Individuals often experience uncertainty about the productivity of Public Goods (PG), causing them to face the possibility that the PG is either high or low in productivity. This study examined the...Show moreIndividuals often experience uncertainty about the productivity of Public Goods (PG), causing them to face the possibility that the PG is either high or low in productivity. This study examined the impact of such productivity uncertainty on cooperation and investigated whether risk propensity moderated this relation. It also explored the effect on cooperation when the productivity is so low that contributing would imply a loss. Participants (N=120) played public good games which varied in levels of uncertainty. Findings revealed that risk seekers (high risk propensity) contribute more than risk avoiders (low risk propensity) in games with uncertainty without potential loss than in games without such uncertainty (baseline game). Furthermore, both risk seekers and risk avoiders contribute less to games with uncertainty with potential loss compared to the baseline game. The potential for loss strongly impacts cooperation decisions, and risk propensity predicts cooperation in situations of uncertainty without potential loss.Show less
This study investigates how productivity uncertainty in public goods games (PGG) influences cooperation of participants differing in risk preference. Productivity uncertainty refers to a state of...Show moreThis study investigates how productivity uncertainty in public goods games (PGG) influences cooperation of participants differing in risk preference. Productivity uncertainty refers to a state of not knowing the effectiveness of one's efforts in reaching common goals or producing public goods. It was hypothesized that, under productivity uncertainty, risk seekers would contribute more while risk avoiders would contribute less. Additionally, it was hypothesized that that in uncertain conditions where a potential loss is introduced, the contribution of participants would decrease regardless of their risk preference. We tested the hypotheses by letting participants complete a series of 5 PGG where we had one baseline game without uncertainty and 4 where we added productivity uncertainty by manipulating the possible outcomes. The last 2 games had the potentially of loss added. In conclusion, based on the study results hypothesis 1 was confirmed if there was no potential of loss involved. Hypothesis 2 was confirmed as the possibility of unproductivity of a contribution lowered the contribution by both seekers and risk avoiders.Show less
This study investigates how environmental uncertainty in public goods games influences cooperation of participants differing in level of Social Value Orientation (SVO). Based on the ‘strong’ versus...Show moreThis study investigates how environmental uncertainty in public goods games influences cooperation of participants differing in level of Social Value Orientation (SVO). Based on the ‘strong’ versus ‘weak’ situations framework, it was argued that under uncertainty about whether contribution is actually cooperation, people would rely more on their SVO than under certainty, for both contribution and beliefs about others’ contribution. The results showed that people with a higher level of pro-sociality contributed more than people with a lower level of pro-sociality. However, contrary to the line of reasoning, it was found that people relied less on their SVO under uncertainty about whether contribution is actually cooperation, resulting in less cooperation and lower contribution expectations of others than under certainty. Altogether, the results ask for more research into why people cooperate less under uncertainty about whether their contribution is actually cooperation.Show less
