It is undeniable that the current ecological crisis could significantly deepen global political and social inequalities, bringing tangible effects on the size of the world population, food...Show moreIt is undeniable that the current ecological crisis could significantly deepen global political and social inequalities, bringing tangible effects on the size of the world population, food abundance, and the occurrence of extreme natural events. To avoid such catastrophic scenarios, our singular individual actions (such as our consumption choices) are seen as too negligible and inconsequential to address the problem at a global level. In this way, the moral gap between our scattered actions and the resulting environmental harm they produce remains intact. Deontological and consequentialist approaches, although dominant throughout the history of western moral philosophy, are not sufficient to tackle the significance of the environmental crisis, especially in its collective-action problems form. In my thesis, I am going to argue for the viability of a third approach to environmental ethical questions, i.e. virtue ethics. In particular, I will explore how a virtue-ethical approach relates to collective action environmental problems such as climate change.Show less
This thesis makes the claim that the distinction made between positive and negative freedom (as well as between competing claims of freedom more generally) are not, and should not be about...Show moreThis thesis makes the claim that the distinction made between positive and negative freedom (as well as between competing claims of freedom more generally) are not, and should not be about disagreements as to what ‘real’ or ‘true’ freedom is, but are instead expressions of which freedoms align with certain philosopher’s broader ideas of justice. What I believe this means is that it is wrong to claim that only a purely negative or positive concept of freedom is the only coherent concept of liberty, and that instead the disagreement and the distinctions made are in fact done so on disagreements about which freedoms are valuable and why. The overall value of instances of freedom is in turn derived from our theories of justice and the ethical commitments which comprise these theories. Therefore I argue, referring to the work of Carter, that a complete and coherent concept of freedom must be both value-neutral in that it does not give superiority to any particular ethical claims made in regards to freedom, and as value-free in that we do not define freedom as only those instances which are also just. It is because of this that I will defend an altered version of MacCallum’s triadic formulation of liberty, which I believe is most successful at encompassing what it is we mean when we’re talking about freedom, by presenting freedom as a relationship between agent, preventing condition - as well as a fulfilment condition that I have added - and an action or behaviour. In this way my altered version of MacCallum’s concept sets the foundations for what I will argue is a value-neutral and value-free concept of freedom, which gives a structure for us to make sense of all intelligible expressions of freedom and gives a neutral base from which to introduce other commitments and values to argue for certain types of freedom over others.Show less