Scholars have thoroughly researched the political backlash against the LGBTI community in Poland and Hungary after EU accession. As time has passed, a new wave has arisen. With very little research...Show moreScholars have thoroughly researched the political backlash against the LGBTI community in Poland and Hungary after EU accession. As time has passed, a new wave has arisen. With very little research conducted concerning this new wave or its relation to the earlier wave, it is time to update the body of literature surrounding politicized LGBTI phobia. Therefore, this thesis researches how politicized LGBTI phobia has developed in Poland and Hungary since their accession into the EU in 2004. This question has been answered through an examination of academic articles and NGO reports from the earlier wave, and a thematic analysis of interviews with local and transnational actors combined with information of NGO reports about the current wave. Thematic analysis has been used to analyze these interviews and this thesis utilizes antagonism theory as the wider framework. This thesis observes both parallels and differences among the waves within Poland and Hungary individually and the totality of waves between the two countries. There are continuations of factors, but also new factors to be found in the new waves. This thesis concludes that politicized LGBTI phobia has come in waves, with a shift towards anti-migration narratives in between the two waves. Furthermore, the developments consist of unique domestic factors, regional parallels that can be understood as echos, and also global developments such as the overall anti-gender and anti-LGBTI movements. New factors include new intensified forms of previous characteristics which are for example LGBT free zones, rule by decree, NGO restructuring and family mainstreaming. However, it is apparent that the latest wave has not yet ended and is showing no evidence of dissipating.Show less
Abstract In 2012, China established the 17+1-forum together with Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). It combined the forum in 2015 with the Belt and Road Initiative, an enormous Chinese...Show moreAbstract In 2012, China established the 17+1-forum together with Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). It combined the forum in 2015 with the Belt and Road Initiative, an enormous Chinese infrastructure investment project. The EU deems the forum problematic because it divides Member States (MSs) in terms of relations with China, preventing the EU from taking a common position on China. The EU fears that this and other consequences will deteriorate its functioning and security. However, despite the EU’s fears, twelve EU MSs still participate in the forum. This raises an important question: Why do governments of BRI-17+1-forum participants that are also EU MSs choose to cooperate with China, despite that the EU fears that this will deteriorate its functioning and security? The literature gives several arguments for this, but this thesis will only test whether one of these arguments, whether these EU MSs have come to see cooperation with China in the forum as “a viable alternative to the EU project” respectively, is a valid answer to this question. Based on case studies of Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia and the application of shelter theory, it is concluded that this argument played a role in the decision of these countries to participate in the BRI-17+1-forum. However, the study also shows that Lithuania, and to a lesser extent Slovakia, have started to consider the forum less important because expectations are not met and because of the risks involved in cooperating with China.Show less
This thesis contributes to the debate over the EMU negotiations and the Council Presidency's role by conducting an 'actor-centered' analysis of archival sources. It focusses on the research...Show moreThis thesis contributes to the debate over the EMU negotiations and the Council Presidency's role by conducting an 'actor-centered' analysis of archival sources. It focusses on the research question how far the senior officials went to advance the Dutch position on EMU during the Dutch presidency of the Council?. It is concluded that the Dutch position on EMU was formulated by senior officials from the Ministry of Finance and the DNB. Wim Duisenberg, President of DNB and Treasurer General Cees Maas, entered the Dutch presidency in 1991 by actively promoting the Dutch position on EMU, disregarding the wishes of other member states. This strategy was successful for establishing the ECB but was less successful for banking supervision and the transition to stage three. Maas and Duisenberg desired to continue tenaciously defending the Dutch position, but Finance Minister Kok determined that an agreement was necessary. The Netherlands was eventually forced to concede several points, but the Treaty was signed in Maastricht. Although the Netherlands had hoped for a different outcome, an EMU with a single currency supervised by a supranational monetary institution would eventually emerge. This has been the Netherlands' desire since 1986.Show less
This thesis explores the role of the OEEC in the management of Western European overseas colonies. Through a qualitative historical research drawing mainly on the archival collection of the OEEC,...Show moreThis thesis explores the role of the OEEC in the management of Western European overseas colonies. Through a qualitative historical research drawing mainly on the archival collection of the OEEC, it argues that beyond its primary objectives of administering Marshall Aid, the OEEC became a platform in which Western European powers organized their relations with their overseas territories. Beyond economic concerns, these territories were considered as a political question, and the OEEC developed into a venue in which the interests of Europe were safeguarded, at the crossroads between integration and decolonization.Show less
