More than twenty years ago, Fearon (1994; 1997) has argued that democracies are more likely to successfully compel a target state than nondemocracies. However, empirical evidence suggests that this...Show moreMore than twenty years ago, Fearon (1994; 1997) has argued that democracies are more likely to successfully compel a target state than nondemocracies. However, empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case (Snyder & Borghard, 2011; Trachtenberg, 2012; Downes & Sechser, 2012; Sechser, 2018, 335). Consequently, a new understanding of the relationship between regime type and compellence outcomes is needed (Gartzke & Lupu, 2012). I argue that democratic leaders have more incentives to keep the costs of conflict low. Consequently, they will want to prevent disputes from escalating. Hence, they are more likely to not mobilise their troops or to mobilise air troops during a conflict. These options have a lower risk of escalating the conflict than the mobilisation of land or naval troops (Pfundstein Chamberlain, 2016; Post, 2019a). By choosing the careful option, democratic leaders will not be perceived as resolved by the target state (Fearon, 1994; Fearon, 1997; Pfundstein Chamberlain, 2016; Post, 2019a). As a result, compellent threats issued by democracies will have a lower chance to be successful in comparison to threats issued by nondemocracies. I have tested this hypothesis by the Militarised Compellent Threat (MCT) database (Sechser, 2011b).Show less
