“The future of the world’s population is urban.”1 People move to the city for opportunities, money and a better life. When we look at this transition from a freedom perspective, instead of the...Show more“The future of the world’s population is urban.”1 People move to the city for opportunities, money and a better life. When we look at this transition from a freedom perspective, instead of the common resource or utility views, you could question whether the city will always provide this better life. Do urban environments provide the freedoms we value, better than rural environments? In this thesis I claim that certain freedoms, present in rural environments, actually get reduced when people move to the city, and that the urban spatial environment is a crucial factor in this. I will introduce Amartya Sen’s capability approach to elaborate on the importance of capabilities, compared to other normative indicators of human flourishing. Sen’s capability approach does not focus on resources or outcomes, but on the process whereby people flourish; the freedom people have to do and to be as they have reason to value. These substantive freedoms are divided by Sen in a freedom concerned with people’s wellbeing (reflecting capabilities) and a freedom concerned with people’s agency. This distinction is particularly relevant when we consider spatial environments. Where wellbeing freedom deals with the different opportunities open to people, agency freedom concerns the freedom people have to effectively shape and choose their own. By looking at concrete cases, I show that certain freedoms, while present in rural environments, are reduced by the spatial design of our cities, after which I present a number of inspirational design cases which are able to address these losses. I conclude by arguing that, in designing our cities, there is reason to pay more attention to the rural valuing of freedom, both in providing alternative options for people to achieve wellbeing, and in providing space for people to exercise agency in order to conceive a wider range of valuable goals.Show less
In this thesis is questioned when human smuggling is permissible. By analysing the risk objection, the exploitation objection, the motivation objection, the freedom of association objection and the...Show moreIn this thesis is questioned when human smuggling is permissible. By analysing the risk objection, the exploitation objection, the motivation objection, the freedom of association objection and the law-breaking objection is concluded that human smuggling is not always wrong, at least not pro tanto. Nevertheless, certain conditions have to be satisfied. For one the smuggler should illuminate as many risks as possible, if doing so does not involve more than moderate risks. Therefore a smuggler should actively investigate the possible risks and take steps to mitigate the risks. Secondly, the smuggler needs to fully inform the client about the risks. Thereon, the client must give his real consent. Thirdly, a smuggler should not exploit his clients. Therefore a smuggler may not harm or abuse his client. A smuggler may not deceive his client by not giving an equivalent in return. Furthermore a smuggler may not take advantage of someone in a vulnerable position for example by charging an amount that includes a high profit. Fourthly, a smuggler may break the law if there is a moral reason to override this. The smugglers’ illegal conduct is justified if it prevents a greater evil than the conduct caused, there is no legal alternative that would have averted the harm and that the person was not responsible for creating the threat she helped avert. Finally, human smugglers should only accept a client when he claims that his rights are threatened. Migrants are only allowed to engage in human smuggling if their human rights are threatened and should apply for officials if the state will indeed give a fair hearing. It is the state's responsibility to give a fair hearing.Show less
This essay explores the possibility of a relational egalitarian account on linguistic justice. For relational egalitarianism, a society based on equal social relations forms the essence of the...Show moreThis essay explores the possibility of a relational egalitarian account on linguistic justice. For relational egalitarianism, a society based on equal social relations forms the essence of the egalitarian ideal. This paper argues that linguistic inequality, which places certain linguistic varieties in a politically, economically, and socially dominant position, automatically placing others in inferior positions, should be of concern for relational egalitarians in particular. Moreover, it portrays how existing accounts on linguistic justice are not sufficient in mitigating the relational egalitarian injustices generated by linguistic diversity. By combining and expanding these accounts, relational egalitarianism provides the theoretical prospect of true linguistic equality. However, it will appear that in practice, the feasibility of such an approach is severely constrained. This does then, in turn, raise important questions for relational egalitarian theory as a whole, which aims to be based in the practical reality that many real-life egalitarian social movements face.Show less
Within Rawls’s theory of justice lies an endorsement of a ‘Property-Owning Democracy’ as a regime-type which has the capacity to meet the institutional demands of justice. In contrast, ‘Welfare...Show moreWithin Rawls’s theory of justice lies an endorsement of a ‘Property-Owning Democracy’ as a regime-type which has the capacity to meet the institutional demands of justice. In contrast, ‘Welfare-State Capitalism’, characterised by redistributive practices, is dismissed as incapable of realising the values of justice as fairness. This thesis presents a challenge to the alleged superiority of a ‘Property-Owning Democracy’ over welfare state regimes. Through an exploration of the concept of predistribution, it is demonstrated that there is conceptual space between ‘Property-Owning Democracy’ and ‘Welfare-State Capitalism’ for a ‘Predistributionist Welfare State’. It is then argued that when a Rawlsian normative framework, consisting of accounts of the values of political liberty, equality of opportunity, reciprocity and social equality, is invoked to evaluate the opposing regime-types, a ‘Predistributionist Welfare State’ performs at least as well as a ‘Property-Owning Democracy’. This leads to the conclusion that Rawlsian philosophers lack a decisive set of reasons to reject the welfare state outright in favour of a ‘Property-Owning Democracy’.Show less