With the adoption of the European Union Global Strategy in 2016 the EU renewed its quest for attaining strategic autonomy. However, the EU document did not specify what would constitute European...Show moreWith the adoption of the European Union Global Strategy in 2016 the EU renewed its quest for attaining strategic autonomy. However, the EU document did not specify what would constitute European strategic autonomy (ESA), so, as is the case with the EU’s external policies, the national perspectives of Member States are its obvious basis. Historically, the Netherlands has been an obstructionist when it came to European security and defence integration due to its Atlanticist position, begging the question: how is European strategic autonomy represented in Dutch politics? To understand the Dutch perspective and positioning regarding ESA, this thesis drew from the field of Critical Geopolitics, conducting an interpretive-explanatory research employing discourse analysis by analysing statements made by party representatives in the Tweede Kamer during the period of 2016-2021. Three distinct schools of thought underpinning the representations of ESA in the Dutch debate. The Sovereigntists are Eurosceptics who present ESA as an attempt to establish a European army and a threat to national sovereignty. The Europeanists actively champion ESA and envision it as an emancipatory project to make the EU able to act independently of the US because it is an increasingly unreliable ally. The Atlanticists present ESA as an opportunity to take responsibility within NATO and improve burden-sharing with the US. This thesis found that the Dutch debate regarding European security policy has substantially Europeanised. While the Atlanticists are still cautious, they no longer take an active obstructionist position, instead adopting Europeanist talking-points from the 90s. Considering this Europeanist momentum, there is potential for the Netherlands to become an active and serious promotor of ambitious European security commitments.Show less
Although the formal role of the European Parliament in European foreign policy is formally limited, it has gained influence in the last years, especially after the Lisbon Treaty. This has given the...Show moreAlthough the formal role of the European Parliament in European foreign policy is formally limited, it has gained influence in the last years, especially after the Lisbon Treaty. This has given the Parliament more power to promote certain policies, such as human rights or gender policy. Whilst this has been extensively researched, little has been published about the inner dynamics of the political groups regarding foreign policy, even though they decide on the final resolutions. This thesis examines these dynamics through a content analysis of several debates regarding the EU's relations with Turkey between 2016 and 2021. Particularly, seeing as the European Parliament is often hailed as a 'champion of gender policy', this thesis pays special attention to the salience of gender policy and equality within these debates, in order to cast a light on the priorities of the party groups: are they really championing gender policy, or are there more pressing issues regarding Turkey?Show less
The thesis tackles the question on the extent to which common values are integrated in the bilateral relations between the EU and Kazakhstan. For this single case-study, process-tracing of the...Show moreThe thesis tackles the question on the extent to which common values are integrated in the bilateral relations between the EU and Kazakhstan. For this single case-study, process-tracing of the negotiation, ratification, and implementation process of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 2015 is conducted. The agreement is officially based on the pursuit of common values. Kazakhstan, as a cooperative authoritarian regime, shows high willingness to work closely together with the EU and to adapt to its view on democratic values. However, human rights violations from the part of the Kazakh government and state authorities do not seem to slow down the negotiation and implementation process of this important agreement. Alongside the process-tracing of the EPCA negotiations, the actorness of both Kazakhstan and the EU is analyzed. Finally, the research concludes that pragmatic interests from the EU side are predominant and that the adherence to values is not taken as a condition but rather as an objective. Doing so, the EU Parliament pursues a more value-based approach compared to the more pragmatic and encouraging behavior of the Council of the EU, the Commission, and the EU External Action Service. Moreover, integrating values in the cooperation is convenient for the reputation-conscious Kazakh government.Show less
This research aims to contribute to the debates on the democratic deficit of the European Union by researching the added value of EU membership in the field of cybersecurity. One of the main...Show moreThis research aims to contribute to the debates on the democratic deficit of the European Union by researching the added value of EU membership in the field of cybersecurity. One of the main arguments when discussing the democratic deficit of the EU, argues that the EU fulfils its democratic purposes, if it works ‘for’ the people. By providing effective governance and polity, the EU membership makes cyberspace safer and more secure for its member states, which is beneficial for all EU citizens. The EU and its agencies facilitate effective and operative cooperation that works ‘for’ the people. This research focused on two member states as case studies, The Netherlands and Hungary and found evidence that the EU provides a trusted and operative environment which contributes to cybersecurity in unique ways like no other international cooperation. This research looks for evidence that Europeanization, securitization, and interdependence drive the integration in cybersecurity at the European level.Show less
