory provides the fundament for showing how this effort at postcolonial reconciliation is lacking, and how this example can be used for furthering the development of postcolonial thinking.Show less
With the grounding of Cartesian mind-body dualism in modern European philosophy the mind has been granted a pivotal place in the field of epistemology. As a result, knowledge production is...Show moreWith the grounding of Cartesian mind-body dualism in modern European philosophy the mind has been granted a pivotal place in the field of epistemology. As a result, knowledge production is predominantly considered a disembodied enterprise. Over the last century critiques have been formulated against placing knowledge within the perimeters of the mind. For one, the phenomenological tradition offered an influential critique against the separability of mind, body as well as the external world in which the cognisant being finds oneself. Despite providing a powerful argument against disembodied theories of knowledge it appears the applicability of such a phenomenological theory falls short when transcending knowledge on the level of individual experience. This research takes a different approach in critiquing a disembodied understanding of knowledge. Through findings in ethnography and material culture studies it becomes clear knowledge cannot be confined to the internal mental processes of individual subjects. These two research fields bring special attention to firstly, the distributive nature of knowledge amongst collectivities and secondly, the shared epistemological and ontological aspects of knowledge amongst groups of people/cultures required to produce knowledge. Knowledge is considered something that is constructed intersubjectively and in direct relation to the physical world and power discourse in which it is used. Through case studies in material culture currently housed at the Pitt Rivers Museum, an ethnographic and anthropology institute in Oxford, UK, it is argued that mind, body and external world properties play inseparable roles in the way knowledge is produced. In addition it becomes clear that a traditional Cartesian understanding of knowledge has consistently been used in interpreting the knowledge systems of other cultures. Such projection of a traditional Cartesian understanding of knowledge on the knowledge systems of other cultures has left an often distorted view of other modes of knowing, being and understanding, and attests to the colonial conditions under which the objects examined here were acquired. Study of material objects expose the fallacy in mind-body dualism and ought to be considered the missing links regarding knowledge systems obscured as result of the universalisation of the traditional Cartesian understanding of knowledge.Show less
Philosophical vegetarianism is a phoenixlike presence as it has risen from ancient ashes; and its current controversy is not a new one, but rather a rekindling of an old one. Correspondingly,...Show morePhilosophical vegetarianism is a phoenixlike presence as it has risen from ancient ashes; and its current controversy is not a new one, but rather a rekindling of an old one. Correspondingly, Porphyry was not ahead of his time by morally advocating for vegetarianism; the modern animal emancipation movement is merely playing catch-up. I argue that a proper understanding of these ancient ashes is required to make the phoenix that is animal emancipation fly high.Show less
Nietzsche's Revaluation of Schein offers an extensive developmental account of Nietzsche's usage of the term 'Schein', which is tranlsated as semblance. The term, it is argued, is revalued over the...Show moreNietzsche's Revaluation of Schein offers an extensive developmental account of Nietzsche's usage of the term 'Schein', which is tranlsated as semblance. The term, it is argued, is revalued over the course of three stages of Nietzsche's thinking on the conception of reality: first a metaphysics of art, then an aesthetic idealism and finally an aesthetic perspectivism. These three stages, it is further argued, represent three different attempts at life-affirmation.Show less
This master thesis investigates Hannah Arendt’s conception of conscience. The implicit scholarly consensus is that Arendt had only one conception of conscience. However, I will argue that Arendt...Show moreThis master thesis investigates Hannah Arendt’s conception of conscience. The implicit scholarly consensus is that Arendt had only one conception of conscience. However, I will argue that Arendt developed two distinct conceptions of conscience and that the later conception should be favoured over her earlier conception. Arendt’s first conception of conscience portrays conscience as the result of taking over societal values, which then make demands on us. However, according to her second conception conscience is not automatically active in everyone, instead conscience needs to be brought about by thinking. To make my argument in favour of Arendt’s second conception, I follow a dynamical, historical approach, according to which thinkers can change their minds. If later texts about the same subject (conscience) strongly contradict earlier texts, then we should look at which text fits better in the thinker’s overall framework. In the case of Arendt and her conception of conscience, it is her second conception of conscience which can support her banality of evil thesis and her conception of thinking. Therefore, I am concluding that Arendt’s conception of conscience as a by-product of thinking should be viewed as her most authoritative position on conscience. As a result, not everyone has a conscience, whereas everyone could have one.Show less
