In this study, we study the effect of productivity uncertainty on the contribution to public goods. We hypothesize that uncertainty about the productivity of the public god leads to a decrease in...Show moreIn this study, we study the effect of productivity uncertainty on the contribution to public goods. We hypothesize that uncertainty about the productivity of the public god leads to a decrease in the perceived impact of the contribution resulting in a lower contribution to the public good. We also hypothesize that this effect on the perceived impact is moderated by a general sense of powerlessness. We have performed an online experiment in which participants faced both a public good game with and without productivity uncertainty. Results showed that uncertainty decreased the contribution to the public good, but this effect was not explained by perceived impact nor a general sense of powerlessness. Interpretations and limitations of this research and suggestions for future research are discussed.Show less
In the current study it is investigated whether environmental uncertainty influences the effect of generalized trust on cooperation. The expectations were that higher generalized trust would be...Show moreIn the current study it is investigated whether environmental uncertainty influences the effect of generalized trust on cooperation. The expectations were that higher generalized trust would be related to higher cooperation, and that this positive relationship would be even stronger when uncertainty about the cooperativeness of contributing would be introduced. The reasoning was that the environmental uncertainty would make the decision situation ‘weaker’ (i.e., vague or no cues for appropriate behavior in the situation), and therefore individuals would rely more heavily on dispositional traits. We tested this by presenting participants with public good games with and without uncertainty. While the first expectation was met, the results did not corroborate our reasoning of the second expectation. Thus, generalized trust proved to be a stable predictor for cooperation. However, it did not become stronger when uncertainty about the cooperativeness of contributing was introduced.Show less
This study aimed to understand whether induced self-uncertainty affects the evaluation of international and national brands in favor of the national brand, and if the need for closure moderates...Show moreThis study aimed to understand whether induced self-uncertainty affects the evaluation of international and national brands in favor of the national brand, and if the need for closure moderates this effect. It was predicted that induced self-uncertainty would increase brand preference for national over international brands. Furthermore, it was predicted that this effect of the induced self-uncertainty would be especially true for participants with low NFC and less so for participants with high NFC. In total 141 Dutch participants filled out the online questionnaire. Based on an ANOVA and a moderation analysis it was concluded that neither the condition nor NFC, had a significant effect on brand preference. Lastly, no significant interaction effect was found as well. However, the manipulation check revealed no difference in self-uncertainty between groups. To conclude, NFC did not affect brand preference, and further research is needed to explore the role of self-uncertainty in brand evaluation.Show less
Social dilemmas arise when individual and collective interests conflict. Some crises-like social dilemmas, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, comprise two parts: people must cooperate to prevent a...Show moreSocial dilemmas arise when individual and collective interests conflict. Some crises-like social dilemmas, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, comprise two parts: people must cooperate to prevent a disaster (public bad) but once prevented, i.e., a turning point was reached, positive externalities are generated (public good). Our study aims to expand the literature by studying cooperation, coordination, and motivation in such crises-like situations. We formulated the Adversity-Opportunity model (AOM) as a modified public goods game, introducing a negative initial group account to model "turning a bad into a good” and the turning point. In a mixed-factorial experiment, we measured participants' social value orientation and afterwards allocated them into three conditions. While contributions in the AOM condition could leave/turn the group account negative/positive, it could only remain negative (Public Bad condition) or is only shared when positive (Public Good condition). Within subjects, we varied the negative initial group account, while prompting expected and most appropriate contribution after each decision. Our results showed consistently high cooperation in the AOM across turning points, while social dispositions were a significant predictor of cooperation. We argue that when cooperation always is continuously beneficial, coordination is not required, and people cannot deduct a convergent collective and individual interest. A common interest to avoid over- or underspending could have enabled participants to form expectations and thus partially coordinate their choices. A public bad fostered marginally larger contributions than a public good interaction, after accounting for dispositions. Further research is necessary to confirm our findings and assess follow-up questions.Show less
