Articles that investigate minority influence on foreign policy-making have mainly concentrated on minorities living in the United States. Research on national minorities outside the United States...Show moreArticles that investigate minority influence on foreign policy-making have mainly concentrated on minorities living in the United States. Research on national minorities outside the United States has been limited. This paper tries to compare two cases that are dissimilar to the United States, namely Turkey and Israel and this essay asks the question: to what extent do the Kurdish and Arabic minorities influence Turkish and Israeli foreign policy? There is a particular emphasis on foreign policy influence of Pro-Kurdish and Pro-Arabic political parties. The party websites of the Pro-Arabic, Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) and Meretz are looked into. With regard to Turkey, the party website of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is examined. The BDP has been established in 2008, which is considerably later compared to the pro-Arabic political parties in Israel. Unfortunately, it is impossible to investigate pro-Kurdish parties from before 2008, as these parties were banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court. It is argued in this paper that no proof can be found of pro-Arabic and pro-Kurdish political parties influencing foreign policy. Since Israel and Turkey are truly dissimilar to the United States, other cases need to be examined in order to find out whether minorities in other countries influence foreign policy. Moreover, international organizations, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union, can play a role in accommodating minorities. More research is necessary to find out whether international organizations, as the Council of Europe and the EU, play a role in protecting minority rights.Show less
According to the rational choice theory acting cooperative in collective goods problems is not rational because the benefits of cooperating do not outweigh the costs. The fact that some countries...Show moreAccording to the rational choice theory acting cooperative in collective goods problems is not rational because the benefits of cooperating do not outweigh the costs. The fact that some countries do cooperate in international collective goods problems means that something must be missing from traditional rational choice models. IR theorists have tried to explain how it is possible that some countries do cooperate in collective goods problems while others do not.This research examines oil wealth as an explanation for non cooperative behavior in collective goods problems. This explanation is derived from the realist school of thought. The results of this research show that in two different cases oil wealth is negatively related to cooperative behavior in collective goods problems. Also other explanations from realist, liberalist and constructivist theories have been tested and compared to understand the importance of any of these explanations when explaining state behavior in collective goods problems.Show less
This thesis discusses the impact of opposition movements in effecting regime transition in Syria and Egypt during the Arab Spring, analyzing their organizational structure, objectives, strategies,...Show moreThis thesis discusses the impact of opposition movements in effecting regime transition in Syria and Egypt during the Arab Spring, analyzing their organizational structure, objectives, strategies, legitimacy, and de facto power. It starts out from the premise that it is crucial that the opposition influences 'soft-liners' within the regime to undermine its internal cohesion and stability. It is argued that the opposition in both countries has been durable due to intrinsic motivations of the participants and widespread social dissatisfaction, and their diffuse yet coherent grassroots forms of organization have rendered them hard to repress by the regime. In both countries, however, the opposition was unable to overthrow the regime by itself since it did not have sufficient military power resources to pose a real threat to the regime's survival. In Syria, the opposition could not generate enough division among the elite, while in Egypt, division already existed among the elite and this was augmented by the opposition, with the acquiescence of the military proving crucial in the regime transition. The extent of influence of the opposition was heavily constrained by the political opportunity structures in which they operated, with repression by the regime playing a large role and curtailing agency.Show less