The literature on distributive justice has mostly focused on interactions within or between states. However, the role of non-state actors in theories of justice has remained largely unexplored. In...Show moreThe literature on distributive justice has mostly focused on interactions within or between states. However, the role of non-state actors in theories of justice has remained largely unexplored. In this thesis, I focus on the role of one of those non-state actors: the multinational corporation. Since multinationals act in multiple countries, I ask what role multinationals should play within a cosmopolitan theory of justice, in which all human beings are considered to be moral equals. More specifically, I argue, that multinationals should not be allowed to determine how justice is realized, because competition forces them to be partial towards their own interest, and second, because they lack formal mechanisms of accountability. I argue that this prevents them from respecting the moral equality of individuals that is required by cosmopolitan justice. Instead, I argue that a lack of global regulation of multinationals will cause injustices in the organization of the multinational as well as in the countries in which the multinational operates. To prevent these injustices from happening, I argue that multinationals should be regulated by impartial, supranational institutions. As a policy recommendation, I suggest that regulatory attempts should focus on global fiscal reform, since current corporate tax evasion aggravates several of the corporate injustices discussed, and because tax evasion undermines the realization of cosmopolitan justice.Show less
Social reproduction involves all the work that people do to (re)make people on a daily and generational basis. It involves processes by which a social system - individually and generational –...Show moreSocial reproduction involves all the work that people do to (re)make people on a daily and generational basis. It involves processes by which a social system - individually and generational – reproduces itself. Socially reproductive labor is essential for the functioning of societies, including capitalistic ones: social reproduction maintains and (re)produces the workers that are the engine of the (formal) labor market. In many analyses on globalized capitalism and the current economy, social reproduction is a completely neglected aspect. This negligence prevents us from recognizing the (structural) crisis in which social reproduction finds itself: socially reproductive labor is not acknowledged as ‘real work’ and there is no reciprocity between, on the one hand, the formal and waged labor sector and, on the other hand, the informal realm. My first aim in this research is to find a (working) definition of social reproduction and, from there, research the crisis. Moreover, I will try to answer the question on how we can solve the crisis in social reproduction by studying two different distributive justice theories: justice as fairness – a theory by John Rawls – and a Unconditional Basic Income, defended by Philippe van Parijs. I will argue that a basic income is the most promising theory of the two to (partly) solve the crisis, but that it is still insufficient as a policy tool to structurally solve the profound crisis of social reproduction under capitalism. I will conclude that social reproduction will always be undervalued - both in forms of monetary reward and social status - under both the welfare state and a radical reform to the welfare state in the form of a basic income.Show less
This thesis critiques the notion of development based on a philosophy of Being. Development, and learning, can only occur within Becoming. Inspired by Nietzsche and Deleuze’s project of...Show moreThis thesis critiques the notion of development based on a philosophy of Being. Development, and learning, can only occur within Becoming. Inspired by Nietzsche and Deleuze’s project of overthrowing Platonism, it is shown that transcendental principles explain the conditioning of reason, not its generation. To explain the process of genesis (of reason) we have to understand the principles that make order out of the chaos of life. My main hypothesis is that development is a process of the embodiment of differences, as a process of becoming. And learning is the process of encountering and internalising differences through involuntary memory and pure thought. Conditioning, on the contrary, is a process that reduces development and thought to functions in service of a final state, an Ideal, and therefore obstructs development. The process of development is a process of individuation where essences of becoming, grounded on an eternal return of difference, become internalised and increase someone’s power to resonate with the World. The production of a subject, however, is problematic because it is the result of conditioning, the internalisation of general identities (the symbolic order) in reaction to overpowering negative tensions. Development has its spiritual equivalent in learning and pure thought. Conditioning stops thought, it allows access to a desired feeling against the condition that someone accepts a certain state, or fact, without question. Because of this, conditioning always produces the unfortunate side-effect of anxiety, since the assumed truths lack any grounding in univocity.Show less
In this master thesis, I argue that current naturalization practices that restrict access to citizenship for long-term resident immigrants are wrong because they are incompatible with some of our...Show moreIn this master thesis, I argue that current naturalization practices that restrict access to citizenship for long-term resident immigrants are wrong because they are incompatible with some of our most fundamental liberal-democratic commitments. Liberal democracies ought to introduce automatic citizenship for long-term resident immigrants instead. I advance a two-fold argument for this claim. My first argument states that democratic principles require incorporating resident immigrants within a democratic demos. The second argument is an argument for status equality, stating that all members of a demos must have equal status as citizens. It follows that resident immigrants must be citizens. As justice requires that all long-term residents are indeed citizens, naturalization should be mandatory for them. Finally, I criticize exclusive understandings of political community as a social or national community and suggest conceptualizing political community as a “community of place” (Bell 2020) instead.Show less