As Covid-19 was beginning to spread, European leaders were forced to debate not only the continued funding of the EU for the next 7 years, but a fiscal relief package as well. Sweden resisted calls...Show moreAs Covid-19 was beginning to spread, European leaders were forced to debate not only the continued funding of the EU for the next 7 years, but a fiscal relief package as well. Sweden resisted calls to approve of the Commission’s 3 trillion-euro plan, begging the question how does Sweden justify its resistance to fiscal redistribution at the EU level in the face of a symmetrical crisis? Solidarity is a complicated subject matter in the world of international affairs, to assist in better understanding a concept written into EU treaties this thesis created a comprehensive typology of solidarity, broken down into humanitarian and social contract subtypes, with the social contract possessing two further categories, interdependence/mutual responsibility, and conditional solidarity. To understand Sweden’s positioning and messaging, the methodology employed was a discourse analysis by utilizing statements made by Swedish politicians and officials from the Government, Riksdag, and European Parliament to understand the messaging and ideas that were presented in their respective forums. This paper finds that Sweden predominantly utilizes conditional solidarity in its discourse, with modernization, trust and invertedly, identity, being primary factors in determining Swedish disposition of aid. Discourse and internal matters which were created from prior experiences in the early 1990s during a domestic financial crisis, that have bled over into Swedish-European relations. This in turn has opened a gap for anti-EU parties and politicians to mask their rhetoric as a new norm to push a narrative for the breakdown of Swedish contributions and interactions in the EU to prevent further interdependence between Member States.Show less
The objective of this research is to create an overview of the frameworks the EU has in place to protect climate change migrants and to argue why the EU Member States hold a responsibility in...Show moreThe objective of this research is to create an overview of the frameworks the EU has in place to protect climate change migrants and to argue why the EU Member States hold a responsibility in protecting victims of climate change hazards. An overview of different international instruments makes clear what the current protective framework for climate change migrants is within the EU. Furthermore, the research provides legal arguments that add to the importance of improved efforts on climate change mitigation and may provide a positive obligation for EU Member States to grant international protection to climate change migrants. Moral arguments on their turn create an argument to answer why the EU Member States hold a responsibility in protecting victims of climate change. The EU’s responsibility for the protection of climate change migrants as well as its responsibility to improve efforts on climate change mitigation is mainly based on an argument on the disproportionality that can be found within the climate crisis, namely: the overrepresentation of the ‘Global North’ amongst the main contributors and the overrepresentation of the ‘Global South’ amongst the main victims. Current frameworks as the Temporary Protection Directive and the UN Guiding Principles are not able to fulfil the EU’s role as a protector of climate change migrants. The precautionary principle, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, and the principle of non-refoulement may be a guide to better tools to fulfil this role.Show less
The Dutch Socialist Party (SP) has often been categorised as a populist and (soft) Eurosceptic party. Lately, however, the party’s Eurosceptic and populist degree have been called into question....Show moreThe Dutch Socialist Party (SP) has often been categorised as a populist and (soft) Eurosceptic party. Lately, however, the party’s Eurosceptic and populist degree have been called into question. Some scholars claimed that the party’s Euroscepticism is becoming ambiguous, whereas others diverge on the SP’s populist nature. Some scholars (i.e., March, 2011; Otjes and Louwerse, 2015) claim that the SP is a populist party portraying the main characteristics of anti-elitism and people-centrism. Others in contrast, stress that the SP is not populist (e.g., Lucardie & Voerman, 2012). Accordingly, this research elaborates on two issues. First, a better understanding is grasped towards the party’s Eurosceptic and populist views. This is done alongside the frameworks provided by Vasilopoulou (2018), Keith (2017), Mudde, (2004) and Hameleers (2018). Secondly, this research examines whether the party has been shifting in its populist and Eurosceptic degree over the past few years in which emphasis is placed on the timeframe 2014-2021. As a result, the research question central to this thesis is: How can the Eurosceptic and populist character of the SP be understood and in what ways did the party shift in their Eurosceptic and populist degree between 2014 and 2021? Qualitative methods in the form of content analysis have accordingly been employed. Party manifestos and additional primary sources such as speeches and electoral campaigning videos have been selected and analysed. Based on the analysis of the main sources, the final results of this thesis reveal that the SP can be categorised as conditional Eurosceptic and populist. The party shows a constant Eurosceptic level, but its populist degree is shifting constantly. This seems to be a result both electoral success, poor electoral performances and party leadership change.Show less
